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I. INTRODUCTION
SUBORBITAL FLIGHTS HAVE BEEN characterized as vehi-cles with the potential to rapidly transport people and cargo
great distances while also offering relatively inexpensive “access
to space.”1 Given their unique technological design, however,
suborbital flights evade regulation under a specific regime due
to overlapping subsets of international law. Suborbital vehicles
spend time in airspace (requiring the application of air law) as
well as outer space (requiring the application of space law). This
Article proposes a solution to the regulation of suborbital flights
in a manner that bridges both aviation and space law.
A. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND OF SUBORBITAL FLIGHTS
A suborbital flight can be best described by what it is not,
namely, an orbital flight. The differences between suborbital
and orbital flights are the duration, angle, and speed with which
a given space object enters, traverses, and exits what is consid-
ered “outer space.”2 Orbital flights are characterized by a space
object escaping Earth’s gravity and reaching a speed great
enough to ensure that it “falls past” Earth as it rotates around
the planet.3 A suborbital flight is one where a space object es-
1 Jeff Foust, What is the Future for Commercial Suborbital Spaceflight?, SPACE REV.
(Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3915/1 [https://
perma.cc/5CJE-XELS].
2 For a discussion on what amounts to “outer space,” see infra Part III.A.
3 Adam Mann, What’s the Difference Between Orbital and Suborbital Spaceflight?,
SPACE.COM (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.space.com/suborbital-orbital-flight.html
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capes Earth’s gravity but does not reach a sufficient speed to
outrun the planet and therefore re-enters the atmosphere
before it has made a complete rotation around Earth.4 Subor-
bital flights, therefore, require enough energy to reach outer
space but not so much as to sustain an orbit (or multiple orbits)
around the planet.5 The International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion (ICAO) presented a concept paper at a United Nations Of-
fice for Outer Space Affairs event in 2005 (discussed further
below) that defined suborbital flights as “a flight up to a very
high altitude which does not involve sending the vehicle into
orbit.”6 The global community distinguishes suborbital flights
from orbital flights in that the former “are not intended to, and
never actually enter, Earth orbit.”7
Suborbital flights are thus meant to provide access to outer
space without completing an orbit of the planet. One of the ad-
vantages of a suborbital flight is that it requires neither the same
amount of fuel to reach and maintain an orbital velocity nor the
technology to withstand the rigors of a high-speed re-entry
through the Earth’s atmosphere (depending on the height of
the suborbital flight and in comparison to an orbital flight),
thereby vastly reducing the cost of accessing space.8 As a result
of this reduced cost, suborbital flights are expected to become
accessible to more consumers.9
[https://perma.cc/8W5R-G6BU]; David Doody, Orbiting a Real Planet, in BASICS
OF SPACE FLIGHT ch. 3, at 4 (Blaine Baggett ed., 2017) (ebook), https://solarsys
tem.nasa.gov/basics/chapter3-4/ [https://perma.cc/Y5UX-UCEG?type=image].
4 See, e.g., Mann, supra note 3; Sara M. Langston, First Space Tourists Will Face Big




5 See, e.g., Mann, supra note 3; Langston, supra note 4.
6 Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Working Paper, Concept of Sub-Orbital Flights, at
1.2, ICAO Doc. C-WP/12436 (May 30, 2005) [hereinafter ICAO Concept Paper].
This paper was presented to the Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on March 19, 2010, at which time the ICAO
Secretariat expressed its belief that the paper remained pertinent. Comm. on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal. Subcomm. on Its Forty-Ninth
Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2010/CRP.9 (2010).
7 GLOBAL SPACE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY 130 (Ram S. Jakhu &
Joseph N. Pelton eds., 2017).
8 See Lizi Gregory, Quick Guide: Suborbital vs Orbital Flights, EXOS AEROSPACE
(Apr. 5, 2016), https://exosaero.com/2016/04/05/suborbital-vs-orbital-flights/
[https://perma.cc/63JN-2LV3?type=image].
9 Foust, supra note 1.
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B. RECENT COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENTS
Suborbital technology is actively improving. While suborbital
flights typically transported experimental payloads in the past,10
the beginning of 2020 witnessed the announcement by the U.S.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) of a
Flight Opportunities program to allow researchers to accom-
pany their payloads on commercial suborbital vehicles.11 A num-
ber of private entities, including Virgin Galactic, Blue Origin
Federation, LLC (Blue Origin), and Space Exploration Tech-
nologies Corp. (SpaceX), are playing a significant role in the
development of both the technology of and the business case for
such flights.12 For example, Virgin Galactic has now entered into
an agreement with the Italian Air Force to fly payloads and three
persons on a SpaceShipTwo suborbital flight,13 while newer
commercial entities such as Dawn Aerospace are also planning
to enter the suborbital market.14 The technology employed by
these companies, however, varies. Blue Origin’s New Shepard
rocket, for instance, is aimed at an eleven-minute spaceflight
and involves launching a rocket through airspace with six peo-
ple on board.15 It would remain in outer space for only a few
minutes, after which the rocket would detach from the capsule
carrying passengers, and the capsule would deploy parachutes
10 See Jeff Foust, New Shepard Carries Research Payloads on Latest Suborbital Test
Flight, SPACENEWS (Jan. 23, 2019), https://spacenews.com/new-shepard-carries-
research-payloads-on-latest-suborbital-test-flight [https://perma.cc/LBD5-
R9WY]; Stephanie Strom, Six Suborbital Research Payloads from MIT Fly to Space and
Back, MIT NEWS (May 3, 2019), http://news.mit.edu/2019/space-and-back-six-
suborbital-research-payloads-mit-media-lab-0503 [https://perma.cc/C8S9-
JHLN].
11 Jeff Foust, NASA to Allow Researchers to Fly on Commercial Suborbital Vehicles,
SPACENEWS (Jan. 31, 2020), https://spacenews.com/nasa-to-allow-researchers-to-
fly-on-commercial-suborbital-vehicles/ [https://perma.cc/CB3P-GYGE].
12 Commercial Suborbital Flight Providers, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/director-
ates/spacetech/flightopportunities/flightproviders [https://perma.cc/ZSJ5-
PVEC].
13 Jeff Foust, Virgin Galactic to Fly Italian Air Force Research Mission, SPACENEWS
(Oct. 2, 2019), https://spacenews.com/virgin-galactic-to-fly-italian-air-force-re
search-mission/ [https://perma.cc/WCW7-2P7E].
14 Dawn Aerospace recently sought national permission to launch suborbital
spaceflights from Oamaru Airport, New Zealand. Press Release, Dawn Aerospace,
MOU for Suborbital Flights Out of Oamaru Airport (Jan. 17, 2020), https://
www.dawnaerospace.com/blog/waitaki-district-council-mou [https://perma.cc/
CK2C-MB5M].
15 See New Shepard Mission Profile, BLUE ORIGIN, https://www.blueorigin.com/
new-shepard/ [https://perma.cc/44FN-NFYK].
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during its return to Earth.16 Virgin Galactic intends to deploy its
WhiteKnightTwo aircraft to “air launch” the reusable winged
spacecraft SpaceShipTwo to approximately 50,000 feet, after
which SpaceShipTwo will modify its wings and tail to commence
re-entry back to Earth.17 Such developments illustrate the tech-
nological implications of such activities and highlight the poten-
tial regulatory complexities surrounding suborbital technology,
as it attracts both international air and space law.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW
No discussion of air law, space law, or their relation to subor-
bital flights can take place without first appreciating, and second
understanding, the origins of public international law. The dis-
cussions related to suborbital flights, therefore, start in the un-
likely and tumultuous epoch of seventeenth century Europe,
following a cessation in hostilities of the Thirty Years War.18 In
1648, following a grueling decades-long war over religious ideo-
logical inconsistencies, the numerous fragmented powers in Eu-
rope agreed, in a series of treaties signed in the region of
Westphalia, to refrain from interfering in their neighbors’ do-
mestic affairs.19 This obligation was accompanied by the recipro-
cal right of a State that neighbors would not involve themselves
in their own domestic affairs.20
Although not specifically enumerated in the treaties that led
to the Peace of Westphalia,21 two founding principles of interna-
tional law have emerged from this mutual exchange of rights
and obligations, namely, State sovereignty and the equality of
States.22 State sovereignty describes the unlimited authority of a
16 Id.
17 See Learn, VIRGIN GALACTIC, https://www.virgingalactic.com/learn/ [https:/
/perma.cc/BA6J-MN49].
18 See Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sover-
eignty, 21 INT’L HIST. REV. 569, 569 (1999).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 582.
21 Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian
Myth, 55 INT’L ORG. 251, 266 (2001).
22 See generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Anne Orford & Florian Hoffman eds., 2016). Scholars Havel and Sanchez stated
that “the principle of State sovereignty, that is, a State’s exclusive and indepen-
dent control over its geographic territory, including over those persons who
abide within that territory, has been recognized (with caveats) among Western
States since at least the Treaty of Westphalia (1648).” See BRIAN F. HAVEL &
GABRIEL S. SANCHEZ, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AVIATION
LAW 17 (2014).
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sovereign (whether it be a democratically elected government, a
republic of city-States, a monarchy, etc.) within its own bounda-
ries.23 Equality of States describes the recognition that all sover-
eigns are equally sovereign with their neighbors, thereby
removing any hierarchy of sovereignty.24 Acting in concert,
these twin principles ensure, theoretically, that a sovereign has
absolute authority to carry on as it sees fit within its jurisdiction,
without worry that neighboring States may interfere.25 Without
foreign interference, States can only interact with one another
on the basis of predetermined and prescribed rules.26 These
rules have come to develop into what is now recognized as inter-
national law.27
Today, therefore, any instance of States interacting with each
other is based on the understanding that both must agree to
move forward—one State cannot impose its will on another.28
This is true of issues related to international trade, human rights
standards, and environmental protection.29 Of course, this also
applies to international transportation. When States agree on
certain issues, they create records of their intentions and the
explicit rules on which they are to interact.30 The resulting crea-
tion of international law is explicitly documented and formal-
ized in the form of a treaty (a written agreement) or implicitly
crystallized in the form of custom (unwritten and unspoken
agreements that all parties recognize as binding).31
Once a State has agreed to a specific international law, they
are bound to follow through on the commitments espoused in
that law.32 This binding obligation arises from the concept of
State responsibility, which is in turn formed by the principles of
23 See Hans Kelsen, The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for Interna-
tional Organization, 53 YALE L.J. 207, 207–8 (1944).
24 See id. at 208–09.
25 See id. at 207–09.
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See id. at 209; Benedict Kingsbury, The International Legal Order, in THE OX-
FORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 274 (Mark Tushnet & Peter Cane eds., 2005).
29 See, e.g., Soyoung Jung, A State’s Sovereign Rights and Obligations in the WTO to
Harmonize Environmental Policies, 21 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 461, 467–68 (2013).
30 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1062.
31 See id.
32 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Treaties as Binding International Obligation, 2 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L., May 14, 1997, at 1, https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/2/issue/4/
treaties-binding-international-obligation [https://perma.cc/8WHX-GY66].
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State sovereignty and equality of States.33 The International Law
Commission, widely recognized as the most highly qualified ex-
perts of international law, adopted the Articles on State Respon-
sibility (ASR), which elaborated on norms of international
responsibility.34 While the ASR cannot be considered a treaty, it
has nonetheless acquired increasing authority as an expression
of the customary law of State responsibility.35
According to the ASR, “[e]very internationally wrongful act of
a State entails international responsibility of that State.”36 The
ASR deems a State’s conduct “internationally wrongful” when its
conduct, “consisting of an action or omission, (a) is attributable
to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a
breach of an international obligation of th[at] State.”37 The ASR
further stipulates that “[t]he State responsible for the interna-
tionally wrongful act is under an obligation: (a) to cease that
act”; and “(b) to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of
non-repetition,” in addition to making “full reparation for the
injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.”38 The ASR’s
true utility, therefore, is its encapsulation of the consequences
when a sovereign State fails to abide by the rules it has agreed to
follow. Without the ASR’s established process for how to address
a State that has failed to uphold its obligations, States would
have no legitimate reason to abide by the very rules they
establish.
A. AIR LAW
Transportation by air has a rich history, originating in the late
nineteenth century and continuing to develop to this day.39 In
the years following the World Wars, the aviation industry grew
33 HAVEL & SANCHEZ, supra note 22, at 7–11.
34 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internation-
ally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the
Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ASR].
The Articles were commended “to the attention of Governments” by the U.N.
General Assembly in 2002. G.A. Res. 56/83, Responsibility of States for Interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002).
35 JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 523
(9th ed. 2019).
36 ASR, supra note 34, art. 1; see also MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
569 (7th ed. 2014).
37 ASR, supra note 34, art. 2; see also SHAW, supra note 36, at 569.
38 ASR, supra note 34, arts. 30–31.
39 Aerospace History Timeline, AM. INST. AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS, https://
www.aiaa.org/about/History-and-Heritage/History-Timeline [https://perma.cc/
R8U4-EGY3].
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considerably and, with growing competition, certain interna-
tional laws were devised to ensure safety, security, and related
features of international air transportation.40 It is necessary to
acknowledge that the existing international air law framework
that applies to everyday aviation would also apply to suborbital
flights; since a suborbital flight would, for example, take off
from the United States and land in Canada, it would be re-
quired to comply with requisite bilateral agreements, interna-
tional conventions, and general standards and practices.
1. Chicago Convention
The Chicago Convention of 1944 (Chicago Convention)41 is a
multilateral treaty42 that addresses international civil aviation.
During the negotiations of the treaty, which occurred around
the end of World War II, the States involved agreed that their
well-defined and generally accepted territorial sovereignty
would be extended vertically to include the airspace above their
physical territory.43 Fundamentally, the same way traversing
through the territory of a State would require the explicit per-
mission of that State by virtue of its sovereignty,44 traveling over
a territory through the airspace of a State would now also re-
quire its explicit permission.45
40 The History of ICAO and the Chicago Convention, INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG.,
https://www.icao.int/about-icao/History/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc
/9UQ6-JF6P].
41 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
42 Current Lists of Parties to Multilateral Air Law Treaties, INT’L CIVIL AVIATION
ORG., https://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/Chicago
_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/UES3-J7TU] (listing signatories to the Chicago Con-
vention). When a State signs a treaty, it expresses both its willingness to engage in
further steps of the adoption process and its acknowledgment not to engage in
acts that defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. See Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, arts. 10, 12(2)(b), 14, 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
On the contrary, the act of ratification expresses the State’s consent to be bound
by the terms of the treaty. Id. arts. 2(1)(b), 14–16.
43 Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art. 1.
44 See, e.g., Applying for Admission into United States, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/travel/international-visitors/applying-admission-
united-states# [https://perma.cc/32Y3-DDGQ].
45 Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art. 1. The Chicago Convention re-
quires State consent for all transit, except transit through the airspace over the
High Seas. Id.; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 87, 89,
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16,
1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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The Chicago Convention reinforces State sovereignty over air-
space through several provisions, including the requirement
that a State first acquire special permission before operating in-
ternational air services through another State’s airspace.46 Addi-
tionally, the convention distinguishes between scheduled and
non-scheduled air services, in that the latter enjoy fewer restric-
tions and are permitted to make stops for non-traffic purposes.47
The Chicago Convention notably established the United Na-
tions’ ICAO as the organization responsible for regulating inter-
national air transportation and defining its organizational
objectives.48 These objectives primarily focus on the develop-
ment of a safe and efficient global air transportation industry.49
In addition, the convention also provides clauses on the nation-
ality and registration of aircraft (discussed in detail below).50
2. Bilateral Agreement
Although the Chicago Convention succeeded in a number of
areas (such as the creation of ICAO and establishing the basic
legal norms related to aviation), it did not establish the specific
rules or regulations related to commercial air travel between dif-
ferent jurisdictions.51 As a result, there emerged over the next
several decades a series of agreements between individual na-
tions and groups of nations establishing the nature of their re-
spective civil aviation relationships.52 These bilateral and
multilateral air services agreements establish specifics related to
air travel between jurisdictions and cover topics as varied as the
number of routes allowed between countries, the number of
daily, weekly, monthly, and annual flights, the total passenger-
carrying capacity of all flights, and the flight paths to avoid.53
46 Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art. 6.
47 Id. art. 5; see also PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW
57–58 (2d ed. 2017).
48 Chicago Convention, supra note 41, arts. 43–44.
49 Id. art. 44.
50 Id. arts. 17–21; Part II.A.3, infra.
51 DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 658–62 (citing Chicago Convention, supra note
41).
52 Id. at 661–728; see also, e.g., Full List of Air Transport Agreements and Record
Documents, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/full-list-of-air-transport-
agreements-and-record-documents/ [https://perma.cc/L9KX-XCXP].
53 DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 734–810. Most bilateral agreements contain provi-
sions to address these points, including Canada’s bilateral agreements with other
States. E.g., Agreement between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Canada
Relating to Air Transport Between the Netherlands and Canada, Can.-Neth.,
June 2, 1989, 2247 U.N.T.S. 215. For example, the bilateral agreement between
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These provisions are influenced by each State’s national aviation
policy, resulting in different forms of bilateral and multilateral
agreements regarding the exchange of rights in international
aviation, known as “freedoms.”54
The five freedom rights of air transport are comprised of (1)
the right of one State to fly across the territory of the other State
without landing; (2) the right of one State to land (in respect of
scheduled international air services) in the territory of the other
State for non-traffic purposes; (3) the right of one State to fly
commercially and offload traffic in the other State’s territory;
(4) the inverse right to fly from another State and take on traffic
destined for the home State; and (5) the right granted by one
State to another State to both put down and take on, in the
territory of the first State, traffic either coming from or destined
for a third State.55
Liberal agreements that involve a broad exchange of rights
between States, including the freedoms of the air, are termed
“open skies agreements.”56 Although the nature of these agree-
ments has evolved over the last few decades to include a broader
exchange of rights,57 the reality is that such agreements between
States are still required, even in “open skies” situations, because
each State retains control and sovereignty over its airspace.58
Canada and the Netherlands contains provisions on agreed routes, tariff, desig-
nation, and capacity. Id. art. X, annex.
54 DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 731.
55 Thomas Jérémie Hayden-Lefebvre, The Five Freedoms of Aviation & Why They
Matter, SIMPLE FLYING (July 1, 2019), https://simpleflying.com/five-freedoms-avia
tion/ [https://perma.cc/MWY8-D9QV]; Freedoms of the Air, INT’L CIVIL AVIATION
ORG., https://www.icao.int/Pages/freedomsAir.aspx [https://perma.cc/PF5P-
D4QN] (citing Int’l Civil. Aviation Org. [ICAO], Manual on the Regulation of
International Air Transport, pt. 4, ICAO Doc. 9626 (3d ed. 2018) [hereinafter
ICAO Manual]). There are also the additional “so-called” sixth, seventh, eighth,
and ninth freedom rights. Freedoms of the Air, supra note 55. These are “so-called”
freedoms because these rights have not been incorporated into any of the widely
recognized air services agreements. Id.
56 DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 668; Fact Sheet: Open Skies Partnerships, U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE (Sept. 16, 2016), https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/pl/262022.htm
[https://perma.cc/FR7Z-D3P4].
57 DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 657; HAVEL & SANCHEZ, supra note 22, at 70–71;
Bruce Stockfish, Opening Closed Skies: The Prospects for Further Liberalization of Trade
in International Air Transport Services, 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 599, 600–27 (1992).
58 Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art. 1; Dempsey, supra note 47, at 728;
Freedoms of the Air, supra note 55. Such agreements generally involve an exchange
of first to fifth freedom landing rights for scheduled international air services as
opposed to their traditional predecessors which only laid down permissible
points of travel. RACHEL Y. TANG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44016, INTERNATIONAL AIR
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Open skies agreements, therefore, refer to agreements that have
as their aim the liberalization of air transport between two
States; nevertheless, some States prefer more protectionist poli-
cies and, therefore, enter into bilateral agreements with a lim-
ited exchange of such rights.59
3. Nationality of Airlines and Registration of Aircraft
When States exchange traffic rights through bilateral air ser-
vices agreements, a clause regarding the “nationality” of the air-
line is usually included as a condition for such exchange.60
Known as the “nationality rule,” the clause often stipulates that
each State’s airline must be substantially owned and effectively
controlled by the home State or its citizens.61 Notably, there is a
difference between “nationality of airlines” and “nationality of
SERVICE CONTROVERSIES: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1–2 (2015). Further,
clauses on capacity and frequency of flights are now unrestricted under such
agreements, curtailed only by competition laws and the Chicago Convention. Id.
at 1; DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 775–82. Similarly, flight routes and designations
are not limited. DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 734–42. Regarding pricing, the more
conservative bilateral agreements involve rates being set by individual carriers
and filed with aviation authorities, sometimes endorsing the International Air
Transport Association “rate-making machinery.” Id. at 765–74. On the contrary,
the more liberal pricing provision is a “double disapproval” mechanism, wherein
the carrier-proposed rate goes into effect and requires disapproval by the govern-
ments of the participating States before the rate is rejected. See Steven Green-
house, One Europe, but Many Airlines, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 1989), https://
www.nytimes.com/1989/10/30/business/one-europe-but-many-airlines.html
[https://perma.cc/VQ8H-8YWH]. In addition, given that open skies agreements
are pro-competition, they incorporate standards of reasonableness, non-discrimi-
nation and most-favored state treatment with respect to different “soft rights”
such as taxes, fuel and ground-handling. DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 783–96; see
also, e.g., Air Transport Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the
Government of the United States of America, Can.-U.S., Mar. 12, 2007, T.I.A.S.
No. 07-312 [hereinafter U.S.-Canada ASA].
59 DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 731. Open skies agreements are only one form of
air service agreements (ASAs): under Canada’s national “Blue Sky Policy” there
are only twenty-two open skies agreements, and thirty “expanded agreements”
with other countries. The Blue Sky Policy: Made in Canada, for Canada, GOV’T OF
CAN., https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/policy/air-bluesky-menu-2989.htm [https://
perma.cc/H4V3-849Q]. The latter category of agreements “modifies an existing
bilateral agreement” to grant greater flexibility to the carriers involved. Id.
60 DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 743–48.
61 See HAVEL & SANCHEZ, supra note 22, at 69–70. The delegates of the Chicago
Conference first agreed on the incorporation of this rule in the Two Freedoms
and Five Freedoms Agreements. Id. at 87–88 (citing International Air Services
Transit Agreement art. 1, § 5, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1693, 84 U.N.T.S. 389; Inter-
national Air Transport Agreement art. 1, § 6, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1701, 171
U.N.T.S. 387).
398 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [85
aircraft.” Article 17 of the Chicago Convention states that aircraft
have the nationality of the State in which they are registered,62
but the convention is silent on the nationality of an airline.63 For
this reason, the nationality of airlines is established by national
laws through the approval of the domestic aviation authority,
which will issue an Air Operator’s Certificate (AOC) to an air-
line upon approval.64 For example, the AOC issued by Trans-
port Canada (Canada’s federal department that oversees
transportation related matters) to Air Canada demonstrates that
Air Canada is incorporated and constituted under Canadian
laws.65
To reinforce the nationality connection between airlines and
their home States, bilateral agreements require that the desig-
nated airlines66 must have their principal place of business in
the designating State.67 Registration is one of the key factors that
determine the airline’s principal place of business.68 Similar to
the difference between the nationality of an airline and the na-
tionality of an aircraft, the registration of an airline and the re-
gistration of an aircraft also differ (including with respect to the
registration of the individual aircraft flown by an airline). Regis-
tration of the airline involves the process described above,
whereby a company registers in a State’s territory, upon which
the company is granted an AOC from the State’s national avia-
62 Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art. 17.
63 DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 62.
64 HAVEL & SANCHEZ, supra note 22, at 340–41; DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at
62–63, 159; e.g., Applying for an Air Operator’s Certificate, GOV’T OF CAN., https://
tc.canada.ca/en/aviation/publications/starting-commercial-air-service-tp-8880/
21-applying-air-operator-certificate [https://perma.cc/XV4C-6KRZ].
65 View Operator Details: Air Canada, GOV’T OF CAN., https://wwwapps.tc.gc.ca/
saf-sec-sur/2/CAS-SAC/olsrles.aspx?lang=eng (search for “Air Canada” in “Legal
or Trade Name” search bar) (last visited Oct. 13, 2020).
66 Designated airlines are the airlines identified in the bilateral agreement and
granted permission to travel to the other State. DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at
734–38. Therefore, both States are designating States, because both countries
agree on designated airlines. Id.
67 ICAO Manual, supra note 55, pt. 4.4. The ICAO Manual defines “principal
place of business” to require that the airline be
established and incorporated in the territory of the designating
party in accordance with [that State’s laws], has a substantial
amount of its operations and capital investment in physical facilities
in the territory of the designating party, pays income tax, registers
and bases its aircraft there, and employs a significant number of
nationals in managerial, technical and operational positions.
Id.
68 See id.
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tion authority.69 Registration of aircraft, on the other hand, oc-
curs on a State’s national registry, and ownership of these
individual aircraft can be transferred to different entities outside
of the nation in which they are originally registered.70 The air-
craft of an airline are thus not always registered in the State
where the airline is incorporated.71 For example, British Airways
can “own aircraft that operate out of the United Kingdom
(U.K.),” but the aircraft may be “registered in Australia or Ja-
pan.” Alternatively, British Airways could operate aircraft that
are “registered in the U.K.,” but those aircraft may actually be
“owned by Australian or Japanese lessors.”72 The concept of re-
gistration of both airlines and aircraft thus facilitates operations
across multiple jurisdictions and encourages broad forms of in-
ternational aircraft financing.73
Although the Chicago Convention is silent on registration or
nationality of airlines, it does mention that registration of an
aircraft can be transferred.74 Article 83 was introduced in 1997
to explicitly permit the transfer of responsibility (primarily in
cases of international aircraft leasing) from the State of registry
(i.e., the aircraft’s nationality) to the State where the operator of
the aircraft has its principal place of business or permanent resi-
dence.75 International aircraft financing has since been globally
streamlined by the Cape Town Convention76 and its supporting
Protocol.77 This mechanism facilitates the creation of a uni-
formly recognized security interest in aviation assets and pro-
vides remedies to creditors in the event of a default.78
Significantly, the drafters of the Cape Town Convention also in-
69 See Part II.A.3, infra.
70 Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art. 19, annex 7; Sir Roy Goode, Asset
Identification Under the Cape Town Convention and Protocols, 81 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 135 (2018) (discussing international sale of aircraft and associated regis-
tration processes).
71 HAVEL & SANCHEZ, supra note 22, at 341.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 328–32.
74 Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art. 19.
75 Id. art. 83.
76 Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001,
T.I.A.S. No. 06-301.2, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter Cape Town Convention].
77 Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment
on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, S. Treaty Doc. No. 108-
10, 2367 U.N.T.S. 517.
78 Cape Town Convention, supra note 76, arts. 1, 8–13.
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troduced a protocol for space assets in 2012, although this pro-
tocol has not been ratified.79
4. ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
Most international rules and regulations related to aviation
emerge as a result of an ICAO Standard and Recommended
Practice (SARP), which are introduced as annexes to the Chi-
cago Convention.80 Although Article 12 of the Chicago Conven-
tion imposes a general obligation on States to keep their own
regulations uniform with those established under the agree-
ment, it does not specifically make a reference to SARPs.81 Nev-
ertheless, SARPs are the result of extensive ICAO committee
discussions dedicated to improving the safety and efficiency of
commercial aviation by creating widespread “uniformity in regu-
lations, standards, procedures, and organization.”82 Although
SARPs are not legally binding on States, States that find it “im-
practicable to comply” with an existing standard or procedure
must notify ICAO under Article 38.83
While actual compliance with the SARPs (as well as the afore-
said reporting) is not obligatory, many bilateral aviation agree-
ments contain clauses requiring a State’s commitment to
implement SARPs.84 Therefore, a failure to comply with SARPs
may amount to a violation of an air traffic agreement (a binding
treaty between two or more States) and result in other State par-
ties to the agreement prohibiting flights to or from a non-com-
pliant State’s jurisdiction (a legitimate international legal
consequence of failing to uphold an international obligation).
Although ICAO does not have the power to compel non-per-
forming States to adhere to SARPs, there remain indirect sanc-
79 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law [UNIDROIT], Pro-
tocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Mat-
ters Specific to Space Assets (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.unidroit.org/english/
conventions/mobile-equipment/spaceassets-protocol-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J5RG-QS5R].
80 DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 69, 72–73; Chicago Convention, supra note 41,
art. 37.
81 DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 71; Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art. 12.
82 DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 69–70; Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art.
37.
83 DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 73–74; Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art.
38.
84 E.g., Air Transport Agreement Between the United States and Brazil, Braz.-
U.S., art. 6, Mar. 21, 2018, T.I.A.S. 18–521; U.S.-Canada ASA, supra note 58, art.
14.
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tions for non-compliance as reflected in the national policies of
both the United States and the European Union (EU). The U.S.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) assigns ratings to foreign
aviation authorities based on their compliance with SARPs and,
on the basis of this rating system, prohibits poorly rated States
from serving the U.S. market.85 The EU has a different ap-
proach by which it “blacklists” airlines that do not meet SARPs
or additional standards under EU law, preventing them from
serving their market.86 Although these two mechanisms are em-
bedded entirely in their respective domestic legal systems, they
ensure other States implement SARPs in their own jurisdictions,
as all States desire access to U.S. and EU markets. For these rea-
sons, even though SARPs are non-binding, States typically en-
sure that they implement them in their jurisdictions.
5. Domestic Aviation Law
Since States have exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above
their territories, they are free to determine their own domestic
aviation rules, including the licensing of their carriers, establish-
ing airport regulations, implementing security requirements,
among other rules.87 Given the international character of avia-
tion, however, most jurisdictions choose to impose the same re-
quirements on domestic flights as they do on international
flights to remain consistent and facilitate interactions between
various airlines, airports, and passengers.88
85 DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 110–20; International Aviation Safety Assessment
(IASA) Program, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/
iasa/ [https://perma.cc/84Z9-WU7S].
86 DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 121–30; Commission Regulation 2111/2005 of
Dec. 14, 2005, On the Establishment of a Community List of Air Carriers Subject
to an Operating Ban within the Community and on Informing Air Transport
Passengers of the Identity of the Operating Air Carrier, and Repealing Article 9
of Directive 2004/36/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 344); Commission Regulation 473/2006
of Mar. 22, 2006, Laying Down Implementing Rules for the Community List of
Air Carriers Which Are Subject to an Operating Ban within the Community Re-
ferred to in Chapter II of Regulation (EC) No. 2111/2005 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council, 2006 O.J. (L 84).
87 DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 54–57.
88 For example, if international standards require a red blinking light on the
right wing of a plane and a white blinking light on the left wing, all international
carriers would have to implement such lighting systems on their aircraft. How-
ever, a State is free to determine whether to impose the same lighting system on
purely domestic flights. Notwithstanding this liberty, to avoid potentially hazard-
ous interactions between international and domestic flights (with regard to the
pilots, air traffic control operators, airport personnel, etc.), most jurisdictions re-
402 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [85
Due to such harmonized domestic regulation, international
aviation has encroached on the functional concept of State sov-
ereignty. While the traditional concept of State sovereignty re-
mains in place, the independent decisions of a State on purely
domestic affairs have evolved to maintain compliance with the
objectives of the Chicago Convention. Some States have
adopted a more flexible and functional approach to sovereignty
to accommodate today’s international aviation marketplace. Al-
though a completely legitimate consequence of international
law (such that a State makes the conscious decision to partici-
pate in international aviation activities knowing that it will likely
concede some of its sovereignty), there is value in acknowledg-
ing this reality. This approach has accommodated, for example,
the emergence of the EU as a single aviation market (such that
independent European States relinquish a degree of control
over their individual jurisdictions in exchange for a harmonized
continental system),89 as well as the increasing conferral of re-
sponsibility to ICAO on issues such as security and safety.90
States thus legally retain exclusive sovereignty over their air-
space, but practically ensure uniformity and efficiency in air
transport by way of domestic rules that mimic international stan-
dards. This evolving nature of sovereignty is particularly relevant
when considering the regulatory framework that may appropri-
ately oversee cross-border suborbital flights.
B. SPACE LAW
The law that governs outer space has evolved over time, begin-
ning with declarations and treaties and now characterized by
principles, norms, and guidelines. Notwithstanding the legal en-
forceability of these various instruments, in combination, they
today make up the corpus of international space law and apply
to governmental and non-governmental activities that are car-
ried out in outer space.91 While suborbital flights may spend rel-
quire domestic flights to comply with international standards since all flights
share the same airspace and land-based infrastructure.
89 See Esteban Coito & Benjamin Klaus Wilhelm Blaser, Air Transport: Market
Rules, FACT SHEET ON EUR. UNION (Feb. 2020), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/
factsheets/en/sheet/131/air-transport-market-rules [https://perma.cc/L7MW-
3CSK].
90 HAVEL & SANCHEZ, supra note 22, at 172–82, 185–89; Esteban Coito & Benja-
min Klaus Wilhelm Blaser, Aviation Safety, FACT SHEET ON EUR. UNION (Feb.
2020), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/134/aviation-
safety [https://perma.cc/6CWU-G6WE].
91 DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 936–40.
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atively less time in the domain of outer space than they do in
airspace, international space law nevertheless applies, particu-
larly in cases of accident or damage.92 The applicable provisions
of the international space treaties and the historical background
from which they were introduced are presented below as a
means of demonstrating the underlying intentions of space law
and the manner in which it may differ from air law.
1. Historical and Contemporary Space Activities
The 1961 decision of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(Soviet Union) to send a cosmonaut into space aboard the Vos-
tok 1 was a demonstration of humanity’s ability and aptitude to
operate in the space domain.93 Alongside the Soviet Union, the
United States also undertook a series of space operations that
pushed humanity further into space with each successful under-
taking, culminating in the Moon landings of 1969 and the early
1970s.94 Given the extremely expensive nature of space opera-
tions, governmental agencies were at the helm of developing
and implementing nearly all of the earliest space technologies
and programs, with NASA (formerly the National Advisory Com-
mittee for Aeronautics) and Roscosmos (a part of the Russian
Federal Space Agency) leading the way.95 In fact, during the
height of the Cold War space race, the U.S. government devoted
an increasing percentage of its annual gross domestic product
to NASA and its related space activities.96 As a result, great ad-
vances in space technology led to the development of numerous
new activities that have since shaped human life on Earth. For
example, telecommunications systems, broadcasting services, re-
mote sensing innovations, and global navigation satellite system
92 Id. at 944–45.
93 Vostok, ENCYCL. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/technology/Vos
tok-Soviet-spacecraft [https://perma.cc/D353-ZNJF].
94 What Was the Apollo Program?, NASA (July 18, 2019), https://www.nasa.gov/
audience/forstudents/5-8/features/nasa-knows/what-was-apollo-program-
58.html [https://perma.cc/LJQ9-5TGP?type=image].
95 See This Day in History: NASA Created (July 29, 1958), HISTORY (July 27, 2020),
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/nasa-created [https://perma.cc/
Y76X-2E9L]; John M. Logsdon, Roskosmos, ENCYCL. BRITANNICA, https://
www.britannica.com/topic/Roskosmos [https://perma.cc/Z38K-VCM5].
96 J.H. CHAPMAN, P.A. FORSYTH, P.A. LAPP & G. N. PATTERSON, SCI. COUNCIL OF
CAN., UPPER ATMOSPHERE AND SPACE PROGRAMS IN CANADA 91 (1967).
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applications all originated with government-backed space
programs.97
Although largely advanced by public space programs, human-
ity’s reliance on space has started to shift from national space
agency activities to private space activities.98 The total invest-
ment in space technologies and space applications has shifted
from public expenditure to private investment, such that more
than 75% of 2018’s $360 billion space economy99 is now gener-
ated by private space companies, which is up from $345 billion
in 2016.100 As a result, the dynamics of space operations are rap-
idly changing: innovative applications are being developed for
market at a quicker pace and competition is enhancing the qual-
ity of product delivered to clients.101 For example, remote sens-
ing technologies now allow private space operators to provide
their clients with daily updates in a variety of formats and con-
stellations of telecommunication satellites will allow for unfet-
tered global Internet access.102 Of course, a number of private
entities are also working to provide commercial launch vehicles
to ferry consumers to space; some intend to provide suborbital
flights whereas others intend to deliver guests to orbiting space
hotels.103
97 See, e.g., NASA Benefits: At Home, NASA (July 29, 2004), https://www.nasa.
gov/audience/foreducators/k-4/features/F_NASA_Benefits_at_Home.html
[https://perma.cc/Q27K-YF99]; Highly Accurate GPS is Possible Thanks to NASA,
NASA (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.nasa.gov/directorates/spacetech/spinoff/
Highly_Accurate_GPS_Is_Possible_Thanks_to_NASA [https://perma.cc/Y6RC-
AFJQ].
98 FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 413–15 (2d ed.,
Routledge 2018).
99 2018 Global Space Economy, BRYCE SPACE & TECH. (2018), https://
brycetech.com/reports/report-documents/2018_Global_Space_Economy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5TQE-V5YS].
100 BRYCE SPACE & TECH., GLOBAL SPACE INDUSTRY DYNAMICS: RESEARCH PAPER
FOR AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY, INNOVATION AND SCI-
ENCE 3 (2017), https://brycetech.com/downloads/Global_Space_Industry_Dy
namics_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZD3-33Q5].
101 Id. at 11.
102 Id. at 9.
103 Elizabeth Howell, Virgin Galactic to Launch Its 1st Suborbital Spaceflight from
Spaceport America in October: Report, SPACE.COM (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.
space.com/virgin-galactic-spaceshiptwo-test-launch-october-2020.html [https://
perma.cc/HUK4-CYQZ]; Kate Baggaley, Huge Space Hotel Promises Fake Gravity and
‘Supersized Basketball’, NBC NEWS (Sept. 14, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/
mach/science/huge-space-hotel-promises-fake-gravity-supersized-basketball-ncna
1051596 [https://perma.cc/TTT8-D5TN].
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2. Outer Space Treaty
Although the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (Outer Space
Treaty) established innumerable principles related to space law,
for the purposes of this Article, some are more relevant than
others, namely: (1) the special status denoted to astronauts (Ar-
ticle V); (2) the role of States in overseeing private space activi-
ties (Article VI); (3) the attribution of liability to launching
States (Article VII); (4) the registration of space objects (Article
VIII); and (5) that all users of space must pay due regard to the
interests of other users (Article IX).104 Setting the tone for the
entire document, Article I requires that the exploration and use
of outer space must be carried out for the “benefit and in the
interests of all countries; irrespective of their degree of eco-
nomic or scientific development,” and further that outer space
is “the province of all mankind”; therefore, although a State is
free to explore and use outer space, its freedom is limited by the
subsequent provisions of the Outer Space Treaty.105
Prominent among these limitations is a State’s duty to bear
“international responsibility for national [space] activities”
(whether conducted by governmental or non-governmental en-
tities), as articulated in Article VI, imposing an obligation on all
States to ensure the authorization and continuing supervision of
the activities of all non-governmental entities in outer space.106
While the expressions “authorization” and “continuing supervi-
sion” are neither defined in the Outer Space Treaty nor further
clarified in the subsequent space treaties, States have inter-
preted both terms to mean, respectively, formal approvals by
way of a licensing process and continuous supervision through
license conditions as required by national law.107 This provision
has therefore resulted in a displaced law-making obligation from
the international to the national level, and is evidenced by the
numerous domestic laws in existence across jurisdictions.108 In
104 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
105 Id. art. I.
106 Id. art. VI.
107 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, National Laws Governing Commercial Space Activi-
ties: Legislation, Regulation, & Enforcement, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 6 (2016).
108 See generally GLOBAL SPACE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY, supra
note 7, at 87–112 (wherein scholars observe the trend toward national regula-
tions to ensure that space activities are approved and monitored by the responsi-
ble State government).
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comparison with the regulation of international air transport,
the regulation of activities in outer space demonstrates a clear
movement towards national law-making at the governmental
level, rather than the continued implementation of interna-
tional standards. This trend of domestic law-making can be at-
tributed, at least partially, to the growing commercialization of
outer space and the obligations of States that they regulate such
activities.
Another notable provision, Article IX of the Outer Space
Treaty, requires that States conduct activities in outer space with
“due regard to the corresponding interests of all other State Par-
ties.”109 The concept of due regard is reflected in international
law, the earliest treaty reference being Article 3 of the Chicago
Convention.110 With respect to outer space, the obligation of
due regard has been interpreted as “the performance of an act
with a certain standard of care, attention or observance.”111 Arti-
cle IX further provides that States are required to undertake in-
ternational consultations if they have reason to believe that their
activities may cause “potentially harmful interference with activi-
ties of other State Parties.”112 While this language does not im-
pose a concrete obligation on State Parties, Article IX has been
interpreted to create an obligation for States to conduct their
space activities with a standard degree of care.113
3. Agreement on the Rescue and Return of Astronauts
Under the Outer Space Treaty, astronauts are denoted a spe-
cial characterization as “envoys of mankind.”114 The status of as-
tronauts (or personnel of a spacecraft)115 is clarified by
provisions contained in a subsequent treaty, the Agreement on
109 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 104, art. IX.
110 See Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art. 3 (which exempted State air-
craft from complying with procedures established by ICAO and required that
these aircraft fly with “due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aviation.”).
111 Sergio Marchisio, Article IX, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW:
OUTER SPACE TREATY 569–70 (Stephen Hobe, Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd & Kai-
Uwe Schrogl eds., 2009).
112 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 104, art. IX.
113 John S. Goehring, Can We Address Orbital Debris with the International Law We
Already Have? An Examination of Treaty Interpretation and the Due Regard Principle, 85
J. AIR L. & COM. 309, 312–20 (2020).
114 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 104, art V.
115 The drafting history of the Rescue and Return Agreement suggests that the
use of the term “astronauts” in the Preamble and “personnel” in the body of the
treaty indicate that the terms have the same meaning. See Rep. of the Legal Sub-
Committee on the Work of the Second Part of its Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/
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the Rescue and Return of Astronauts and Space Objects of 1968
(Rescue and Return Agreement).116 Since the Rescue and Re-
turn Agreement refers only to “astronauts” and “personnel”
without explicitly defining either term, it is unclear whether the
provisions of the Rescue and Return Agreement will apply to all
space travelers, including space tourists aboard suborbital vehi-
cles. Whether this lack of State-appointed space voyagers (as op-
posed to, for example, NASA or European Space Agency
astronauts) will reduce the applicability of the rights and re-
sponsibilities afforded in the Rescue and Return Agreement is
yet to be seen.
While this ambiguity requires legislative attention, there is evi-
dence of customary international law that implies that travelers
aboard suborbital flights would nonetheless be afforded basic
rights in cases of emergency. The duty to render assistance in
situations of distress can be traced to the nineteenth century,
where the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1864 included a
provision for participating States to take care of the wounded,
the sick, and the shipwrecked in war at sea.117 This duty was in-
cluded in subsequent Red Cross Conventions, including the still
operating Geneva Red Cross Convention (II) of 1949.118 This
principle to render assistance in case of distress also transferred
over to the maritime environment, as demonstrated by Article
98(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
of 1982.119 The duty to aid and render assistance was also consid-
ered critical to the aviation environment in 1944, with a similar
provision appearing in Article 25 of the Chicago Convention.120
While discussing maritime regulation in 1956, the International
Law Commission acknowledged that the principle of rendering
assistance to those in distress qualified as customary interna-
AC.105/21 (1964); see also Francis Lyall, Who is an Astronaut? The Inadequacy of
Current International Law, 66 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 1613, 1614 (2010).
116 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched Into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672
U.N.T.S. 119.
117 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Ar-
mies in the Field art. 6, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (no longer in
force).
118 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 6,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
119 UNCLOS, supra note 45, art. 98(1).
120 Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art. 25.
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tional law.121 On this basis, the absence of a specific obligation
under the space treaties does not negate a State’s duty to render
assistance to travelers aboard suborbital flights, and customary
international law ensures that such travelers will receive basic
support in case of distress or emergency, regardless of whether
the suborbital vehicle is considered to be a space object or ordi-
nary aircraft.
4. Registration Convention
As an expansion of Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, the
Registration Convention of 1974 (Registration Convention)
aimed to increase the transparency and accessibility of informa-
tion related to space objects and aspired to promote coopera-
tion among States.122 In doing so, the Registration Convention
encouraged launching States to register their space objects by
granting compliant States explicit jurisdiction and control over
their objects in space.123 Therefore, in the great expanse of
outer space, where territoriality does not exist, some semblance
of ownership may exist over man-made space objects if a launch-
ing State properly registers said object in their national registry.
With respect to cross-border suborbital flights, although in
theory the vehicles may be considered space objects and, if regis-
tered, would provide ownership rights,124 in practice the Regis-
tration Convention would not apply. State practice for the
registration of orbital space objects—while desirable from the
perspective of transparency—is neither consistent nor uni-
form.125 Indeed, for suborbital vehicles that will likely only re-
main in space for a few hours, the licensing process would far
outlast the flight itself.126 Therefore, imposing a registration re-
quirement on suborbital flights would be ineffective and would
likely hamper the development of a suborbital marketplace. Al-
though the objectives of the Registration Convention are impor-
121 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Eight Session, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/104, art. 36 (1956).
122 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space pmbl.,
opened for signature Sept. 15, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S 15.
123 Id. art. III.
124 See id.
125 For documentation of delayed submissions of launches from numerous
States including spacefaring nations such as the United States and Russia, see
Ram S. Jakhu, Bhupendra Jasani & Jonathan C. McDowell, Critical Issues Related to
Registration of Space Objects and Transparency of Space Activities, 143 ACTA AS-
TRONAUTICA 406, 409–10 (2018).
126 See, e.g., Registration of Space Objects, 14 C.F.R. § 417(b) (2019).
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tant and worth pursuing, the mechanism of registering a
suborbital vehicle in national and UN registers is ill-suited to the
fleeting presence of a suborbital vehicle in space. Rather, by up-
holding Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty (namely, ensuring
a suborbital flight is carried out with due regard for the interests
of other space activities), the objectives of the Registration Con-
vention can be satisfied.
5. Liability Convention
The Liability Convention of 1971 expanded on Article VII of
the Outer Space Treaty and provided that the launching State of
a space object is liable for any damage caused by that space ob-
ject, whether the damage occurs during launch or operation,
and whether the damage occurs in space, on Earth, or to an
aircraft in flight.127 A launching State is defined as: (1) a State
that launches a space object; (2) a State that procures the
launch of a space object; (3) a State whose territory is used to
launch a space object; and (4) a State whose facility from which
a space object is launched.128 The Liability Convention also de-
notes that if the damage occurs in space between two or more
space objects, the launching State of the object that caused the
damage is liable on the basis of internationally recognized
fault;129 if the damage is caused on Earth or to an aircraft in
flight, the launching State is liable on the basis of absolute liabil-
ity (barring a finding that the injured party had acted with gross
negligence).130
In many instances, two or more States can be characterized as
the launching State of a space object, making them jointly and
severally liable for any damage caused by that space object.131
For example, if Maple Leaf Space (a Canadian company) was to
127 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects
arts. II–III, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability
Convention].
128 Id. art. I(c).
129 Id. art III. International jurisprudence suggests that international fault is
characterized as negligence, which is understood to be an infringement of the
duty of due diligence or due care. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment,
1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9); Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment,
2010 I.C.J. 425 (Apr. 20); see also Giuseppe Palmisano, Fault, MAX PLANCK EN-
CYCLS. PUB. INT’L L. (2007), http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL [https://
perma.cc/FK7T-FB63].
130 Liability Convention, supra note 127, art. II.
131 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 98, at 85–87; Liability Convention, supra note
127, art. IV.
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procure the launch of a satellite from Bald Eagle Rockets (a U.S.
company), and the object were to be launched from New Zea-
land, then all three—Canada, the United States, and New Zea-
land—would be launching States. If Maple Leaf Space’s satellite
were to cause damage, all three would be jointly and severally
liable. This remains true even if (as is the case in most instances)
only Canada (by way of Maple Leaf Space) had control over the
space object when it caused damage. To avoid the consequences
of being found liable for damage caused by a space object exclu-
sively under the control of another State, launching States often
enter into an indemnification agreement prior to launch to ap-
propriately protect the interests of the “bystander” States in case
damage is caused by a space object of which they are a launch-
ing State.132
6. Domestic Space Legislation
Domestic space laws fulfill an essential role in the regulation
of space activities, as they implement a State’s international legal
obligation to authorize the space activities of non-governmental
entities. By creating a national regulatory framework (embodied
by domestic space laws), a State provides legal clarity and cer-
tainty to its private space sector by precisely outlining the kinds
of space activities, minimum safety standards, orbital require-
ments, system disposal plans, and other regulations that a State
deems acceptable.
In some instances, the concretization of otherwise non-bind-
ing international norms into domestic space law (such as debris
mitigation requirements133 or the long-term sustainability of
outer space134), can influence the adoption of similar measures
in other jurisdictions. For example, as a major spacefaring na-
tion, the United States has been recognized for its ability to in-
fluence the development of global governance principles; by
making a concerted effort to tackle specific issues within its na-
tional legal regime, it sets the course for other States to follow,
or at the very least, consider implementing similar mecha-
132 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 98, at 87, 89–90.
133 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Comm., Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N.
Doc. ST/SPACE/49 (2010) http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/bst/COPUOS_SPACE_
DEBRIS_MITIGATION_GUIDELINES.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZEQ9-YBL4].
134 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. on Its Fifty-Ninth Ses-
sion, ¶¶ 125–38, annex, U.N. Doc. A/71/20 (2016).
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nisms.135 For example, when the United States enacted the
space resource law,136 soon thereafter Luxembourg followed137
and the United Arab Emirates announced that it too would en-
act similar legislation.138 This can be seen as a demonstration of
other nations following the United States’ lead in determining,
at a domestic level, principles of international law that are not
clearly defined or explained in the international space treaties.
The expectation is that, in the context of suborbital flights, the
United States may also assume a leading role in adopting new
regulations to facilitate suborbital flights. This includes the U.S.
Commercial Space Launch Amendment Act of 2004 (CSLAA),
which has defined the expressions “suborbital rocket” and “sub-
orbital trajectory” based on the unique technical features of
these vehicles.139 The CSLAA additionally stipulates the proce-
dure for issuance of permits for suborbital rockets under a pro-
vision for “experimental permits.”140
III. LEGAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS-BORDER
SUBORBITAL FLIGHTS
Notwithstanding the technological complexities associated
with suborbital flights, there are also significant legal complexi-
ties. Aside from simply determining how a State is to regulate
suborbital flights within its own jurisdiction (such as the efforts
already undertaken by the United States), there are additional
legal complexities associated with such transportation when con-
sidering that the significant benefits, and likely future volume of
flights, of suborbital transportation will be cross-border in
nature.
135 GLOBAL SPACE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY, supra note 7, at 108.
136 Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, 129
Stat. 704 (2015).
137 L’exploration et l’utilisation des ressources de l’espace [Exploration and
Use of Space Resources], No. 674 (July 20, 2017) (Lux.), http://data.legilux.pub-
lic.lu/file/eli-etat-leg-loi-2017-07-20-a674-jo-fr-pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VEX-
9PZY].
138 The UAE recently enacted its own legislation but chose to enact a compre-
hensive space law rather than a law specific to space resource exploitation. On




139 Commercial Space Launch Amendment Act, Pub. L. No. 108-492,
§ 2(b)(19)–(20), 118 Stat. 3974, 3976 (2004) [hereinafter CSLAA].
140 Id. § 70105a.
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A. THE DELIMITATION DEBATE
The regulation of suborbital flights is connected with the is-
sue of delimitation between airspace and outer space.141 Discus-
sions related to where airspace ends and where outer space
begins were never finalized during the negotiations of the space
treaties and continue to this day in the United Nations Commit-
tee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS).142 One
ideology favors a “spatialist” approach, believing that it is neces-
sary to delimitate a physical boundary between airspace and
outer space,143 whereas an opposing ideology favors a “function-
alist” approach, believing that the law applicable to a specific
activity can be determined by the nature and purpose of the
activities being carried out.144
Indeed, the absence of a clearly defined boundary results in
ambiguities as to which laws are most appropriate for the regula-
tion of suborbital flights.145 This is attributed to the almost con-
tradictory approaches to sovereignty in airspace and outer
space.146 States are prohibited from appropriating the outer
space environment and are only permitted to assert sovereignty
over their own space objects.147 This is sharply contrasted with
the extension of State sovereignty to the airspace above its terri-
tory.148 From the absence of a boundary, the following questions
thus emerge—at precisely what point would a suborbital flight
move from airspace to outer space, and which laws would apply?
Specifically, consider an international suborbital flight, which
would entail the vehicle first traversing one State’s airspace,
thereafter briefly entering and exiting outer space, and finally
traversing another State’s airspace and landing in its territory.
141 Vernon Nase, Delimitation and the Suborbital Passenger: Time to End Prevarica-
tion, 77 J. AIR L. & COM. 747, 748–49 (2012).
142 Id. at 752.
143 See Jinyuan Su, The Delineation Between Airspace and Outer Space and the Emer-
gence of Aerospace Objects, 78 J. AIR L & COM. 355, 363 (2013).
144 Id. Scholar Jinyuan Su noted that the functionalist approach has been pre-
dominant in the last few decades due to the mostly separate spheres of aerial and
space activities. Id. Consequently, there has been no urgent requirement for a
physical boundary, as States directly comply with aviation law for aerial activities
and comply with space law for space activities. Id.
145 DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 934–35, 944–45, 950–62.
146 Id. at 940–50.
147 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 104, art. II.
148 Chicago Convention, supra note 41, art. 1.
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B. ICAO CONCEPT PAPER ON SUBORBITAL FLIGHTS
In 2005, ICAO presented a concept paper on the regulation
of suborbital flights, noting the future potential that a single
suborbital flight could cross more than one national airspace.149
In fact, ICAO had suggested that the issues surrounding cross-
border travel could be addressed by way of bilateral agree-
ments.150 ICAO has raised the possibility of regulating suborbital
flights within the framework of the Chicago Convention by in-
corporating additional annexes to the Chicago Convention, ap-
plicable to topics such as communication, navigation,
surveillance, licensing, and airworthiness.151 However, due to
the difficulties posed by the evolution of entirely new SARPs for
this area, ICAO referred to a recommendation from the thirty-
fifth ICAO Assembly in 2004, wherein an interim measure was
proposed for “certain categories of aircraft or classes of airmen,”
where it may be many years before SARPs are adopted, if at
all.152
ICAO cited Resolution A35-14, which stipulates that “certifi-
cates and licenses issued or rendered valid, under national regu-
lations, by the Contracting State in which the aircraft is
registered shall be recognized by the other Contracting States
for the purpose of flight over their territories, including land-
ings and takeoffs.”153 The subsequent reference to domestic U.S.
legislation in this regard154 is of particular relevance, as the
CSLAA identified the Department of Transportation and the
FAA as the governmental entities responsible for the regulation
of operations and safety of the commercial human space flight
industry.155
IV. REGULATING SUBORBITAL FLIGHTS WITHIN
EXISTING AVIATION LAW AGREEMENTS
The legal discussions presented above apply to specific activi-
ties solely within the domain of airspace or outer space; how-
ever, suborbital flights are unique in that they straddle both
domains and cannot be characterized as exclusive enterprises of
149 ICAO Concept Paper, supra note 6, at 5.2.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 5.3.
152 Id. (referencing G.A. Res. 35/14, app. G (Nov. 3, 1980)).
153 Id. (citing G.A. Res. 35/14, supra note 152, cl. 2).
154 Id. at 5.4.
155 CSLAA, supra note 139, § 70101(c)(1).
414 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [85
aviation or space.156 Therefore, until international law or na-
tional consensus (as derived from a majority of domestic space
laws) has concluded that suborbital flights belong exclusively in
one domain or another, a hybrid governance structure will nec-
essarily apply.
As stated above, the technology for suborbital flights differs
across companies.157 Regardless of the chosen technological de-
ployment, however, suborbital vehicles spend only a minimal
amount of time in outer space and a majority of the vehicle’s
function occurs in airspace.158 Therefore, suborbital flights are
more similar in function to traditional aircraft, and hence are
more suited to be regulated under the laws applicable to avia-
tion. Given the similarities between traditional international avi-
ation and suborbital aviation (for example, their use of the same
airspace, their use to transport people and cargo, etc.), con-
tinuity between air traffic management, takeoff and landing per-
missions, safety, security, and other related matters would prove
necessary. Rather than creating a parallel regulatory structure
for suborbital activities (simply because of their limited expo-
sure to space), incorporating such activities into the existing avi-
ation regime is preferable. As technologies flourish, this
approach would better serve the specific and relevant interests
of States.
A. A PROPOSAL TO REGULATE CROSS-BORDER SUBORBITAL
FLIGHTS
A bilateral agreement governing cross-border suborbital
flights would be a progressive development toward ensuring the
safe and efficient operation of a nascent suborbital industry with
minimal disruption to the existing and extremely important avi-
ation industry. As discussed above, bilateral agreements are trea-
ties between concerned States under international law.159
Although a bilateral or multilateral air services agreement that
includes provisions related to suborbital flights does not yet ex-
ist, there is clear support for such a solution, including ICAO’s
own suggestions that such vehicles be regulated through bilat-
eral agreements.160 If a critical mass of States include provisions
156 GLOBAL SPACE GOVERNANCE, AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY, supra note 7, at 130.
157 See Part I.B, infra.
158 Nase, supra note 141, at 757.
159 See Part II.A.2, infra.
160 ICAO Concept Paper, supra note 6, at 5.2.
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related to the safe and secure operation of suborbital flights in
their bilateral and multilateral air services agreements, such pre-
cedent would allow ICAO to establish best-practices and pro-
duce SARPs related specifically to suborbital technologies.
Given the current legal ambiguities surrounding the status of
suborbital flights,161 it is contended that standards related to
cross-border suborbital flights be introduced to existing bilateral
agreements between two States (such as the United States and
Canada). These amendments would include provisions on liabil-
ity, indemnity, and registration and would not only ensure that
States involved in the suborbital flight in question comply with
international space law (if the vehicle is considered a space ob-
ject), but also would provide a means to said States to clarify
their positions in case of damage. Since suborbital vehicles
spend the majority of their flight time traversing airspace and
only remain in outer space for a short period, traditional “space
object registration” methods will not prove effective.162 Instead,
registration of the craft (or its “principal place of business” in
ICAO parlance) ought to be carried out (as is the case with air-
craft), and the jurisdiction in which the vehicle is registered
ought to be considered the launching State (and therefore de-
termine liability) for any space-related damage.
Consider the following example: Vehicle X is registered in Ca-
nada and scheduled to take off from a spaceport located in
Nova Scotia, spend ten minutes in space and re-enter Earth, fi-
nally landing at a spaceport located in the United States. Under
the proposed framework, imagine that X accidentally collides
with a Japanese satellite Y, and Japan chooses to bring a claim
under the Liability Convention163 for damage to Y. Since the bi-
lateral agreement between Canada and the United States speci-
fied that the State in which the suborbital vehicle is registered is
to be considered the sole launching State for the purposes of
liability,164 and because X is registered in Canada, Canada would
be the launching State and would assume fault-based liability for
damage caused to the Japanese satellite Y. Under the proposed
model, even if Japan elects to bring a claim for joint liability
against the United States and Canada collectively, the bilateral
161 GLOBAL SPACE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY, supra note 7, at 130.
162 Largely because space objects are, at the earliest, only required to register
days after their launch, not prior to or immediately following a launch. E.g., 14
C.F.R. § 417.19(b) (2019).
163 Liability Convention, supra note 127, art. II.
164 U.S.-Canada ASA, supra note 58, arts. 14.3, 21–22.
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agreement would provide, in effect, an indemnification clause
whereby Canada, as the State in which Vehicle X is registered,
would indemnify the United States. The proposed framework
therefore circumvents the ongoing debate regarding delimita-
tion and the overlapping regimes of air and space law, by com-
pelling States to contractually resolve such issues.
Alternatively, if X accidentally collides with a passing aircraft
upon re-entry—or for example, an Aeromexico flight—then Ca-
nada would be absolutely liable to Mexico for damage caused by
its space object under Article II of the Liability Convention.165
The same would be true if X caused damage while returning
from the United States back to Canada. In such a situation,
traditional space law would deem both the United States and
Canada as joint launching States since X would have been
“launched” from U.S. territory; however, the proposed amend-
ments to the existing bilateral treaty would ensure only Canada
is considered a launching State.
Incorporating a clause in the bilateral agreement which re-
quires that the suborbital vehicle be registered in a single State,
and further, that such registration amounts to a State’s status as
the sole launching State for purposes of liability, will thus clearly
identify which entities would be internationally liable in case of
damage. Indeed, the amended bilateral agreement could in-
clude provisions related to indemnity, where one State (the reg-
istering State) would be obliged to indemnify the other in
certain cases of damage.
The suggested approach of amending existing bilateral agree-
ments may have the overall appearance of adhering to the func-
tionalist perspective.166 However, it is pertinent to note that this
approach would not contradict a spatialist view that requires
drawing a physical boundary,167 as the suborbital vehicle would
still comply with aviation laws while it traverses airspace and
comply with international space law for the duration it is in the
domain of outer space. For instance, if a 100-kilometer bound-
ary is indeed declared as the official demarcation at UN-
COPUOS, the Authors’ suggested clause regarding damage
while the craft is in outer space would still apply to any damage
occurring beyond 100 kilometers. The consequence of such a
demarcation would be that the State in which the suborbital
165 Liability Convention, supra note 127, art. II.
166 See DEMPSEY, supra note 47, at 946–50.
167 Id. at 940–41.
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craft is registered would be considered the sole launching State,
to the exclusion of all other traditional launching States.
V. AMENDING THE EXISTING U.S.–CANADA BILATERAL
Having established that a bilateral agreement can address pre-
liminary regulatory incongruities, it is suggested that rather than
negotiating an entirely new agreement, States simply amend
their existing bilateral air services agreements to accommodate
the regulation of suborbital flights. The U.S.–Canada Air Ser-
vices Agreement168 has been identified as a case study for three
reasons. First, both States are spacefaring nations with suborbital
capabilities.169 Second, as mentioned above, the United States
has adopted domestic legislation to clarify certain technical as-
pects of suborbital flights.170 Third, a bilateral approach to sub-
orbital flights would be mutually beneficial to both States and
provide them each a competitive advantage, as evidenced below.
A. THE U.S.–CANADA BILATERAL AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT
While the United States has continued to pursue open skies
agreements with other nations to liberalize the aviation mar-
ket,171 Canada maintains its own “Blue Sky Policy,” which entails
negotiating agreements exclusively on a case-by-case basis.172
Therefore, while the United States and Canada have a bilateral
agreement that amounts to an open skies agreement, Canada
does not accord the same flexibility to its other international air
services agreements.173 Although Canada has a more protection-
ist policy as compared to the United States, this form of treaty-
making appears to correspond with the growing preference for
individual national space laws rather than wide-sweeping inter-
national agreements.174 Furthermore, Canada’s approach for
168 U.S.-Canada ASA, supra note 58.
169 See International Cooperation, NASA (last updated Feb. 28, 2019), https://
www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/cooperation/index.html [https://
perma.cc/55BN-XKEH].
170 See Part II.B.6, infra.
171 Press Release, U.S. White House, Commemorating the 25th Anniversary of
the U.S. Open Skies Policy and 10th Anniversary of the U.S.-EU Open Skies
Agreement (July 10, 2017), https://www.state.gov/commemorating-the-25th-an
niversary-of-the-u-s-open-skies-policy-and-10th-anniversary-of-the-u-s-eu-open-skies
-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/VF7U-C852].
172 See The Blue Sky Policy: Made in Canada, for Canada, supra note 59.
173 Id.
174 See Creating Opportunities Through Open Skies Agreements, UNITING AVIATION
(July 18, 2018), https://unitingaviation.com/news/economic-development/crea
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specific agreements, as opposed to a universal format for all
agreements, may be more suitable to accommodate the interests
of individual States and the nuances of their respective aero-
space sectors, particularly in the context of regulating suborbital
flights.
In March 2007, the United States and Canada entered into a
new bilateral open skies agreement (USCASA), which remains
in force.175 The agreement includes an exchange of fifth free-
dom rights (enabling carriers to serve points in third coun-
tries),176 seventh freedom rights (related to cargo),177 and
provisions related to competitive pricing.178 Through this agree-
ment, carriers in both States can operate scheduled air transport
services between any point(s) in the United States and Ca-
nada.179 Provisions of the USCASA that would be relevant to
cross-border suborbital flights are briefly outlined below.
Article 12 of the USCASA requires that a State’s airlines enter-
ing, exiting, or conducting operations within the territory of the
receiving State comply with all laws relating to operation and
navigation of aircraft of the receiving State.180 By extending this
clause to apply similarly to suborbital vehicles, a Canadian sub-
orbital flight destined for the United States would, in addition
to Canadian domestic law, therefore be obligated to comply
with U.S. domestic laws on safety and security related to subor-
bital flights as the vehicle would land in American territory.
Further, Article 13 of the USCASA pertains to safety, mandat-
ing both parties to recognize certificates and licenses of the
other Party, with a condition requiring that such certificates or
licenses “at least equal the minimum standards that may be es-
tablished pursuant to the [Chicago] Convention.”181 The clause
simultaneously grants each party the right to refuse recognition
of such documents granted to or validated for its own nationals,
for the purposes of flight above its own territory.182 Although
there are no standards in place for suborbital vehicles, inserting
a new Article 13 provision that grants permission to suborbital
ting-opportunities-through-open-skies-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/63X4-2Z
4C].
175 See U.S.-Canada ASA, supra note 58.
176 See id. at annex III.
177 See id. art. 11.7.
178 See id. art. 6.
179 See id. at annex III.
180 Id. art. 12.
181 Id. art. 13.
182 Id.
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vehicles upon the inspection and approval of the other State’s
domestic aerospace authorities would address this gap. This
would allow, for example, the FAA to conduct a safety inspec-
tion of a suborbital vehicle from a Canadian company, until
such time that the suborbital industry grows sufficiently large
enough to culminate in the creation of internationally recog-
nized standards.
Article 14 of the USCASA concerns security procedures for
aviation and reaffirms compliance with international conven-
tions already in place: i.e., the Tokyo Convention of 1963,
Hague Convention of 1970, Montreal Convention of 1999, and
Montreal Protocol of 1988.183 Similar to the previous clause on
safety, Article 14 requires conformity with SARPs and mandatory
notification to ICAO of any non-conformity.184 This clause also
provides for the mutual observance of the other State’s security
procedures when entering, exiting, or operating in that State.185
Notably, there is also a provision for “sympathetic considera-
tion” to a request from the other Party to enter into reciprocal
administrative arrangements permitting the domestic authori-
ties of one Party to assess security measures in respect of flights
destined to its territory.186 This provision could be amended to
apply the same security procedures to both passengers and pay-
loads on suborbital vehicles, as States would likely desire con-
formity with domestic security protocols when an international
suborbital flight enters its territory.
VI. CONCLUSION
The regulation of suborbital flights has been hindered by in-
terminable discussions regarding the delimitation between air-
space and outer space and the applicability of air or space law.187
This Article proposes the amendment of existing bilateral air
services agreements between States as a first step towards the
development of regulatory standards applicable to international
suborbital flights. This conclusion is based on the established
benefits of a bilateral agreement, which include approved routes
and frequency, in addition to minimum standards for safety and
security. The bilateral agreement could promote transparency




187 GLOBAL SPACE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY, supra note 7, at 36.
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by specifying the information required to be shared with the
other State, such as the technical features of the craft, coordi-
nates and route, and the duration in which it would operate in
the receiving party’s airspace. Further, the bilateral agreement
could introduce a provision mandating registration of the vehi-
cle, which would clearly identify which State is liable in case of
damage under the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability
Convention.
In the proposed manner, bilateral agreements would dovetail
with parallel discussions regarding the delimitation of airspace
and outer space. Therefore, even if a demarcation is eventually
introduced, bilateral agreements regulating suborbital flights
would not be significantly affected.
A considerable advantage to bilateral agreements is not only
the likelihood of acceptance, but also the competitive benefits
accorded to certain States. Specifically, with respect to the
United States and Canada for instance, the USCASA could be
amended to remove the prohibition on transport of passengers
or cargo between two points in the other State’s territory, and
instead integrate the North American region into a consolidated
aerospace market, similar to that of the EU.188 If such an inte-
gration were to occur, the commercial space markets of both
States would benefit from greater access to routes, technological
support, and information-sharing.189
Finally, bilateral agreements may subsequently culminate in
the creation of minimum standards regarding aspects of inter-
national suborbital transport, such as safety and security. Even-
tually this may lead to a global consensus on uniform standards,
either by way of a multilateral agreement, or under the auspices
of ICAO and its annexes to the Chicago Convention.
188 U.S.-Canada ASA, supra note 58, art. 2; see also id. pmbl. (“[r]ecognizing . . .
the geographic situation of the two countries, including the location of their
main centers of population,” and further noting that “the close relationship be-
tween their two peoples create a situation unique in international civil
aviation.”).
189 It may also be true that the traditional commercial aviation markets of both
States would similarly benefit.
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I. INTRODUCTION
IN FISCAL YEAR 2019, National Aeronautics and Space Ad-ministration (NASA) procurement obligations totaled over
$19.5 billion1 as the agency worked with private partners to ad-
vance its vision of reaching for new heights and revealing the
unknown for the benefit of humankind.2 Of the billions of con-
tracting dollars the agency awarded, a significant portion went
to large, established businesses such as the approximate $1.7 bil-
lion, $1.3 billion, and $915 million awarded to The Boeing
Company (Boeing), Lockheed Martin Corporation (Lockheed
Martin), and Jacobs Technology, Inc. (Jacobs), respectively.3
Even beyond contract awards to long-time government contrac-
tors, newer space industry actors have increasingly sought out
and won NASA’s heart and dollars. For example, in 2019, NASA
awarded $914 million in contracting dollars to Space Explora-
tion Technologies (SpaceX),4 the unconventional recent en-
trant to the federal contracting world, whose work with NASA
has solidified into a formidable partnership.
Indeed, in 2019 alone, NASA’s work with SpaceX included a
considerable number of contracts to advance some of the
agency’s most awe-inspiring missions. NASA entered into a $50.3
million contract with SpaceX to provide launch services for the
Imaging X-Ray Polarimetry Explorer (IXPE) mission, which
seeks to measure polarized X-rays from some of the universe’s
most mysterious and fascinating phenomena like black holes
and neutron stars.5 The agency also entered into a similar
launch services contract of $69 million for the Double Asteroid
1 Fiscal Year 2019, 2019 NASA ANN. PROCUREMENT REP. 1, 6 [hereinafter NASA
FY19 Procurement Report], https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/
annual_procurement_report_2019_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH2P-76BD].
2 Our Mission and Values, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/careers/our-mission-
and-values [https://perma.cc/FV3X-23KJ].
3 NASA FY19 Procurement Report, supra note 1, at 20.
4 Id.
5 Press Release, Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., NASA Awards Launch Ser-
vices Contract for Groundbreaking Astrophysics Mission (July 8, 2019), https://
www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-awards-launch-services-contract-for-ground-
breaking-astrophysics-mission [https://perma.cc/ZH5P-4RUP].
424 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [85
Redirection Test (DART) mission.6 Each additional launch ser-
vices contract award rests on the existing baseline of a $3.1 bil-
lion commercial crew partnership to send astronauts to the
International Space Station (ISS) directly from U.S. soil,7 among
several other ongoing agreements.
Yet beyond massive dollar awards to aerospace industry giants
and newer innovators, NASA contracts with no shortage of small
businesses—in fact, forty-nine small business firms feature
amongst the agency’s top 100 contractors by dollar value.8 In
the same one-year period that NASA deepened its launch ser-
vices partnership with SpaceX, the agency also entered into
12,914 contract actions with small businesses.9 NASA’s relation-
ships with small businesses, including minority-owned small
businesses (MOSBs) and women-owned small businesses
(WOSBs), provide enormous benefits to both the agency and to
individual business owners seeking opportunities for investment
and experience. For example, NASA’s Ames Research Center
has worked with woman-owned Earth Resources Technology for
earth science data modeling and analysis, geospatial data man-
agement, and safety engineering.10 Glenn Research Center ben-
efits from the services of Logical Innovations, Inc., a minority-
owned and economically disadvantaged small business provid-
ing strategic operational support, training, and software devel-
opment.11 Similarly, in 2014, WOSB MORI Associates, Inc. was
awarded a ten-year, $200 million contract to provide IT infra-
6 Press Release, Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., NASA Awards Launch Ser-
vices Contract for Asteroid Redirect Test Mission (Apr. 11, 2019), https://
www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-awards-launch-services-contract-for-asteroid-re-
direct-test-mission [https://perma.cc/H7BD-J7RA].
7 Jeff Foust, The Long Countdown to Commercial Crew’s Liftoff, SPACENEWS (July 5,
2020), https://spacenews.com/the-long-countdown-to-commercial-crews-liftoff/
[https://perma.cc/H8W6-AAHR]. Since the retirement of the Space Shuttle pro-
gram in 2011, the United States had not sent astronauts directly to the ISS from
U.S. soil—American astronauts traveled on Russia’s Soyuz vehicle—until re-
cently. Press Release, Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., NASA Astronauts
Launch from America in Historic Test Flight of SpaceX Crew Dragon (May 30,
2020), https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-astronauts-launch-from-america-
in-historic-test-flight-of-spacex-crew-dragon [https://perma.cc/PMS7-AURQ]. In
May 2020, SpaceX successfully launched U.S. astronauts from NASA Kennedy
Space Center in Florida to the ISS. Id.
8 NASA FY19 Procurement Report, supra note 1, at 20.
9 Id. at 16.
10 NASA OFF. SMALL BUS. PROGRAMS, NASA OSBP SPOTLIGHT: WOMEN-OWNED
SMALL BUSINESSES 10 (2014), https://osbp.nasa.gov/docs/OSBP_WOSB_SPOT
LIGHT_Rev2-TAGGEDv2.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z897-KY8P].
11 Id. at 12.
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structure support to the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory.12
Moreover, NASA investment helps businesses grow. After seek-
ing advice from NASA in March 2011 with a company of only
two employees, Kegman, Inc. founder Susan “Susie” Glasgow
was able to win her first NASA contract in September 2011 to
support the Kennedy Space Center Doppler Radar Wind
Profiler.13 Through performance of this government contract,
Glasgow expanded her business to sixteen employees and, in
the last few years, secured four prime contracts to revenues of $1
million.14 In this way, NASA contracts often contribute to the
growth of a significant number of MOSBs and WOSBs.
Given the enormity of NASA’s $19 billion in yearly con-
tracting dollars, allocated to both large corporations and a vari-
ety of small businesses, the agency has a considerable
opportunity to shape investment in the space industry. This
raises important questions: how does NASA award contracting
dollars, and how can those dollars be allocated with social policy
in mind to support and uplift various actors in the space indus-
try? To what extent might the potential to secure government
contracts encourage women, minorities, and others traditionally
underrepresented in outer space work to become more involved
with NASA and the space industry?
This Article seeks to increase the involvement of women and
minority business owners in the space industry by encouraging
NASA and other agencies procuring space technology to employ
existing “affirmative action” government contracting programs
more frequently and efficiently. Part II highlights the lack of
gender and racial diversity in the space field. It notes the con-
cerning low involvement of women in private aerospace work—
just over 24% women—and the underrepresentation of women
and minorities at NASA in scientific, mission-driven positions
and top leadership. Part III provides a primer on the legal
framework regulating contracts with the federal government
and the general mechanics of agency contract awards. The sec-
tion provides brief background on the Small Business Adminis-
tration (SBA) and its small business contracting programs,
examining in particular the WOSB program and the SBA 8(a)
Business Development Program (8(a) Program) for socially and
economically disadvantaged business owners. Part IV examines
12 Id. at 9, 14.
13 Id. at 15.
14 Id.
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these contracting programs within the context of the space in-
dustry, analyzing how agencies such as NASA and the Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) have met, or at times have fallen short
of, government-wide goals for contracting with WOSBs and
MOSBs. Finally, Part V proposes potential solutions to increase
the number of women-owned businesses (WOBs) and minority-
owned businesses (MOBs) to which NASA awards procurement
dollars, from improving on SBA program inefficiencies to imple-
menting legislation intended to increase diversity in science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields more
generally.
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: THE IMPORTANCE OF
DIVERSITY
It is indisputable that diversity matters.15 Both private employ-
ers16 and the federal government17 recognize that diverse work-
places form an essential part of a successful enterprise. Though
diversity remains difficult to define, diversity is, at its core, “the
collective amount of differences among members within a social
unit.”18 Within a work environment, scholars define workplace
diversity as “variation of social and cultural identities among
people existing together in an employment or market setting.”19
Most essential is that the term refers to the collective—“[a]n in-
dividual cannot be diverse, but groups of individuals (e.g., the
15 CARY FUNK & KIM PARKER, WOMEN AND MEN OFTEN AT ODDS OVER WORK-
PLACE EQUITY 72 (2018), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/01/09/diversity
-in-the-stem-workforce-varies-widely-across-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/Y99H-6B4J].
Eight in ten Americans say it is at least somewhat important to have racial and
ethnic diversity in today’s workplaces, including around half who categorize this
as “extremely” (26%) or “very” important (27%). Id.
16 See generally Matti F. Dobbs, Managing Diversity: Lessons from the Private Sector,
25 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 351 (1996).
17 The federal government has recognized the importance of diversity in fed-
eral workplaces, including the military. See Hugh B. McClean, The Diversity Ratio-
nale for Affirmative Action in Military Contracting, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 745, 749
(2017) (“The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that a racially integrated military is
a matter of national security.”).
18 GEORGE GOTSIS & ZOE KORTEZI, CRITICAL STUDIES IN DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT
LITERATURE: A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS 1 (2015) (quoting David A. Harrison &
Hock-Peng Sin, What is Diversity and How Should it Be Measured?, in MARGARET S.
STOCKDALE & FAYE J. CROSBY, THE PSYCHOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT OF WORKPLACE
DIVERSITY 3–30 (2006)).
19 Id. at preface.
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scientific research workforce) can possess diversity.”20 Promot-
ing full inclusion means that workplaces must include employ-
ees from backgrounds that are traditionally underrepresented as
well as those backgrounds that are already well represented in
the field.21
A. WHY PURSUE WORKPLACE DIVERSITY?
There are untold benefits to workplace and industry diversity
across a multitude of measures. Perhaps most important for the
success of space missions is the increase in creative thinking. Sci-
entific research often involves group problem-solving.22 As re-
searchers have noted, “the ability to see the problem differently,
not simply ‘being smart,’ often is the key to a breakthrough.”23
Individuals of varying backgrounds do, on average, tend to “ap-
proach work and problem solving differently”—differences
which spur the innovation needed to drive advancement.24 Sixty-
five leading American businesses, as amici in the Supreme Court
case Grutter v. Bollinger,25 stressed that diverse workplaces result
in greater creativity, which often presents more unique and ef-
fective solutions to the new problems that arise in a quickly
growing marketplace, achieved by integrating different
perspectives.26
In addition to increased creativity and innovation, diverse
workspaces take better advantage of the presumed natural distri-
bution in talent across racial, ethnic, and gender lines, amongst
other identities. Research reveals no evidence that brilliant, sci-
entific minds are unequally represented across socially con-
structed lines of identity.27 By maintaining a system that
discourages women and minorities from entering certain fields,
such as STEM, in addition to the gross underrepresentation of
20 Kenneth Gibbs, Jr., Diversity in STEM: What It Is and Why It Matters, SCI. AM.






25 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The Supreme Court upheld the narrowly tailored use
of race in admissions decisions, noting the benefits of educational diversity. Id. at
343.
26 Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Business in Support of Respon-
dents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 399056, at *7.
27 Gibbs, supra note 20 (quoting Francis Collins, Director, National Institute of
Health).
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women and minorities in many career fields, industries lose ac-
cess to top talent.28 Former National Institute of Health Director
Francis Collins described such underrepresentation as resulting
in an “inescapable conclusion that we are missing critical con-
tributors to our talent pool.”29
For the private sector, workplace diversity also drives profit. A
McKinsey & Company study found that “[c]ompanies in the top
quartile for racial and ethnic diversity are 35 percent more likely
to have financial returns above their respective national industry
medians.”30 Gender wise, “[c]ompanies in the top quartile for
gender diversity are 15 percent more likely” to see higher finan-
cial returns.31 In addition to company-wide diversity, a diverse
leadership team matters32—a finding of particular interest for
this Article’s study of businesses owned by women or minorities.
Diversity plays as an essential part of competing in today’s mar-
ketplace and an increasingly diverse nation.33
The increased creativity, talent, and profit derived from di-
verse workplaces creates stronger contractors that can build bet-
ter products through ingenuity and reinvestment of profit into
research and design. The government in turn reaps the benefits
of efficiency and better products or services, which drive overall
mission success. Such ingenuity is all the more crucial when ap-
plied to the creative thinking necessary to plan for the vast
unknowns of space. Given the importance of diversity, the next
sections examine diversity statistics within the space industry and
in the NASA workforce.34
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Vivian Hunt, Dennis Layton & Sara Prince, Why Diversity Matters, MCKINSEY &
CO. (Jan. 1, 2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/
our-insights/why-diversity-matters [https://perma.cc/2FH5-5K64].
31 See id. (“More diverse companies . . . are better able to win top talent and
improve their customer orientation, employee satisfaction, and decision making,
and all that leads to a virtuous cycle of increasing returns.”).
32 See id. (“[F]or every 10 percent increase in racial and ethnic diversity on the
senior-executive team, earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) rise 0.8
percent.”).
33 Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Business in Support of Respon-
dents, supra note 26, at *2.
34 This Article addresses diversity in a variety of environments, from industry-
wide diversity (the gender and racial diversity of the space industry at large) to
workplace diversity (the percentage of women and minority employees at NASA,
by job function and seniority) and programmatic diversity (the success of SBA
initiatives in ensuring appropriate diversity in the federal government con-
tracting arena). The Author recognizes that these environments are not analo-
gous—comparisons do not fully account for the complexity of addressing
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B. DIVERSITY IN THE SPACE INDUSTRY
What is the space industry, and why does it struggle with diver-
sity? How do challenges in involving diverse voices differ in the
private and public sectors? At its core, the “space industry” refers
to “the economic sector providing goods and services related to
space.”35 Many limit the definition to its “purest” form, the nar-
rower subset of space actors providing hardware (typically
“launchers and satellites”), ground equipment, or sub-compo-
nents for those items.36 More broadly, the space industry rests
within the overall aerospace industry—the “assemblage of manu-
facturing concerns that deal with vehicular flight within and be-
yond Earth’s atmosphere”37—and the space economy, which can
include any private or public actor providing space-enabled
products and services, from space hardware to space tourism.38
This Article will adopt a broad conception of the space industry,
with a slight focus on scientific and technical positions over the
business, marketing, legal, creative, and other skills and posi-
tions crucial to driving the overall space economy.
Overall, aerospace suffers from a lack of gender diversity.
Studies indicate that only 24% of aerospace employees are wo-
men, with little change in recent years.39 While several promi-
nent women lead major space industry entities—for example,
Gwynne Shotwell, President and Chief Operating Officer for
SpaceX, and Leanne Caret, head of Boeing’s defense and space
division40—the industry as a whole still faces immense chal-
lenges. As lamented by an influential woman in space:
diversity in such disparate environments, and the extent to which the meaning
and goal of “diversity” vary in each environment.
35 EUROPEAN SPACE POLICY INST., YEARBOOK ON SPACE POLICY 2008/2009: SET-
TING NEW TRENDS 49 (Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Wolfgang Rathgeber, Blandina Baranes
& Christophe Venet eds., 2011).
36 Id.; see also Jeff Foust, What is the “Space Industry?”, SPACE REV. (July 14, 2003),
https://www.thespacereview.com/article/34/1 [https://perma.cc/7XNX-
AH9N].
37 Stanley I. Weiss, Aerospace Industry, ENCYCL. BRITANNICA (July 26, 1999),
https://www.britannica.com/technology/aerospace-industry [https://perma.cc/
S5GV-LHX6] (including the full range of vehicles from balloons, airplanes, mis-
siles, space launch vehicles, and spacecraft).
38 See generally id.
39 Christian Davenport, At NASA, 2019 Was the Year of the Woman, Yet Women are
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“[a]erospace is still heavily male and white, and we’re not mov-
ing very quickly.”41
Given the crux of space activity—the need for expertise in
STEM fields to build space hardware and orchestrate complex,
technical operations for space missions—much of core space in-
dustry work requires some experience with STEM. However, wo-
men are vastly underrepresented in STEM fields overall.42 While
women fill close to half the total “college-educated workforce”
in the U.S. economy, in 2017 women held less than 30% of
STEM jobs,43 which is approximately “half as many women [ ]
working in STEM jobs as one might expect if gender representa-
tion in STEM professions mirrored the overall workforce.”44 For
women of color in academia, despite earning a higher percent-
age of doctorates in science than minority men, only 3% of mi-
nority women were employed in STEM academic positions in
2006.45 Out of “7,000 computer-science doctoral faculty in 2006,
only sixty were African American women,” and “numbers for
Hispanic and Native American women were too low to [even]
report.”46 Beyond mere statistics on underrepresentation, wo-
men in male-dominated fields often experience a host of nega-
tive experiences, such as isolation, harassment, or bullying,
which serve to dissuade entry or continued work in the field—
further worsening representation.47 The lack of women in
STEM serves as one cause of low female involvement in the
space industry: women are vastly underrepresented in STEM
overall.
41 Id. (quoting Mary Lynne Dittmar, President and Chief Executive Officer of
the Coalition for Deep Space Exploration).
42 Quick Take: Women in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM),
CATALYST (Aug. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Catalyst Data], https://www.catalyst.org/re
search/women-in-science-technology-engineering-and-mathematics-stem/
[https://perma.cc/TC6E-XZSA].
43 Id. In terms of scientific research and development, women worldwide ac-
counted for only 29.3% of those employed in 2016. Id.
44 DAVID BEEDE, TIFFANY JULIAN, DAVID LANGDON, GEORGE MCKITTRICK,
BEETHIKA KHAN & MARK DOMS, U.S. DEP’T OF COM. ECON. & STA. ADMIN., ESA
ISSUE BRIEF NO. 04-11, WOMEN IN STEM: A GENDER GAP TO INNOVATION 2 (2011).
45 Marcy H. Towns, Where are the Women of Color? Data on African American, His-
panic, and Native American Faculty in STEM, 39 J. COLL. SCI. TEACHING, Mar. 2010,
at 8.
46 See CATHERINE HILL, CHRISTIANNE CORBETT & ANDRESSE ST. ROSE, WHY SO
FEW? WOMEN IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, AND MATHEMATICS 15–17
(2010).
47 Id. at 24 (“Women cited feelings of isolation, an unsupportive work environ-
ment, extreme work schedules, and unclear rules about advancement and success
as major factors in their decision to leave.”).
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Racial and ethnic minorities are similarly underrepresented
in STEM. Hispanic employees comprise 16% of the total U.S.
workforce but only 7% of STEM workers; for African Americans,
only 9% are employed in STEM out of a total of 11% of the U.S.
workforce.48 For sectors of the STEM workforce requiring a
bachelor’s degree or higher, only 6% are Hispanic and 7% are
Black.49 In contrast, Asian-Americans are overrepresented at
13% of the STEM workforce, which is above their 6% share of
the workforce overall.50 For occupations particularly relevant to
space research and development, Black and Hispanic STEM ma-
jors are most underrepresented: the two populations represent
together “only 14% of chemists and materials scientists, 10% of
atmospheric and space scientists, . . . and 6% of astronomers
and physicists.”51 Apart from Asian Americans, the low employ-
ment figures for minority employees in STEM fields give rise to
concern, indicating that racial minorities face untold barriers to
entering into STEM occupations, including those positions un-
derlying much of the work in the space industry. In addition to
hindering the opportunities of individual employees, low female
and minority representation dampens the overall creativity of
STEM workforces.52
C. DIVERSITY AT NASA
NASA has demonstrated a commitment to diversity. As
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center expressed, “[i]n order to
remain at the forefront of scientific research, we need diversity
of thinking, education, skills, and cultural backgrounds to effec-
48 FUNK & PARKER, supra note 15, at 8. The overall STEM data from this study
may be somewhat skewed given a broader definition of STEM encompassing a
large number of health fields. Id. at 3. For example, the data includes health
technician and nursing jobs, amongst which Black and Hispanic employees are
overrepresented—37% of licensed nurses are Black or Hispanic. Id. at 34. Figures
for physical sciences demonstrate much lower minority employment. Id.
49 Id. at 24.
50 Id. at 34–35.
51 Id.
52 See Vann Newkirk III, Boosting Science with Diversity, PBS (Mar. 3, 2016),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/stem-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/
GQH5-HB4M]. “Collective knowledge productivity depends on people knowing
different things and seeing things different ways. . . . [T]he questions that scien-
tists ask and the tools they use are a product of their background and personal-
ity. . . . [D]iversity improves scientific productivity, discovery, and fairness of
results.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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tively compete in this global marketplace.”53 Indeed, NASA rec-
ognizes that “[d]iversity is a business imperative and is crucial to
our continued success.”54 However, today’s vision for diversity
notwithstanding, NASA has a long history of discrimination in
hiring and promoting women and minorities, from science posi-
tions to its astronaut class.55 Employment figures for the agency
demonstrate that diversity issues persist even as NASA official
policy seeks out and encourages diversity.
As measured in NASA’s 2017 Diversity Report, women ac-
count for 34% of NASA’s workforce.56 Yet women make up only
23% of scientific employees (those in NASA’s science and engi-
neering labor force), and half of NASA’s female employees are
employed in professional administrative positions.57 In terms of
minorities, African Americans account for 11.6% of the total
NASA workforce,58 which does not immediately suggest under-
representation.59 However, Black employees account for only
1.3% of combined senior level and senior scientific and profes-
sional employees.60 Furthermore, while Black employees com-
prise 10% of the overall federal STEM workforce, at NASA, only
53 Sharon Wong, Diversity—Making Space for Everyone at NASA/Goddard Space
Flight Center Using Dialogue to Break Through Barriers, 47 HUM. RES. MGMT. 389, 390
(2008).
54 Id.
55 See generally Kim McQuaid, “Racism, Sexism, and Space Ventures”: Civil Rights at
NASA in the Nixon Era and Beyond, in SOCIETAL IMPACT OF SPACEFLIGHT 421 (Steven
J. Dick & Roger D. Launius eds., 2007); Devlin Healey, Note, There are No Bras in
Space: How Spaceflight Adapted to Women and How Women Adapt to Spaceflight, 19
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 593 (2018); Marina Koren, Why Women Weren’t Allowed to be
Astronauts, ATLANTIC (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/
archive/2017/03/women-in-space/498833/ [https://perma.cc/YYY6-LK2M].
This section’s discussion of NASA’s need for more gender and racial diversity is
not intended to diminish the impact of the groundbreaking hard work by women
and minorities at NASA over the years. Black women have been a fundamental
part of NASA’s history and success. See, e.g., MARGOT LEE SHETTERLY, HIDDEN
FIGURES: THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE BLACK WOMEN
WHO HELPED WIN THE SPACE RACE (2016).
56 FY17 Annual Report and Update, 2017 NASA OFF. OF DIVERSITY & EQUAL OP-




58 Id. at 3.
59 Typically, underrepresentation is measured by a difference of two percent-
age points, “regardless of statistical significance,” between the percent of the mi-
nority in the overall U.S. population and the percent of employees. Id.
60 Id.
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6% of science and engineering employees are Black.61 Instead,
most Black employees are concentrated in professional adminis-
trative positions.62
Hispanic and Asian Americans are slightly better situated in
the NASA workforce, but both groups still face significant chal-
lenges. Though NASA’s 7% Hispanic employees in scientific
and engineering positions matches the overall federal STEM
workforce, Hispanics face major barriers when it comes to secur-
ing senior leadership positions.63 Only 3.8% of senior level and
senior scientific and professional employees are Hispanic, and
the minority group accounts for only 5.5% of NASA supervi-
sors.64 Asians, often highly represented in STEM, indeed make
up 7.5% of NASA’s workforce; however, challenges remain in
securing appropriate representation in leadership, with only 5%
representation in NASA senior executive service positions.65
This data suggests that women and minorities face challenges in
obtaining employment with NASA, encounter setbacks in receiv-
ing promotions to leadership positions, and may face negative
externalities associated with underrepresentation in the
workplace.
The workplace diversity of a federal agency matters not only
for the agency’s own productivity and work environment, but
also because agency diversity has been shown to have a measura-
ble impact on the award of contracts to WOSBs and MOSBs. A
recent study analyzed data from the Small Business Innovation
Research and Small Business Technology Transfer programs,
which NASA often uses to award research and development
grants to startups engaging in feasibility studies (Phase I) that
hopefully lead to implementation awards (Phase II).66 The study
found that the “likelihood of a Phase II transition for all Phase I
awardees is increased by about 10 and 8% for every 1% increase
in racial/ethnic and gender diversity, respectively, at the agency-
level.”67 An agency like NASA’s racial, ethnic, and gender diver-
sity “exhibits a consistently positive and highly significant rela-
61 Id.




66 Amol M. Joshi, Todd M. Inouye & Jeffrey A. Robinson, How Does Agency
Workforce Diversity Influence Federal R&D Funding of Minority and Women Technology
Entrepreneurs? An Analysis of the SBIR and STTR Programs, 2001–2011, 50 SMALL
BUS. ECON. 499 (2018).
67 Id. at 512.
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tionship with the likelihood of successful transition from Phase I
to Phase II for all grantee firms. This means that all else being
equal, Phase I awardees are more likely to obtain follow-on
Phase II funding if the granting agency is more diverse.”68
Therefore, agency diversity matters significantly for whether or
not WOBs or MOBs are selected for future work.
While the present Article’s proposed approach to improving
diversity in government contracting might not directly impact
employment figures at NASA, an overall increase in space indus-
try diversity could have incidental effects on NASA employment
figures. For example, private companies that secure lucrative
government contracts may have increased hiring needs to fulfill
their contract obligations. The availability of these new private
space industry employment opportunities, which are likely to be
well-paying, stable jobs, might encourage more minority under-
graduates to pursue degrees in STEM. More minorities inter-
ested in STEM would also increase the number of minorities in
the candidate pool from which NASA selects employees. Fur-
thermore, these private sector job opportunities might allow mi-
norities more room for advancement. NASA data indicates that
women and minorities have a harder time securing promotions
than their white male counterparts,69 and only half of NASA em-
ployees agree that promotions in their work are based on
merit.70 Smaller, innovative companies might provide more
room for advancement,71 permitting NASA to later hire these
seasoned employees into higher-level positions. Government
contracts thus have the potential to diversify the entire space
industry, both public and private.
68 Id. at 513.
69 NASA FY17 Diversity Report, supra note 56, at 17 tbls.2–4.
70 Id. at 16.
71 See Ready for Liftoff: The Importance of Small Businesses in the NASA Supply Chain:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Agric., Energy, and Trade of the H. Comm. on Small
Bus., 114th Cong. 12 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 NASA Small Business House Hear-
ing] (statement of George Davis, President and Founder, Emergent Space Tech-
nologies) (“Aerospace is a very top-down, military style chain of command . . .
[but at a small business,] I can just go walk into the president’s office and have a
conversation with him.”). Greater opportunities for interpersonal interactions
and individualized attention, combined with a more collaborative workstyle, sug-
gests a higher likelihood of advancement. See id.
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III. PROCUREMENT LAW PRIMER: UNDERSTANDING
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS AND SMALL
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
CONTRACTING PROGRAMS
As Part II indicated, the space industry has historically strug-
gled with a lack of diversity, with few women and minorities
holding traditional STEM jobs at the heart of the industry.
Given that diverse workforces yield more creative solutions and
greater profits,72 and also help to remedy past discrimination,73
diversifying the space workforce is crucial to building a stronger
and more inclusive industry. Government contracts have im-
mense potential to serve this diversifying function.
A. WHY GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS?
Historically, socially disadvantaged businesses (socially DBs)
faltered on the path to prosperity “not . . . solely because of lack
of size or other competitive disadvantages, but also because of
racial discrimination.”74 Government contracting programs can
partially alleviate the longstanding impact of discrimination.
Through government contracting programs, minority business
enterprises gain experience, industry expertise, and opportuni-
ties for expansion stemming from government investment.75
This experience also increases the likelihood of success in the
private sector: minority businesses that “excel and prosper in
public procurement are arguably more likely to be successful in
the private market because of the similar skills required in both
fields.”76 In fact, studies show that the strongest and most com-
petitive WOBs are ones that have contracted with the federal
government.77 In turn, these newly strengthened businesses go
on to support their communities by hiring minority employees
72 See Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Business in Support of Re-
spondents, supra note 26, at *7.
73 The government itself has affirmed that there may be benefits to remedying
past discrimination. See, e.g., McClean, supra note 17, at 746–47. For example, the
government defends the SBA 8(a) program, discussed in Part III.D, on remedial
grounds, arguing that the SBA 8(a) program “eliminates barriers to business de-
velopment created by past discrimination.” Id.
74 Trent Taylor, Note, The End of an Era? How Affirmative Action in Government
Contracting Can Survive After Rothe, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 853, 872 (2010).
75 Id. at 855.
76 Id. at 869.
77 Kathleen Mee, Note, Improving Opportunities for Women-Owned Small Businesses
in Federal Contracting: Current Efforts, Remaining Challenges, and Proposals for the Fu-
ture, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 721, 727 (2012); see also Denise Benjamin Sirmons, Federal
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and sourcing from minority suppliers, multiplying the effects of
government investment.78 Overall, diversity in government con-
tracting serves to increase public trust in the government’s abil-
ity to support its citizens’ success,79 achieve efficiency and best
value in procurement,80 and yield better and more creative solu-
tions. The remainder of this section provides an overview of fed-
eral government contracting mechanics and how federal
programs aimed at small businesses can help develop WOSBs
and MOSBs.
B. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS OVERVIEW
“The U.S. government is the largest customer in the world.”81
The federal government spends approximately 40% of its “dis-
cretionary spending” on contracts for goods and services sup-
porting its vast multitude of projects—a total of over $586
billion in fiscal year 2019.82 Moreover, federal government
spending continues to increase,83 with total spending increasing
Contracting with Women-Owned Businesses: An Analysis of Existing Challenges and Po-
tential Opportunities, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 725, 733 (2004).
78 Taylor, supra note 74, at 870.
79 Id. at 869–70.
The amicus curiae brief of several former high-ranking officers and
civilian leaders of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps also
argued for greater diversity in the military forces. The officers as-
serted that greater diversity in leadership roles results in greater
“public confidence in the fairness and integrity of public institu-
tions” and enhances “their ability to perform their vital functions
and missions.” Accordingly, diversity in public procurement not
only will increase diversity among government contractors, but also
will lead to greater public trust of the Government because of the
Government’s demonstrated commitment to diversity and equality.
Id. (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. in Sup-
port of Respondents at 1, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241)).
80 Id. at 869 (“Unique approaches in problem solving and product design are
essential to achieving efficiency and the best value in procurement. Creativity is
especially important in proposals involving competitive negotiations, which seek
the proposal that offers the best solution and is by far the most preferred method
of fixed-price contracting.”).
81 Contracting Guide, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/federal-con-
tracting/contracting-guide [https://perma.cc/ZB78-FDWQ].
82 A Snapshot of Government-wide Contracting for FY 2019 (Infographic), U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.: WATCHBLOG (May 26, 2020) [hereinafter Federal Govern-
ment Contracting for FY 2019], https://blog.gao.gov/2020/05/26/a-snapshot-of-
government-wide-contracting-for-fy-2019-infographic/ [https://perma.cc/76TJ-
B9X4].
83 Compare id. (depicting government spending), with Federal Government Con-
tracting for Fiscal Year 2018 (Infographic), U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.: WATCH-
BLOG (2019) [hereinafter Federal Government Contracting for FY 2018], https://
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by $100 billion between 2015 and 2018.84 Overall, this renders
federal government contracting an enormous endeavor in terms
of scope, dollar amounts, and complexity.
Several statutes regulate how the government acquires goods
and services. The primary and most fundamental set of regula-
tions is the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which went
into effect in April 1984.85 The FAR, intended to establish uni-
form, government-wide procurement procedures, governs all
purchases by federal executive agencies, unless otherwise ex-
cluded.86 The regulations enable the government “to deliver on
a timely basis the best value product or service . . . maintaining
the public’s trust and fulfilling public policy objectives.”87 Appli-
cable FAR provisions “are incorporated into every federal gov-
ernment procurement contract and have the same effect as if
they were set forth in the contract itself,” with contract terms
that legally bind both parties.88 Beyond this 53-part regulatory
system, many agencies also have their own FAR supplements,
such as the NASA FAR Supplement or the DoD FAR Supple-
ment.89 With each agency’s supplement included, the total FAR
exceeds 5,000 pages.90
Contracting officers (COs), agency officials with the authority
and responsibility to contract for goods and services,91 retain
sole authority to enter into, sign, modify, or terminate contracts
on behalf of the government.92 COs oversee the major phases of
the acquisition process: “(1) acquisition planning and market
research; (2) solicitation of offers and selection of sources . . . ;
blog.gao.gov/2019/05/28/federal-government-contracting-for-fiscal-year-2018-
infographic/ [https://perma.cc/M9DX-K2FU] (depicting government spending
lower than that of fiscal year 2019).
84 Federal Government Contracting for FY 2018, supra note 83; U.S. GOV’T AC-
COUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-244SP, CONTRACTING DATA ANALYSIS: ASSESSMENT OF
GOVERNMENT-WIDE TRENDS 5 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/
683273.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DH9-UWM9].
85 Stephen W. Feldman, Federal Acquisition Regulation, 4 GOV’T CONT. GUIDE-
BOOK, at § 2:12 (Oct. 2019), Westlaw GCGUIDE.
86 Id.
87 FAR 1.102(a) (2020).
88 Feldman, supra note 85, § 2:12.
89 Richard D. Lieberman & Jason D. Morgan, The Basics of Government Con-
tracts—A Primer, 47 CONT. MGMT. Aug. 2007, at 33.
90 Id.
91 FAR 2.101.
92 FAR 1.601(a), 43.202, 52.249-2(a).
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and (3) contract performance and administration.”93 In particu-
lar, COs play a major role in ensuring FAR provisions are closely
followed in the award of government contracts.94
Federal statutes stipulate that most contracts be awarded com-
petitively. Per the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984
(CICA), all government contracts are subject to full and open
competition through the use of competitive procedures, apart
from certain exceptions.95 The two primary competitive proce-
dures include (1) sealed bidding through an invitation for bids;
or (2) negotiated procurement using a request for proposals.96
Exceptions arise in situations such as sole source procurements,
where the good or service is only available from a single vendor
(or a limited number of vendors), emergency situations, “or
where full and open competition would compromise national
security.”97 The small business set aside programs discussed be-
low also receive exemption from CICA.98
93 See Anna S. Molina, The Sisyphean Course of Combatting Gender Discrimination in
the Federal Marketplace for Prime Contracts: Rolling the Boulder of Small Business Size, 22
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 109, 115 (2015) (citing FAR 2.101).
94 FAR 1.602-2.
95 41 U.S.C. § 253; see also FAR 6.101. CICA intended for all procurements to
be competed as full and open so that any qualified company would be able to
submit an offer. 41 U.S.C. § 253(a)(1)(A). CICA aimed to increase competition
for procurements to enable cost reduction and increased opportunities for small
businesses to win federal contracts. Id. § 253(b)(1)(A).
96 Lieberman & Morgan, supra note 89, at 35, 37. “Sealed bidding is employed
when an agency is able to articulate all of the specifications, terms, and condi-
tions of the contract in the IFB, except for price. In this method, contractors
provide the missing term—price—in the form of a sealed bid.” Id. In contrast,
[n]egotiated procurements are used where the procuring agency
seeks “best value,” meaning that the agency will award the contract
on the basis of evaluation factors, including but not limited to
price. . . . Once the CO receives the initial proposals from offerors,
he or she will then conduct an evaluation using the evaluation fac-
tors and may make an award, if it is the best value. Otherwise, the
CO will whittle the field to a “competitive range” of three to four
contractors.
Id.
97 Id. at 35.
98 See FAR 6.203–.207 (permitting the award of contracts on a basis other than
full and open competition for small business and minority set aside programs).
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C. THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION AND SMALL BUSINESS
CONTRACTING PROGRAMS
The Small Business Act of 1953 (SBAct) established the
SBA.99 The SBAct recognized the imperative need to assure
American economic security and well-being through the encour-
agement and development of small business activity.100 In sup-
port of this initiative, Congress declared it sound policy for the
government to:
aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the inter-
ests of small-business concerns in order to preserve free competi-
tive enterprise, to insure that a fair proportion of the total
purchases and contracts or subcontracts for property and services
for the Government . . . be placed with small-business enter-
prises, to insure that a fair proportion of the total sales of Gov-
ernment property be made to such enterprises, and to maintain
and strengthen the overall economy of the Nation.101
The SBA helps American small businesses102 by securing access
to funding, providing counseling and training on proper busi-
ness management, and advocating for small business concerns
through research, policy analysis, and congressional testi-
mony.103 In terms of government contracting, the SBA oversees
the federal agency-wide goal of awarding 23% of federal govern-
ment prime contract awards to small businesses each fiscal year,
as mandated by Congress.104 The agency in turn advises, encour-
99 About SBA: Organization, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/
about-sba/organization [https://perma.cc/6M46-YTZ7].
100 See Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. 85-536, § 2, 67 Stat. 232, 232 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 631).
101 Id.
102 There is no uniform definition for what constitutes “small.” See Federal Con-
tracting Guide: Size Standards, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/fed-
eral-contracting/contracting-guide/size-standards [https://perma.cc/6DYS-
55BQ]. Instead, the SBA sets size standards, which “define the largest size a busi-
ness can be to participate in government contracting programs and compete for
contracts reserved or set aside for small businesses. Size standards vary by industry
and are generally based on the number of employees or the amount of annual
receipts the business has.” Id.
103 See About SBA: Organization, supra note 99.
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ages, and monitors all federal agencies in meeting this
benchmark.105
1. Small Business Set Asides
Small businesses benefit from SBA programs that permit COs
to give priority to small businesses when procuring goods and
services. This preferential consideration, termed a “small busi-
ness set-aside[ ],”106 is a competitive award reserved “exclusively”
for participation by “small business concerns.”107 With few ex-
ceptions, contracts with an anticipated dollar value between
$10,000 and $250,000 are automatically set aside for small busi-
nesses.108 This restriction offers smaller companies a unique op-
portunity to secure government contracts without competition
from larger businesses that, based on size, might be better
equipped to spread costs to undercut a small business’s propo-
sal. For acquisitions over $250,000, a CO shall set aside an acqui-
sition provided that certain conditions are met, most
fundamentally when: (1) the CO has a “reasonable expectation
that: (1) [o]ffers will be obtained from at least two responsible
small business concerns; and (2) [the a]ward will be made at fair
market prices.”109 Where a total set-aside is not appropriate for a
given acquisition, the contracting officer also is expected to set
aside only a portion of the acquisition—in essence, leaving
room for small businesses where it would not otherwise be feasi-
ble to award the whole contract to a smaller entity.110
105 See id. (“Every Federal agency with procurement authority is responsible for
contributing towards meeting the Federal government-wide small business pro-
curement goals. Each agency must provide the maximum practicable opportunity
to small businesses to win awards and must work to improve its procurement
processes to meet the goals.”).
106 See FAR 19.203(e) (“Small business set asides have priority over acquisitions
using full and open competition.”).
107 FAR 19.501(a)(1).
108 FAR 2.101, 19.502–2(a). Contracts valued between $10,000 and $250,000
are automatically reserved exclusively for small business concerns and “shall be
set aside for small business unless the contracting officer determines there is not
a reasonable expectation of obtaining offers from two or more responsible small
business concerns that are competitive in terms of fair market prices, quality, and
delivery.” Id.
109 FAR 19.502–2(b).
110 Partial set-asides exclude construction contracts. FAR 19.502–3(a).
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2. Social Policy-Oriented Small Business Set-Asides: The HUBZone,
SDVOSB, WOSB, and SBA 8(a) Programs
The federal government has made a commitment to employ-
ing government contracts to better support and empower cer-
tain groups. To that end, it is government policy to:
provide maximum practicable opportunities in its acquisitions to
small business, veteran-owned small business [VOSB], service-dis-
abled veteran-owned small business [SDVOSB], HUBZone small
business [HUBZone], small disadvantaged business [small DB],
and [WOSB] concerns. Such concerns must also have the maxi-
mum practicable opportunity to participate as subcontractors in
the contracts awarded by any executive agency, consistent with
efficient contract performance.111
The SBA veteran and “affirmative action” small business pro-
grams, like the general small business program, allow for set-
asides that exempt acquisitions from “full and open competi-
tion.”112 These set-asides permit consideration of minority busi-
ness concerns before considering more generalized small
business concerns: COs use their discretion to utilize any of the
above-mentioned programs before the traditional small business
set-aside.113 However, there is parity amongst the programs,
meaning that COs assign no automatic “order of precedence” in
deciding which program to employ.114 Instead, an agency
chooses amongst the four programs based on market research
(a determination of whether there are any “socioeconomic firms
capable of satisfying the agency’s requirement”) and current
progress in advancing toward contracting goals for each
program.115
Each of the SBA’s four programs effectuates different, impor-
tant policy goals through relatively similar mechanisms. The
HUBZone set-aside program, established through the Small Bus-
iness Reauthorization Act of 1997, “limits competition for cer-
tain contracts to businesses in historically underutilized business
111 FAR 19.201(a).
112 FAR 19.203(d).
113 FAR 19.203; U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., WOMEN OWNED SMALL BUSINESS
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zones.”116 The goal of the program is “to provide federal con-
tracting assistance . . . to increase employment opportunities,
investment, and economic development in such areas,”117 which
are typically geographic areas with low income levels, high pov-
erty, high levels of unemployment, disaster areas, or qualified
Indian lands.118 In July 2020, there were 7,461 actively certified
firms in the HUBZone program.119 The current federal goal is
for each agency to award 3% of prime contracts to HUBZone
businesses.120 The SDVOSB set-aside program serves a similar
set-aside function for VOSBs and requires at least 51% business
ownership by a service-disabled veteran.121 The government
seeks to award at least 3% of all annual federal contracting dol-
lars to SDVOSBs.122 The WOSB and SBA 8(a) Programs, of chief
importance for this paper, are discussed more thoroughly
below.
D. WOMEN-OWNED SMALL BUSINESS PROGRAM
There are over 11 million WOBs in the United States.123 In
fact, “[i]f all the women-owned businesses in the United States
were their own country, they would have the fifth largest gross
domestic product (GDP) in the world, preceding France, Italy,
and the United Kingdom.”124 “Women own a quarter of all
non[-]farm businesses in the United States,”125 employing nearly
9 million people.126 As changing cultural factors have permitted
116 FEDERAL CONTRACTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: HUBZONE PROGRAM, U.S.
SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/federal-contracting/contracting-assis-
tance-programs/hubzone-program [https://perma.cc/HK9U-S8JS]; see also U.S.
SMALL BUS. ADMIN., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41268, HISTORICALLY UNDERUTILIZED
BUSINESS ZONE EMPOWERMENT CONTRACTING (HUBZONE) PROGRAM (July 7, 2020)
[hereinafter SBA HUBZONE PROGRAM], https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R41268.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FZ2-SSB2].
117 13 C.F.R. § 126.100 (2019).
118 SBA HUBZONE PROGRAM, supra note 116, at 1, 8.
119 Id. at 15.
120 Id. at 20.




122 SBA HUBZONE PROGRAM, supra note 116, at 20.
123 AM. EXPRESS, THE 2017 STATE OF WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESSES REPORT 3
(2017) (defining a WOB as one that is “at least 51% owned, operated, and con-
trolled by one or more females.”).
124 Mee, supra note 77, at 723.
125 Id. at 724.
126 AM. EXPRESS, supra note 123, at 3.
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women greater autonomy and access to education and employ-
ment, women have increasingly taken on business ownership
roles. From 1997–2017, the number of WOBs grew by 114%—a
growth rate 70% higher than the 44% national growth rate for
all businesses.127 The growth rates for women of color are sub-
stantially higher, with the number of firms owned by women of
color expanding by 467% during that same period.128 While the
largest industry area for women-owned firms is in services such
as hair salon or pet care services, about 1.5 million women-
owned firms engage in services ranging from law to accounting,
public relations, or scientific functions.129
Despite dramatic increases in business ownership by women,
significant challenges remain. Women face a marked disadvan-
tage based on gender discrimination that prevented women
from owning or growing businesses throughout history.130 When
women have started businesses, barriers often render attaining
the same level of revenue generation as men more difficult—on
average, WOBs generate just a quarter of the sales of male-
owned businesses.131 Studies on the survival of new businesses
have found that “over a four-year period, seventy-two percent of
men-owned firms survived compared to only sixty-six percent of
WOBs.”132 Figures for WOBs demonstrate that while ownership
is a first step, more work needs to be done to ensure WOBs en-
joy the same access to capital, opportunities, and continued
growth as male-owned businesses.
Based on this need, women stand to greatly benefit from gov-
ernment contracting opportunities. However, government con-
tracting with women has historically been severely lacking:
“WOBs comprise 28.7% of all the nonfarm businesses in the
United States, but they only represent 8.3% of all federal prime
127 Id.
128 Id. at 5.
129 Id. at 8. About 2.8 million, or 23% of all women owned firms, are in the
“other services” category, which includes services like hair and nail salons or pet
care businesses. Id. This is the top industry area for women. Id. Approximately
12% of women-owned firms are in the professional, scientific, or technical ser-
vices category. Id. Currently, the most rapidly growing industry for WOBs is the
construction business. Id.
130 See generally Wendy Gamber, A Gendered Enterprise: Placing Nineteenth-Century
Businesswomen in History, 72 BUS. HIST. REV. 188 (1998); S. COMM. ON SMALL BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 113TH CONG., 21ST CENTURY BARRIERS TO WOMEN’S ENTREPRE-
NEURSHIP (rev. ed. 2014) (Maj. Rep.) (authored by Maria Cantwell, Comm.
Chairwoman).
131 Mee, supra note 77, at 725.
132 Id.
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contractors and they are awarded less than 2.5% of all federal
prime contracting dollars.”133 The sections below examine the
slow start of the federal WOSB program and the government’s
inadequate efforts to achieve WOSB contracting goals.
1. History of WOSB Federal Government Contracting
Despite a long history of gender discrimination in the United
States, women were not the original focus of SBA affirmative ac-
tion programming. When Congress first amended the SBAct to
create the SBA 8(a) Program, the primary focus was on “socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals”—which tacitly in-
cluded women of color, but did not explicitly include women on
the whole.134 In 1979, President Carter signed Executive Order
12138 requiring federal agencies to “take affirmative action in
support of women’s business enterprise,”135 which included fed-
eral procurement.136 Yet, women did not truly receive support in
securing federal procurement dollars until the Federal Acquisi-
tion Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA).137 The FASA established
the goal of awarding at least 5% of all federal prime contracting
dollars to WOSBs each fiscal year.138 This 5% goal was sorely
needed—in 1989, only 1% of federal contracting dollars were
being awarded to WOBs.139
While the FASA was a legislative victory, it did not do much to
actually implement improvements in contracting awards to
WOSBs. Even after five years with FASA’s 5% contracting goal
for WOSBs in place, in 2000, WOSBs only received 2.3% of what
was at the time $200 billion in annual federal contract awards.140
FASA’s initial enactment left COs with no tools or guidance to
meet the 5% goal and no true incentive.141
Instead, legislation in 2000 and subsequent rulemaking in
2010 went further to advance opportunities for WOBs.142 Con-
gress enacted the Equity in Contracting for Women Act
133 Id. at 727.
134 See Molina, supra note 93, at 124.
135 Exec. Order No. 12138 § 1-101(b), 3 C.F.R. § 393 (1979).
136 Molina, supra note 93, at 124.
137 Id.; Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355
§ 7106(a)(2)(A), 108 Stat. 3243, 3375 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 644).
138 Molina, supra note 93, at 125.
139 Id. at 124–25.
140 Patricia A. Meagher, The Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contracting Pro-
gram: Ten Years in the Making, 46 PROCUREMENT LAW., Winter 2011, at 17.
141 Mee, supra note 77, at 729.
142 Id. at 729, 732.
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(ECWA) in 2000, which amended the SBAct to create a WOSB
program.143 The ECWA called for the SBA to first conduct a
study to identify which industries most sorely suffered from un-
derrepresentation of WOBs.144 It then authorized COs to set
aside contracts for the WOSB program specifically in those in-
dustries the SBA had previously identified as lacking in WOSB
representation.145 The success of the ECWA’s passage, however,
was diminished with a change in presidential administration and
new priorities for the SBA.146 While the SBA did conduct an ini-
tial study in 2001 to identify in which industry areas WOSBs
were underrepresented, this study was never published.147 A
study by the RAND Corporation, commissioned by the SBA sev-
eral years later, now serves as the basis for measuring representa-
tion of WOSBs in industry areas.148
The SBA’s 2010 rulemaking, which finally implemented the
WOSB program ten years after its initial creation, was a hard-
fought victory that finally increased opportunities for women.149
The final rule150 sets out eighty-three industries in which WOSBs
Unlike other small business programs in which Contracting Of-
ficers (COs) were enabled to reserve (or “set aside”) some contracts
for specific types of businesses, no similar program existed with re-
gard to WOSBs. The House Committee recognized that without a
specifically targeted WOSB program, the Government would never
achieve the five percent goal. In light of this recognition, the legis-
lature drafted and enacted the ECWA.
Id. at 730.
143 Equity in Contracting for Women Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. I § 302,
114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-684 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(C)); see also FAR
19.1500(a).
144 Meagher, supra note 140, at 17.
145 Id.
146 See id.
147 Id. In 2003, SBA sought an independent review, and in 2005, the National
Academy of Sciences declared the SBA study flawed based on poor methodology.
Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. Spurred in part by a 2004 meeting with the SBA administrator who pur-
portedly declared the ECWA’s goals (helping women-owned businesses) “mean-
ingless,” the U.S. Women’s Chamber of Congress sued the SBA for the undue
delay in implementing the program. See id. The final rule was issued by SBA on
October 7, 2010. Id. at 18; 75 Fed. Reg. 62,258 (Oct. 7. 2010).
150 In the SBA’s 2007 proposed rule, the agency set out only a small set of
industries/NAICS codes to which the WOSB program would apply. See Lillian F.
McManus, Note, The Anatomy of a Helping Hand: Women-Owned Small Businesses and
Federal Contract Procurement, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 625, 632 (2012). Sena-
tor John Kerry “called it ‘a slap in the face to women business owners’ and ac-
cused the SBA of ‘cherry picking data’ in order to create a highly exclusive
program.” Id. (quoting Sharon McLoone, SBA Upsets Lawmakers with Contracting
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are either underrepresented or substantially underrepresented,
measured by both the share of contracting dollars awarded and
the share of total contracts awarded to WOSBs.151 At the time
the rule took effect on February 4, 2011, the WOSB Program
was generally well received.152
2. Current WOSB Program Functioning
The WOSB Program helps meet the federal government-wide
goal of awarding 5% of all prime contracting dollars to WOSBs
each year.153 Program regulations distinguish between awards to
economically disadvantaged WOSBs (EDWOSBs) or WOSBs, for
which COs may set aside acquisitions when the acquisition is “as-
signed a [North American Industry Classification System (NA-
ICS)] code in which SBA has determined that WOSB concerns
are underrepresented in Federal procurement,” and for those busi-
nesses, for which COs may set aside acquisitions when the acqui-
sition is assigned a NAICS code for which “WOSB concerns are
substantially underrepresented.”154 The WOSB Program also per-
mits COs to award WOSB sole source set-asides before consider-
ing other small business set-asides, provided certain conditions
are met.155
Two shortcomings limit the ability of the WOSB Program to
fully support the needs of women business owners. First, the fed-
Plan, WASH. POST. (Dec. 28, 2007), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/small-busi-
ness/2007/12/sba_upsets_lawmakers_with_cont.html [https://perma.cc/HT8E-
E3JL]).
151 Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg.
62,258, 62,258 (Oct. 7, 2010) (codified at 13 C.F.R. pts. 121, 124, 125, 126, 127,
134).
In the 2010 final rule, the SBA identified eighty-three North Ameri-
can Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes that would be eli-
gible for the WOSB federal contracting program. Of these
industries, forty-five were identified as industries in which WOSBs
were underrepresented and thirty-eight were identified as indus-
tries in which WOSBs were substantially underrepresented. This
rule took effect on February 4, 2011, and since then COs oversee-
ing contracts that fall within one of the eighty-three NAICS codes
identified by the rule have been able to implement the WOSB fed-
eral contracting program.
Mee, supra note 77, at 732–33 (citing Women-Owned Small Business Federal
Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. at 62,258, 62,262); see also Meagher, supra note
140, at 18.
152 Meagher, supra note 140, at 18.
153 Id.
154 FAR 19.1505(a)(2) (emphasis added).
155 See FAR 19.1505(c).
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eral government has consistently fallen short of actually meeting
the 5% WOSB contracting goal.156 Though the government
overall has come close, for example reaching 4.75% of contracts
in 2018,157 in an entire decade (2009–2019) the government
only met its WOSB contracting goal in a single year—2015.158
This significantly shortchanges WOSBs,159 as even a 1% increase
in award of contracting dollars would mean an additional ap-
proximately $5.5 billion allocated to women business owners.160
Second, the WOSB Program only permits set-asides for
EDWOSBs and WOSBs in certain NAICS-coded industries.161
Many commenters to the original rule criticized162 the selection
processes for the NAICS codes under which WOSBs may receive
set-asides, and “expressed their desire for the SBA to include all,
or at least more, NAICS codes in the program instead of only
156 Jessie Bur, Agencies Improved on Small Business Goals, But Can Do More, FED.
TIMES (June 26, 2019), https://www.federaltimes.com/acquisition/2019/06/26/
small-businesses-get-a-fair-share-of-contracts-but-improvements-remain/ [https://
perma.cc/NQB5-JZ6R].
157 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., GOVERNMENT-WIDE PERFORMANCE FY18 SMALL BUSI-
NESS PROCUREMENT SCORECARD (2019), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/
2019-06/G_W.pdf [https://perma.cc/WG59-3JYG].
158 Bur, supra note 156.
159 It is worth noting, however, that often individual agencies will meet their
contracting goal. See Molina, supra note 93, at 134. For example, in 2014, twenty-
two out of twenty-four federal agencies met their 5% WOSB goal; however, the
DoD, the “largest buyer in the executive branch,” did not, skewing the overall
agency-wide contracting goal. Id. In fact, the DoD decreased overall contract
awards to small businesses while awarding significantly higher value contracts,
suggesting that the agency is procuring large contracts from large companies—
leaving little room for small business empowerment goals. Id. As DoD procure-
ments often source from aerospace industry actors, this holds significance in
terms of diversifying the space industry. See Molina, supra note 93, at 134; Top 10
Defense Contractors, BLOOMBERG GOV. (June 26, 2020), https://about.bgov.com/
top-defense-contractors/ [https://perma.cc/P7R5-HLQB] (listing major aero-
space industry actors, such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin).
160 In fiscal year 2018, the federal government spent $550 billion on contracts.
Federal Government Contracting for FY 2018, supra note 83. One percent of $550
billion is $5.5 billion.
161 Federal Contracting Assistance Programs: Women-Owned Small Business Federal
Contracting Program, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/federal-con
tracting/contracting-assistance-programs/women-owned-small-business-federal-
contracting-program [https://perma.cc/8TAC-CXZL].
162 The SBA itself acknowledged that “dozens of comments” supported a “dra-
matic expansion of the list.” McManus, supra note 150, at 632. Such an expansion
would put the WOSB on equal footing with the SBA’s other affirmative action
programs. Id. (quoting Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Pro-
gram, 75 Fed. Reg. at 62,259).
448 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [85
the specified eighty-three codes.”163 Limiting set-asides to only
specific industry areas impedes COs from considering a WOSB
set-aside even when the industry area may still effectively need
the support of the WOSB Program. These shortcomings indi-
cate the need for further work to implement the WOSB Pro-
gram and strengthen its impact.
E. CONTRACTING WITH MINORITIES: SOCIALLY AND
ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED BUSINESSES AND THE
SBA 8(A) BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
1. History
The U.S. federal government has a long history of affirmative
action in government contracting, having first set out the 8(a)
Program in the SBAct of 1953.164 This section gave the SBA the
“authority to enter into subcontracts with small businesses for
the acquisition of goods and services ‘whenever it determines
such action necessary.’”165 Support for minorities coalesced in
1968 when President Johnson urged the SBA to create a pro-
gram under its SBAct 8(a) authority that would assist minority
businesses, known as those owned by “‘socially or economically
disadvantaged’ persons.”166 Based on this missive, in 1969 the
SBA transformed the 8(a) Program from one focused mostly on
stimulating low-income areas to one aimed at assisting disadvan-
taged business owners.167 The goal was to help “small concerns
owned by disadvantaged persons to become self-sufficient, viable
businesses capable of competing effectively in the market
place.”168
After the establishment of support for minorities in the 1960s,
the SBA 8(a) Program grew throughout the 1970s and 80s. In
1971, executive orders by President Nixon prompted implemen-
tation of additional policies, including technical and manage-
ment assistance to relevant firms and coordination across
163 Mee, supra note 77, at 734.
164 15 U.S.C. § 637(a).
165 Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, A Decade Later: Adarand and Croson and the Status of
Minority Preferences in Government Contracting, 21 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 3 (2009)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)).
166 Id. (quoting 13 C.F.R. § 124.8–1(c)(1)(7) (1997)).
167 Antoine Marshall, Pathways for Procurement: Operating Minority Business Pro-
grams After Rothe, 6 S. REGION BLACK STUDENTS ASS’N L.J. 1, 9 (2012).
168 Id. (quoting 13 C.F.R. § 124.8–1(b) (1970)).
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federal agencies.169 Congress built upon these changes in 1978
amendments to both the SBAct and the Small Business Invest-
ment Act. The amendments reformatted the 8(a) Program to
concentrate on set-asides to “socially and economically disadvan-
taged small business concerns,” and set a goal of awarding 5% of
the total value of all contracts to small DBs.170
Presently, much of the debate about the 8(a) Program con-
cerns its constitutionality following several court opinions: in
particular, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,171 Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Pena,172 and Rothe Development Corp. v. Department of
Defense.173 These cases suggest that for affirmative action pro-
grams in federal government contracting to survive strict scru-
tiny, the government must produce evidence of discrimination
to justify a present need in each industry in which it awards con-
tracts.174 Though the legal landscape remains unclear post-Rothe,
for now affirmative action contracting programs withstand con-
169 Christopher R. Noon, The Use of Racial Preferences in Public Procurement for
Social Stability, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 611, 613 (2009) (citing Exec. Order No. 11,625,
3 C.F.R. § 213 (1971); Exec. Order No. 11,458, 3 C.F.R. §§ 779, 780 (1969)).
170 Patricia C. Bradley, Affirmative Action or Passive Participation in Perpetuating
Discrimination? The Future of Race-Based Preferences in Government Contracting, 2008
ARMY LAW., Feb. 2008, at 25–26 (quoting An Act to Amend the Small Business Act
and the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1757
(1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)).
171 488 U.S. 469 (1989). In Croson, the Court applied strict scrutiny in evaluat-
ing state and local contracting programs that considered race in awarding con-
tracts. See id. at 493, 508, 511. The Court “essentially abolished most minority
preference business programs for public contracting at the state and local levels
that were in effect at the time of the decision.” See Marshall, supra note 167, at 16.
172 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Adarand extended the Croson strict scrutiny analysis for
race-based contracting programs to federal programs. See id. at 221–22, 238–39.
After Adarand, Congress revised the SBA to survive the Court’s strict scrutiny re-
view. Zehrt, supra note 165, at 12–14. Most Circuits have since concluded that
“Congress had a strong evidentiary basis in deciding that remedial action was
necessary to eradicate the effects of race discrimination in government con-
tracting.” Id. at 16.
173 545 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Federal Circuit struck down an act that
set a 5% goal for awarding defense contracting dollars to socially and economi-
cally disadvantaged individuals each year and permitted awarding contracts to
this group at prices 10% above fair market cost. See id. at 1026–27. The court’s
criticism of the statute concerned the quality and means of gathering evidence of
necessity. See Taylor, supra note 74, at 862–63.
174 McClean, supra note 17, at 747–48 (“If the government fails to meet its
evidentiary burden . . . it risks exposure to Equal Protection challenges. While the
[8(a) Program] remains constitutional on its face, the risk of as-applied chal-
lenges stalled its use in particular industries [and] reduced its overall
effectiveness.”).
450 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [85
stitutionality provided proof exists as to the necessity of the pro-
gram and the narrow tailoring of its design and use.175
2. Current Functioning
Section 8(a) of the SBAct authorizes the SBA “to enter into
[prime] contracts with other [federal] agencies and award sub-
contracts for performing those contracts to firms eligible for
program participation.”176 The 8(a) Program functions by em-
powering the SBA to work with agencies to match agency “re-
quirements with the capabilities of 8(a) participants.”177 The
program permits “set-asides, partial set-asides, and reserves of
Multiple Award Contracts” for the 8(a) Program, and awards
may be either sole source or competitive.178 Competition is re-
quired where there is a reasonable expectation that two eligible
participants will submit offers, and where the anticipated dollar
award, for non-construction contracts, exceeds $4 million.179
Qualification for the program, which involves certification as an
8(a) participant by the SBA, requires firms to be small busi-
nesses and at least 51% owned and controlled by U.S. citizens
who are economically180 and socially disadvantaged,181 among
other requirements.182 The regulations presume that members
of designated racial groups are socially disadvantaged.183 Once
175 Marshall, supra note 167, at 28.
176 FAR 19.800(a).
177 FAR 19.803.
178 13 C.F.R § 124.501(a)–(b) (2019).
179 Id. § 124.506(a)(2).
180 Id. § 124.104(a) (“Economically disadvantaged individuals are socially dis-
advantaged individuals whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has
been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared
to others in the same or similar line of business who are not socially
disadvantaged.”).
181 Id. § 124.103(a) (“Socially disadvantaged individuals are those who have
been subject to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias within American society
because of their identities as members of groups and without regard to their
individual qualities. The social disadvantage must stem from circumstances be-
yond their control.”).
182 Federal Contracting Assistance Programs: 8(a) Business Development Program, U.S.
SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (2020), https://www.sba.gov/federal-contracting/contracting
-assistance-programs/8a-business-development-program [https://perma.cc/A
236-4M5Z].
183 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b) sets out a rebuttable presumption that certain indi-
viduals are socially disadvantaged, including Black-Americans, Hispanic-Ameri-
cans, Native-Americans, Asian Pacific-Americans, Subcontinent Asian-Americans,
and “members of other groups designated from time to time by SBA.” Id.
§ 103(b)(1). An individual not a member of these groups may “establish individ-
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admitted, businesses may remain in the program for up to nine
years.184
Generally, efforts to support MOBs have been more effective
than several of the other affirmative action contracting pro-
grams, including the WOSB program. For example, in fiscal
year 2018 the federal government as a whole exceeded its goal
of awarding 5% of contracting dollars to small DBs by awarding
$46.5 billion, or 9.65%, of prime contracts to small DBs.185
There is a large disparity in which agencies meet the federal 5%
SBA 8(a) goal, in part based on the number of small business-
eligible actions agencies have available.186 For example, in 2018
the Department of Energy awarded only 0.79% of procedure
dollars to SBA 8(a) businesses; the Department of Education
only 1.65%, and the Social Security Administration only
2.28%.187 The most successful agencies have been the SBA itself,
the Department of the Interior, the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission, and the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment.188 Notably, the DoD, the nation’s largest contracting
agency, awarded only 3.4% to the SBA 8(a) Program in 2018,
though at $10.1 billion, the dollar value was relatively high.189 In
any case, each agency must strive to meet yearly program goals
for the program to be most effective.
The federal government has for years developed programs in-
tended to benefit WOBs and MOBs to remedy historical disad-
vantage, empower business owners, and stimulate the economy
ual social disadvantage by a preponderance of the evidence.” See id.
§ 124.103(c)(1).
184 Id. § 124.2.
185 Press Release, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Federal Government Achieves Small
Business Contracting Goal for Sixth Consecutive Year with Record-Breaking $120
Billion to Small Businesses (June 25, 2019), https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/sba-
newsroom/press-releases-media-advisories/federal-government-achieves-small-
business-contracting-goal-fifth-consecutive-year-record-breaking [https://
perma.cc/DE7G-AK4W]; U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 157. All SBA 8(a)
certified firms are socially DBs, but not all socially DBs are SBA 8(a) certified. See
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 157. Generally, agency figures are higher for
small DBs, the broader category, than for the SBA 8(a) program specifically. Id.
This figure is for the broader category. Id.
186 8a Application Package “Bestseller”, EZ8A, https://www.ez8a.com/8a-certifica
tion-package.aspx [https://perma.cc/AL4W-9ZNV].
187 Id.
188 Fact Sheet: Small Disadvantaged Business Federal FY 2018 Prime Contracting, U.S.
SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (2020), https://www.sba.gov/document/support-small-disad
vantaged-business-federal-prime-contracting-factsheet [https://perma.cc/4EMR-
QEH4].
189 8a Application Package “Bestseller”, supra note 187.
452 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [85
by providing more opportunities for small businesses. These
programs, part of the immense set of regulations controlling the
complex government contracting system, provide essential fi-
nancial assistance to deserving businesses. Greater use of SBA
affirmative action programs within industries such as the space
industry could provide the financial investment needed to at-
tract more women and minorities to an industry in dire need of
diversity.
IV. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS AND THE SPACE
INDUSTRY
The government engages in an astronomical amount of con-
tracting each fiscal year and manages both to abide by a uniform
set of regulations in engaging in diverse, complex procure-
ments, and to concentrate on social policy-oriented affirmative
action goals in the process. How does this government con-
tracting framework unfold in the space industry? This section
examines government contracts within the space industry and
how NASA in particular conducts procurements.
A. SPACE PROCUREMENTS GENERALLY
1. Unique Landscape
Fulfilling a government contract for any activity involving
outer space presents unique challenges for both COs and con-
tractors themselves. COs face two issues: acquiring products that
will withstand the unforgiving and ever-mysterious environment
of outer space itself,190 and the practical difficulties that arise
from such large acquisitions.191 From a technological stand-
point, space acquisitions involve a high degree of technical com-
plexity.192 Space systems also grow more complicated than
190 This includes “the harsh launch environment (i.e., shock and vibration)
and space environment (i.e., thermal, radiation, and vacuum).” YOOL KIM, EL-
LIOT AXELBAND, ABBY DOLL, MEL EISMAN, MYRON HURA, EDWARD G. KEATING,
MARTIN C. LIBICKI, BRADLEY MARTIN, MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, JERRY M. SOLLINGER,
ERIN YORK, MARK V. ARENA, ARV BLICKSTEIN & WILLIAM SHELTON, ACQUISITION OF
SPACE SYSTEMS: PAST PROBLEMS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES VOLUME 7, at 41–43
(2015).
191 See id. at 39 (“The[se] include low-quantity buys, the limited industrial base,
very stringent standards for components (e.g., space qualified), high technologi-
cal complexity, and inability to repair hardware on-orbit cost-effectively.”).
192 See id. at 42. Technological
[c]omplexity in space systems may be attributed to the fact that
space system hardware cannot be repaired once launched. . . . But
other complexities result from immature technologies, a high de-
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terrestrial projects given “that space system hardware cannot be
repaired once launched”193—rendering stringent standards for
components and rigorous testing before launch all the more im-
portant.194 The nature of the acquisition process itself, such as
the practice of making expensive but low-volume purchases,
means that contractors producing space equipment often lack
the benefit of repeated production to improve research and de-
sign—a so-called “learning curve” benefit.195 Thus, the high
complexity and infrequent purchasing contribute to a small in-
dustrial base,196 making the inclusion of new or small businesses
more difficult.
Despite the difficulties of product development for space ac-
tivity, contracting with private actors will likely dramatically in-
crease given the privatization trend within the space industry.
Today, the vast majority of space activity is “driven by govern-
ments with private industries acting as contractors.”197 Rather
than the model employed during the height of the Space Race,
whereby NASA employees themselves drove the scientific inno-
vation behind most launches and programs, or even more re-
cent models of the agency procuring goods as a “customer,”
gree of integration with other complex components, subsystems,
and systems, and complex failure modes. As a result, complex sys-




194 See id. at 43 (“High reliability . . . requires high engineering margins and
rigorous testing.”).
195 Id. at 40.
Purchasing in low volumes [means] there is little learning curve
benefit. The last of the production run, although less costly than
the first, will not have the cost reduction that accompanies large
runs. Second, low volumes make it hard to break out all or even
major parts of the design for competition or second-sourcing as a
way to reduce cost, because the learning cost of a new contractor
cannot be absorbed in a small production run.
Id.
196 Id. at 41.
The high qualification standards required for space system parts
have limited the growth of supplier base and competition, particu-
larly when the qualification process itself requires special infrastruc-
ture. Quality requirements for government satellites can be more
demanding than those for commercial satellites to ensure high reli-
ability and hence long life for increasingly complex parts.
Id.
197 ALESSANDRA VERNILE, THE RISE OF PRIVATE ACTORS IN THE SPACE SECTOR, at
xxv (Eur. Space Pol’y Inst. ed., 2018).
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NASA now has shifted “from their position of almighty customer
having full control of all the details of the development of sys-
tems, to a position of consumer, making extensive use of all
readily-available capacities developed in full autonomy by indus-
try.”198 This framework has notable advantages: the government
benefits from substantial cost savings; in turn, private industry
benefits from lucrative government funding while maintaining
full control of design and product development.199 Given the
ever-increasing use of private companies to fulfill agency goals,
contracting between space companies and agencies such as
NASA and DoD will likely remain the framework for space in-
dustry activity, and thus merits additional scrutiny on how and to
whom federal contracting dollars are awarded.
2. Space Actors
As the New York Times articulated,
our day-to-day lives depend on the herds of satellites occupying
orbital space, the world community’s commons. They are inte-
gral to communications, social media, business transactions, mili-
tary operations and surveillance, surveys for charting world
resources and climate and the G.P.S. devices that help us keep
track of ourselves and others.200
Given the multitude of benefits outer space provides, it is no
wonder that a wide variety of federal agencies regulate and over-
see outer space actors.
The space industry is best “understood as a tripartite structure
with civilian, military, and commercial components.”201 For non-
commercial space activity, three main government agencies de-
sign and operate spacecraft: (1) the DoD, which operates space
craft for military purposes;202 (2) NASA, which controls all civil-
ian governmental space activities; and (3) the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which operates envi-
198 Id. at 10.
199 Id.
200 John Noble Wilford, 3, 2, 1, and the Last Shuttle Leaves an Era Behind, N.Y.
TIMES (July 8, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/09/science/space/
09wilford.html [https://perma.cc/X37Z-JUWW].
201 Gabrielle Daley, Note, Building a Ladder to the Stars: A Competition Policy for
the New Space Race, 17 COLO. TECH. L.J. 339, 343 (2019).
202 MATTHEW J. KLEIMAN, THE LITTLE BOOK OF SPACE LAW, at xv (2014). These
purposes include “communications, reconnaissance, early warning [technology],
and meteorology.” Id.
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ronmental and weather monitoring satellites.203 Each agency re-
ceives sizable appropriations from Congress to procure and
launch satellites for their missions.204 Numerous other agencies
also oversee and regulate space activity, such as (1) the Federal
Aviation Administration, which “regulates the launch and reen-
try of commercial spacecraft”; (2) the Federal Communications
Commission, which “licenses and coordinates usage of the radio
frequency spectrum by private satellites”; and (3) other agen-
cies, such as those that regulate environmental protection, intel-
lectual property, or export control.205 As NASA and DoD most
frequently engage in space procurements, DoD procurements
are discussed briefly in this section, and NASA procurements be-
low in Part IV.B.
The DoD has the largest space budget of any federal
agency.206 In 2008, DoD investment in major space programs to-
taled $6.1 billion: $3.2 billion allocated for research, develop-
ment, test, and evaluation; $1.2 billion directed towards
procurement of space products; and $1.6 billion spent on
launch activity.207 Given the military’s need for particular capa-
bilities, the DoD frequently procures more complex and unique
products than any other agency, resulting in acquisition require-
ments unlike any products in the commercial sector.208 There-
fore, DoD satellite acquisitions typically involve developing new
technologies to meet the agency’s “stringent needs.”209 Due to
this particularity, the DoD rarely enters into firm, fixed-price
contracts, as such contracts require advance knowledge of satel-
lite design and cost, which is more typical of mature technolo-
gies than prototypes.210 Instead, the agency pursues cost-
reimbursement contracts that more flexibly accommodate
203 Id. at xv–xvi.
204 E.g., Comm. on Appropriations Together with Minority Views, Department
of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2020, H.R. REP. NO. 116–84, at 156, 187, 226, 236,
251–52, 273, 276 (2020).
205 KLEIMAN, supra note 202, at xvi.
206 Id. at xv.
207 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-315R, BRIEFING ON COMMERCIAL
AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPACE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND ACQUISITION PRAC-
TICES 12 (2010), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10315r.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CQ6Z-M3UJ].
208 Id. at 2.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 3.
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launch delays, changing needs, and the diverse array of other
organizations involved.211
As the agency with the federal government’s largest budget,
the DoD is well situated to direct federal procurement dollars
towards WOSBs and MOSBs in the space industry. In fact, in
fiscal year 2018, DoD prime contract awards to small businesses
represented 59% of all federal small business contracting
awards.212 In terms of diversity, the DoD has, as a general trend,
increasingly awarded more of its contracting dollars to small
businesses, WOSBs, and socially DBs.213 In 2018, the DoD re-
ceived an “A” on its SBA scorecard.214 Overall, the agency has
historically done better in terms of race than gender. For exam-
ple, the agency exceeded its 2018 goal of awarding 5% of con-
tracting dollars to small DBs, with 8.76%, or $26.1 billion,
awarded.215 However, the DoD failed to meet its 5% goal for
WOSBs, totaling only 4.1%, or $12.2 billion.216 While shortcom-
ings in supporting WOSBs may in part stem from inefficiencies
in the WOSB program itself, the DoD can certainly do more to
improve awards to WOSBs. Meeting goals for both WOSBs and
MOSBs would better foster diversity amongst DoD space indus-
try contractors.
B. NASA AND GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
NASA is no stranger to government contracts. With 35,929
procurement actions in fiscal year 2019,217 NASA ranks fifth
amongst civilian federal agencies for most contracting dollars
awarded.218 Since 2015, NASA’s obligations have grown steadily,
leading to total obligations that have expanded from $21 billion
211 Id.
212 Press Release, Dep’t of Def., DoD Achieves Small Business Contracting Goal
for Fifth Consecutive Year (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.businessdefense.gov/
News/News-Display/Article/2031580/dod-achieves-small-business-contracting-
goal-for-fifth-consecutive-year/ [https://perma.cc/AN6N-7EXV].
213 Small Business Program: Goals and Performance, DEP’T OF DEF., https://busi
ness.defense.gov/About/Goals-and-Performance/ [https://perma.cc/387X-
MMYA].
214 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., DEP’T OF DEF.: FY18 SMALL BUSINESS PROCUREMENT
SCORECARD (2019), https://business.defense.gov/Portals/57/Documents/Score
card%20FY2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2AG-EFRW].
215 Id. The agency fell below its subcontracting goal of 5% to small DBs at only
4.10%. Id.
216 Id. The agency did meet its goal of directing 5% of subcontracting dollars
to WOSBs with 5.1% awarded in 2018. Id.
217 See NASA FY19 Procurement Report, supra note 1, at 6.
218 See Federal Government Contracting for FY 2018, supra note 83.
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in 2015 to $35.9 billion in 2019.219 As NASA plans to return to
the Moon and eventually travel to Mars,220 the agency faces new
procurement needs to tackle the scientific feats that will carry
humans to new frontiers. How has NASA typically involved small
businesses, women-owned, and minority-owned small businesses
in contracting?
1. Small Businesses
NASA has committed to promoting and integrating “all small
businesses into the competitive base of contractors that pioneer
the future of space exploration, scientific discovery, and aero-
nautics research.”221 In practice, NASA has in fact incorporated
numerous small businesses—awards to small business firms to-
taled over $3.1 billion in fiscal year 2019,222 of which the agency
awarded $1.6 billion through the set-aside program.223 NASA’s
top 100 contractors in 2019 included 49 small business firms, of
which “21 were disadvantaged firms at the time of the award.”224
Furthermore, NASA awards contracts to entities in all fifty states,
which allows for widespread support of local economies.225
Each award to a small business provides an enormous support
to that business’s growth and development. Historically, long-
term, large-scale NASA projects provided small businesses the
opportunity to build upon their initial research to provide sec-
ondary technologies to the commercial market.226 For example,
a small business that originally developed LED chips to grow
plants on the International Space Station later transformed
these chips for use in a handheld medical device that provided
relief for muscle and joint pain.227 Initial government contracts
therefore provided small businesses with innovative, marketable
219 NASA FY19 Procurement Report, supra note 1, at 6.
220 Press Release, Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., NASA’s Moon to Mars
Plans, Artemis Lunar Program Gets Fast Tracked in 2019 (2019), https://
www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-s-moon-to-mars-plans-artemis-lunar-program-
gets-fast-tracked-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/2VT9-CG49].
221 OSBP Vision & Mission, NASA OFF. SMALL BUS. PROGRAMS, https://
www.osbp.nasa.gov/vision.html [https://perma.cc/4XAR-H9MW].
222 NASA FY19 Procurement Report, supra note 1, at 16.
223 Id. at 17.
224 Id. at 20.
225 See 2016 NASA Small Business House Hearing, supra note 71, at 1 (statement of
Rep. Carlos Curbelo, Comm. Chairman).
226 E.g., id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Grace Meng).
227 Id.
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technology that constituted a new revenue source for sustained
business growth.228
However, while NASA has committed to, and remains actively
involved in, contracting with small businesses, opportunities
may be shrinking. Small businesses testifying before Congress
noted “a diminishing supply of small business set-asides.”229
These smaller companies testified to shrinking opportunities
given NASA’s increasing reliance on large, private sector part-
ners, many of whom perform manufacturing themselves rather
than sub-contracting to smaller businesses,230 and concern over
NASA’s budget, which fluctuates based on Congress’s percep-
tion of NASA mission success.231 Moreover, awards to small busi-
nesses amounted to 21% of total dollars awarded in 2018232 and
22% in 2019;233 while these figures demonstrate that NASA has
met its small business contracting goals in recent years, this suc-
cess indicates that opportunities remain for NASA to set more
ambitious goals, such as setting a goal closer to the federal gov-
ernment-wide goal of allocating 23% of awards to small busi-
nesses.234 In sum, NASA has evoked a commendable
commitment to working with small businesses, but work remains
to uphold this stated vision.
2. NASA and the SBA 8(a) and WOSB Programs
NASA has generally made progress towards supporting wo-
men and racial minorities through SBA contracting programs.
Through the SBA 8(a) Program, NASA awarded $698 million to
small DBs in fiscal year 2019.235 This amounts to an increase
over 2015’s $551 million.236 Through the WOSB program,
NASA awarded $783 million to WOSB firms, including $410 mil-




231 Id.; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-262SP, NASA: AS-
SESSMENT OF MAJOR PROJECTS 5, 9–10 (2019), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/
699373.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B2K-TWGH].
232 NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., NASA PROCUREMENT ANNUAL REPORT:
FY 2018, at 14 (2018), https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/an
nual_procurement_report_2018_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/MV8M-JHUG].
233 NASA FY19 Procurement Report, supra note 1, at 16.
234 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 157.
235 NASA FY19 Procurement Report, supra note 1, at 17.
236 Id. at 19.
2020] DIVERSITY IN THE SPACE INDUSTRY 459
nority women).237 NASA’s investment in these small businesses
provides much needed capital to develop companies and ensure
their continued survival.
In addition to supporting WOBs and MOBs through contract
awards, NASA has developed its own mentorship program de-
signed to improve minority contracting. The NASA Mentor-Pro-
tégé Program (MPP)
encourages NASA prime contractors to assist eligible Protégés,
thereby enhancing the Protégés’ capabilities to perform on
NASA contracts and subcontracts, fostering the establishment of
long-term business relationships between these entities and
NASA prime contractors, and increasing the overall number of
these entities that receive NASA contract and subcontract
awards.238
Eligible protégés include firms participating in SBA programs
for minorities, women, and veterans (small DBs, HUBZone,
WOSBs, and VOSBs/SDVOSBs), Historically Black College or
Universities (HBCUs), minority institutions, and a small handful
of other firm categories.239 This program, which operates sepa-
rately from any other federal program, provides a unique oppor-
tunity for small businesses to enhance their opportunities to win
contracts and subcontracts, and demonstrates NASA’s support
of these firms.
Space industry procurements are amongst the most compli-
cated and lucrative of government contracts. NASA and the
DoD spend billions of dollars on procurement in support of
their missions. On the whole, both agencies fare well in terms of
awarding contracting dollars to WOSBs and MOSBs and in im-
plementing programs to support these businesses their con-
tracting efforts. However, both agencies fall short of contracting
with WOBs, suggesting that further efforts must be undertaken
to improve program success.
237 Id. at 17.
238 Business Development and Technology: Mentor-Protégé Program (MPP), NASA
OFF. SMALL BUS. PROGRAMS, https://osbp.nasa.gov/mpp/index.html [https://
perma.cc/WRW7-N4KJ].
239 Id.
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V. THREE SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING DIVERSITY
IN THE SPACE INDUSTRY THROUGH CONTRACT
AWARDS
A. COMBATTING FRAUD TO ENSURE PROGRAMS TRULY AID
TARGETED POPULATIONS
Though the majority of SBA program participants qualify for
assistance programs and truthfully pursue contracts with the
government, SBA programs do experience significant instances
of fraud and abuse.240 In particular, contractors may commit
fraud by falsely certifying as a woman-owned business, by induc-
ing the SBA to erroneously award SBA 8(a) Program certifica-
tion, or by claiming small business status when a business
exceeds size eligibility.241 These practices direct valuable con-
tracting dollars away from intended program beneficiaries,242
and therefore constitute one major area where the SBA and
space procurement agencies could institute reforms to reserve
more contract awards for women and minority business owners.
1. New Changes to WOSB Certification Stand to Help WOSBs
To qualify as a WOSB, firms must satisfy three requirements:
(1) “be a small business”; (2) “be at least 51% owned and con-
trolled by women who are U.S. citizens”; and (3) have women
managing “day-to-day operations” and “making long-term deci-
sions.”243 Economically disadvantaged WOSBs must meet the
same requirements, and must also demonstrate that the owner’s
net worth, gross adjusted income, and personal assets fall below
a certain dollar amount.244
240 Sarah Westwood, Feds Gave $400 Million in Contracts to Ineligible Firms, WASH.
EXAM’R (Sept. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/feds-gave-400-
million-in-contracts-to-ineligible-firms [https://perma.cc/BHZ5-6FHG]; Press
Release, Dep’t of Justice, Dist. Colo., $3.6 Million Settlement Resolves Procure-
ment Fraud Investigation Against Colorado and Maryland Construction Compa-
nies Involved with SBA’s Minority Disadvantaged Business Development Program
(Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-co/pr/36-million-settlement-re
solves-procurement-fraud-investigation-against-colorado-and [https://perma.cc/
J6FK-KVPX].
241 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., FY2018 CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 5, 16–18 (2017), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/
2019-08/SBA_OIG_FY_2018_CBJ_5-17-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/MP5J-2WW5].
242 Id.
243 Federal Contracting Assistance Programs: Women-Owned Small Business Federal
Contracting Program, supra note 161.
244 Id.
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Historically, the WOSB program was not an SBA certification
program—that is, the SBA did not investigate into WOSB eligi-
bility and did not certify firms as eligible participants in the pro-
gram. WOSBs could certify their eligibility in two ways: by self-
certifying through providing documentation or by obtaining
certification from a third-party certification company approved
by the SBA.245 After self-certifying, the process merely required
COs seeking to award contracts to WOSBs to verify that the en-
tity was (1) registered in the System for Award Management; (2)
had listed its self-certification in the system; and (3) had submit-
ted documents verifying its eligibility by the time of initial of-
fer.246 This method of self-certification absolved the SBA of any
responsibility for determining eligibility for the program by in-
stead taking program applicants at their word—a highly trusting
method easily abused by dishonest firms.247 Self-certification was
thus an easy means for contractors to fraudulently assert WOSB
eligibility and deprive the program of funds for bona fide WOSB
firms.248
However, the SBA recently, and at long last, implemented
changes to WOSB certification that should address many of the
infirmities plaguing self-certification. Based on program modifi-
cations enacted by Congress in the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act of 2015, the SBA announced in January 2020 that it was
developing new regulations.249 The SBA’s new WOSB regula-
tions, published in May 2020 and initially implemented in July
To qualify as an economically disadvantaged business within the
women’s contracting program, a business must: meet all the re-
quirements of the women’s contracting program; be owned and
controlled by one or more women, each with a personal net worth
less than $750,000; be owned and controlled by one or more wo-
men, each with $350,000 or less in adjusted gross income averaged
over the previous three years; and be owned and controlled by one
or more women, each $6 million or less in personal assets.
Id.
245 FAR 19.1503(b), (c)(1).
246 FAR 19.1503(b).
247 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. 18-18, AUDIT RE-




249 Press Release, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., SBA Issues New Regulations for Wo-
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2020, end self-certification.250 Instead, the regulations allow for
WOSB or EDWOSB program-eligible firms to use either the
SBA’s free online certification platform or SBA-approved third-
party certifiers.251
The elimination of self-certification addresses major flaws in
the program.252 A 2015 SBA Inspector General report on WOSB
set-asides “found that from a sample of thirty-four set-aside
awards, ‘[nine] of these [thirty-four] were awarded to firms that
did not provide required documentation to prove they were eli-
gible for WOSBP.’”253 In particular, “[twelve] firms did not pro-
vide sufficient documentation to prove that a woman or women
controlled the day-to-day operations of the firm.”254 Overall,
“tens of millions of dollars” have likely been allocated to WOSBs
that were technically ineligible, but whose eligibility was not
monitored by the SBA.255 The proposed regulations implement-
ing a new certification regime stand to help eligible WOSBs win
contracts that might have otherwise gone to ineligible
businesses.
As the SBA’s new certification process takes effect in 2020,
making self-certification less of a concern, the SBA must take
care to ensure that businesses do not continue to evade pro-
gram goals by making false statements to the agency or its part-
ners. The revised regulations continue to rely on third-party
certifiers, which have been in use since soon after the start of
the WOSB program.256 However, the U.S. Government Account-
ability Office (GAO) reports indicate that the SBA performed
250 Id. The SBA announced the regulations would take effect in July 2020 and
October 2020. Id.
251 Federal Contracting Assistance Programs: Women-Owned Small Business Federal
Contracting Program, supra note 161.
252 Mee, supra note 77, at 735. When the SBA issued its 2010 rule implement-
ing the WOSB program, self-certification was controversial. See id. (“Commenters
disagreed as to the certification procedures set forth in the rule. Many com-
menters believed that self-certification should not be allowed because they feared
it would be too easy to take advantage of the program.”).
253 Matthew Layman, Note, Mistake, Fraud, and Waste: Mass Inefficiencies in Small
Business Programs That Allow Self-Certification, 46 PUB. CONT. L.J. 167, 176–77
(2016) (quoting U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., NO. 15-10, EVALU-
ATION REPORT: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN SBA’S MANAGEMENT OF THE WOMEN-
OWNED SMALL BUSINESS FEDERAL CONTRACTING PROGRAM 4 (2015), https://
www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2019-07/Report_15-10_Improvements_Needed_
in_SBAs_Management_of_WOSBP.pdf [https://perma.cc/4372-GFBY]).
254 Id. at 177.
255 Id.
256 Federal Contracting Assistance Programs: Women-Owned Small Business Federal
Contracting Program, supra note 161.
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little oversight of these third-party certifiers since implementa-
tion of their use.257 As third-party certification remains in use
under the new regulations, the SBA must provide sufficient
oversight to ensure consistent and strict application of the pro-
gram requirements.258 Similarly, the SBA must investigate fur-
ther into claims made by WOSBs. For example, one means of
manipulating the SBA program has been to establish simple
WOSB ownership rather than true control.259 In a 2013 report,
NASA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) found that, out of
twenty contracts awarded to WOSBs, seven, or thirty-five percent,
“were awarded to [six] different firms that may not have met the
criteria for a woman-owned small business.” Specifically, those six
firms appeared to be run by the male spouse of the woman who
owned the business, violating the control requirements set forth
by the SBA.260
These evasions of program rules matter. The goal of the WOSB
program is to redress years of discrimination against women bus-
iness owners and to empower women to grow and develop their
enterprises. Such opportunities are limited and should remain
with the intended beneficiaries. Therefore, despite the signifi-
cant progress made through new SBA rulemaking, the agency
must continue to be vigilant as it now undertakes review of
WOSB program participants.
2. SBA 8(a) Business Development Program Fraud
The SBA 8(a) Program provides exceptional benefits to 8(a)
certified small businesses. Perhaps because of this substantial as-
sistance, some firms have engaged in program fraud by falsely
asserting eligibility in terms of economic status, socially disad-
257 Layman, supra note 253, at 176 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-15-54, WOMEN-OWNED SMALL BUSINESS PROGRAM: CERTIFIER OVERSIGHT AND
ADDITIONAL ELIGIBILITY CONTROLS ARE NEEDED 7 (2014)).
258 The SBA has noted that, to ensure consistency between its review and third-
party certifiers, “SBA is the final authority for all of the certification processes. . . .
[T]he foundation for all the processes is SBA’s Program eligibility requirements.”
Women-Owned Small Business and Economically Disadvantaged Women-Owned
Small Business Certification, 85 Fed. Reg. 27650, 27651 (May 11, 2020).
259 See, e.g., Layman, supra note 253, at 177.
260 Id. (“In total, the OIG estimated that these firms were awarded ‘approxi-
mately $74.5 million in contract obligations during fiscal year 2010 from 54
unique Federal procurement organizations,’ which as a result ‘may have over-
stated progress toward meeting woman-owned business contracting goals by the
same amount.’”).
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vantaged status, or small business size.261 For example, a 2010
GAO report “identified fourteen ineligible firms participating in
the 8(a) Program, that received $325 million of 8(a) contracts.
Eligibility issues included under reporting of net worth and sal-
ary, the principal’s false claim of racial ethnicity, . . . [and] man-
agement by [a] non-disadvantaged individual.”262 These
attempts to deceive SBA program officers occurred despite the
SBA’s direct review and certification of SBA 8(a) firms—unlike
the WOSB program, SBA 8(a) has not permitted self-
certification.263
Based on GAO recommendations, the SBA implemented
changes to the 8(a) regulations in 2011 to combat instances of
fraud.264 Such changes included consideration of SBA 8(a) ap-
plicants’ spouses’ financial assets and determination of whether
an individual’s immediate family member has previously partici-
pated in the SBA 8(a) Program.265 Other changes recom-
mended by the GAO included fraud detection tools and
verification through third-party data sources.266 These improve-
ments go far to help curb erroneous awards to ineligible firms.
Other fraud detection tools include regulations that permit
protests to challenge businesses’ SBA 8(a) certification. How-
ever, protests themselves cannot fully combat fraud given limita-
tions to what aspects of SBA 8(a) certification may be protested.
For example, another offeror, the contracting officer, or the
SBA District Director may launch a size protest alleging that a
successful offeror for a competitive SBA 8(a) award does not
meet size specification to qualify as a small business.267 Yet the
overall “eligibility of an [SBA] 8(a) participant for a sole source
or competitive 8(a) requirement may not be challenged by an-
other 8(a) participant or any other party, either to SBA or any
administrative forum as part of a bid or other contract pro-
test.”268 There are certainly valuable reasons not to question an
individual’s socially disadvantaged status or to require concrete
proof of such status, which would force individuals to prove
261 E.g., Jeffrey F. Pan, Preventing Small Business Fraud, Including Small Business
Contracting Fraud Prevention Act, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 13 (2012).
262 Id. at 21–22.
263 Id. at 15.
264 Id. at 14.
265 Id. at 22.
266 Id.
267 FAR 19.813(c), 19.814.
268 FAR 19.813(a) (emphasis added).
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their racial or ethnic background at the request of disgruntled,
unsuccessful offerors. However, insufficient means exist to en-
sure eligibility requirements are met, and further tools to verify
proper eligibility would go far to reduce fraud and create more
opportunities for true socially and economically DBs.
The SBA should consider further study into 8(a) Program
abuse and the efficacy of protest mechanisms. The agency might
also consider increasing the availability and clarity of guidance
on non-SBA 8(a) opportunities so that ineligible firms have
clear alternative avenues to government funding. Additionally,
the government could decrease fraud by establishing stricter
sentencing guidelines for punishing the exploitation of govern-
ment contracting programs—in essence, raising the stakes for
wrongdoing.269 These improvements to SBA 8(a) Program func-
tioning might serve to preserve valuable government con-
tracting opportunities for the SBA 8(a) Program’s intended
beneficiaries.
B. EMPLOYING NASA’S OTHER TRANSACTIONAL AUTHORITY
In the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (Space
Act), which created NASA, Congress endowed the agency with
the authority to enter into “other transactions as may be neces-
sary in the conduct of its work and on such terms as it may deem
appropriate.”270 The “founding father” of this authority, Space
Act drafter and former NASA General Counsel Paul Dembling,
intended the phrase “other transactions” to be a “‘catchall
phrase’ [that would] provide NASA freedom from traditional
269 Section 2B1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines covers “economic
crimes” like fraud and forgery, and prescribes offense level calculations depen-
dent in part on a calculation of loss. See Michael Sabo, Note, Affirmatively Ambigu-
ous: Reforming the Fraud Federal Sentencing Guidelines Rules in “Affirmative Action”
Government Contracts, 43 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 157, 161–62 (2019). Currently,
many circuit courts use the “general loss rule,” which mitigates loss by factoring
in benefits the government received. Id. at 159. In contrast, under a “government
benefits rule,” often reserved for entitlement programs, the loss for sentencing
purposes is the entire total of the grant or contract awarded without any mitiga-
tion for legitimate services rendered. Id. Resolving the current circuit split in
favor of a government benefits rule would create a harsher punishment for gov-
ernment contracting fraud. Sabo argues that contract programs should be con-
sidered government benefits and that the U.S. Sentencing Commission should
revise the sentencing rules to ensure that those “who illegally exploit government
programs are held accountable for the full amount of money awarded by the
government regardless of any benefits or services provided.” Id. at 187.
270 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Act of 1958, Pub. L. 111-
314, § 20113(e), 124 Stat. 3328, 3334 (1958).
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procurement regulations and flexibility to structure agreements
in line with commercial business practices.”271 Presently, this au-
thority, termed “other transaction[al] authority” (OTA), equips
NASA with flexible, additional contracting authority outside typ-
ical regulatory or contractual constraints,272 as “OTAs are legally
binding instruments [different and separate from] contracts,
grants, or cooperative agreements.”273 Since first envisioned at
NASA’s establishment, the authority to enter into other agree-
ments as necessary has been extended to eleven other agencies,
subject to additional agency regulations.274 The DoD, the fed-
eral government’s largest procurer of goods and services,275 em-
ploys OTAs more than any other agency,276 often for its research
and development work.277
OTAs stand to greatly benefit WOBs and MOBs by providing
an easier, more flexible means of contracting with the govern-
ment that bypasses some of the regulatory hurdles imposed by
contracting regulations. For example, OTAs circumvent regula-
271 Nathaniel E. Castellano, Other Transactions are Government Contracts, and Why
It Matters, 48 PUB. CONT. L.J. 485, 487 (2019).
272 Annejanette Heckman Pickens & Daniel J. Alvarado, Other Transaction Agree-
ments: An Analysis of the Oracle Decision and Its Potential Impact on the Use of OTAs, 54
PROCUREMENT LAW., Fall 2018, at 1, 18.
There is a list of notable statutes that do not apply to OTAs, a few of
which are the Competition in Contracting Act, the Contract Dis-
putes Act, and the Buy American Act. Most notably excluded from
application is the Bayh-Dole Act, which governs patent rights and




274 Id. NASA has broad OTA authority without any preconditions, as opposed
to the DoD. Castellano, supra note 271, at 502.
275 Federal Government Contracting for FY 2018, supra note 83 (showing that the
DoD had $358.3 billion in procurement obligations in 2018).
276 Pickens & Alvarado, supra note 272, at 17 (“[B]etween FY 2015 and FY 2017
DoD spent nearly $21 billion through 148 OTAs.”).
277 Victoria Dalcourt Angle, Innovation in Government Contracting: Increasing Gov-
ernment Reliance on Other Transaction Agreements Mandates a Clear Path for Dispute
Resolution, 49 PUB. CONT. L.J. 87, 95 (2019). The DoD often uses OTAs for re-
search and development purposes. Id. The agency has “authority to enter into
two types of other transactions: OTAs for basic, applied, and advanced research
and development projects and OTAs for prototype projects.” Id. “Prototype OTAs
have the potential to turn into follow-on production OTAs.” Id. In the FY18 Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act, Congress announced “a ‘preference’ for the
use of OTAs for prototypes and research and development projects under 10
U.S.C. § 2371b and 10 U.S.C. § 2371.” Id. at 98 (quoting National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 867, 131 Stat. 1283,
1495 (2017)).
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tions such as the FAR, the CICA, and the Cost Accounting Stan-
dards, and provide the “freedom to negotiate intellectual
property rights outside the [constraints] of the Bayh-Dole
Act.”278 OTAs allow agencies to craft unique, individualized
agreements with a diversity of actors to meet agency needs. Tra-
ditionally, this authority has permitted “agencies to more readily
attract nontraditional contractors, such as commercially focused
technology companies, to research and development
projects.”279 It allows for agency partnerships “with firms that in-
frequently participate in government contracting due to indus-
try perception that government contract regulations are overly
burdensome.”280 Despite these typical uses, OTAs can be used
for a variety of means—in fact, a survey of federal agencies
found that the main reason for their use is for the “flexibility”
the agreements provide.281
There are certainly benefits for women and minorities to
abiding by the FAR. FAR provisions set forth the very SBA pro-
grams that are key to ensuring WOSBs and MOSBs even receive
consideration for prime contracts. However, OTAs can supple-
ment these contracting programs by allowing for additional,
non-traditional means of involving small businesses. For exam-
ple, NASA Kennedy Space Center entered into a non-reimburs-
able agreement, under its OTA, with WOSB Craig Technologies
to take over the remains of the NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot.282
This OTA provided Craig Technologies “the opportunity to
house and maintain the manufacturing equipment for a period
of 5 years and utilize it for any commercial purpose.”283 The
agreement, under which no money was exchanged, “was purely
an entrepreneurial opportunity” that provided an enormous
benefit to a WOSB.284 In fact, founder Carol Craig explained
that the profits secondarily derived from the agreement enabled
her to expand the business to include an aerospace solution di-
278 Castellano, supra note 271, at 488.
279 Pickens & Alvarado, supra note 272, at 19.
280 Angle, supra note 277, at 91.
281 Pickens & Alvarado, supra note 272, at 19 (quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTA-
BILITY OFF., GAO-16-209, FEDERAL ACQUISITIONS: USE OF “OTHER TRANSACTION”
AGREEMENTS LIMITED AND MOSTLY FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES 12
(2016)).
282 2016 NASA Small Business House Hearing, supra note 71, at 9 (statement of
Carol Craig, President and CEO of Craig Technologies).
283 Id.
284 Id.
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vision.285 These types of flexible arrangements, which in the pre-
sent example required relatively little burden or financial
expenditure on NASA’s part, can be transformational for small
businesses seeking experience and resources.
Recent case law regarding OTAs does stand to somewhat limit
their use by decreasing agencies’ discretion to enter into these
agreements. In 2018, the GAO ruled in Oracle America Inc.’s
bid protest286 that “(1) GAO will review a timely protest that an
agency is improperly using its OTA authority and (2) GAO will
sustain a protest where an agency does not comply with statutory
requirements for the award of follow-on production work with-
out competition.”287 As a result of the GAO’s ruling, agencies
must be more careful and adhere to stricter parameters when
entering into OTAs.288 Otherwise, GAO will review the agency’s
OTA use if “entered into without complying with [ ] statutory
requirements,” a decision likely to increase bid protests and
scrutiny of OTAs.289 Despite these new parameters, OTAs pre-
sent a viable alternative option to traditional contracting under
the FAR, and could help encourage agencies to find new solu-
tions to increase contractor diversity.
C. SUPPORT FOR MINORITIES IN STEM
To even address improving the gender and racial diversity of
federal contract awardees requires a body of qualified WOBs
and MOBs in the first place. One source of the lack of diverse
companies contracting with NASA and other space-adjacent
agencies stems from the underrepresentation of women and mi-
norities in STEM fields as a whole.290 As discussed in Part II,
women make up less than 30% of U.S. STEM employees.291 Ra-
cial minorities also face underrepresentation given that STEM
employees with bachelor’s degrees are only 6% Hispanic and
7% Black compared to a total U.S. workforce that is 16% His-
panic and 11% Black.292 Given these barriers, representation
could be improved by (1) supporting minorities by building
285 Id.
286 Oracle Am., Inc., B-416061, 2018 WL 2676823, at *1 (Comp. Gen. May 31,
2018).
287 Pickens & Alvarado, supra note 272, at 22.
288 Angle, supra note 277, at 91 & n.26.
289 Pickens & Alvarado, supra note 272, at 22.
290 See supra Part II (describing the lack of diversity in STEM fields).
291 See Catalyst Data, supra note 42.
292 See FUNK & PARKER, supra note 15.
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upon existing programs assisting minority-serving institutions;
and (2) supporting women by enacting legislation meant to im-
prove conditions for women in STEM.
1. HBCU & Minority-Serving Institution Programs
Building strong and supportive academic departments at mi-
nority-serving institutions (MSIs)293 would encourage students
to enter STEM majors, better educate those students to ensure
their success in competitive job markets, and attract high-caliber
faculty to improve instruction and mentorship. NASA and the
DoD have designed programs to support minority institutions,
both of which have the capacity to improve diversity in STEM.
NASA’s Office of Small Business Programs manages the NASA
HBCU/MSI Program, which directs funds towards Hispanic-
serving institutions, Tribal colleges or universities, Alaska Native-
serving or Native Hawaiian-serving institutions, predominantly
Black institutions, Asian American and Native American Pacific
Islander-serving institutions, and Native American-serving non-
tribal institutions.294 NASA’s policy “is to attain an Agency-wide
goal of one percent of total contract value of prime and subcon-
tracting awards for acquisitions to [HBCUs] and [MSIs].”295 At-
taining this 1% goal, and setting even more ambitious goals
moving forward, would help drive resources towards minority in-
stitutions. Overall, NASA awarded $1.87 billion to educational
institutions in 2019; however, not one of the ten institutions re-
ceiving the greatest percentage of educational contracting
awards were HBCUs or MSIs.296 Investing more in university re-
search programs has enormous potential to drive more STEM
293 Small Business Programs: Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) /
Minority Serving Institutions (MSIs), NASA OFF. SMALL BUS. PROGRAMS, https://
osbp.nasa.gov/hbcu-mi/index.html [https://perma.cc/VR2A-NGF3].
“Minority Serving Institution” must be an institution of higher edu-
cation whose enrollment of a single minority or a combination of
minorities . . . exceeds 50 percent of the total enrollment. Minority
is defined, in 20 U.S.C. § 1067k, as American Indian, Alaskan Na-
tive, Black (not of Hispanic origin), Hispanic (including persons of
Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, and Central or South American ori-




295 NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT: NASA FAR
SUPPLEMENT § 1826.302 (2015), https://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/procurement/
regs/NFS.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2HT-A5JZ].
296 NASA FY19 Procurement Report, supra note 1, at 24.
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majors to these schools or to foster an interest in majoring in
STEM amongst current students.
The DoD’s programs serve similar goals, with the agency dem-
onstrating an interest in and commitment to supporting minori-
ties in STEM. The DoD’s HCUs and MSIs Research and
Education program
enhances work in scientific and engineering disciplines critical to
the national security functions of DoD, improves the capacity of
HBCUs/MSIs to participate in DoD research programs and activ-
ities and increases the number of graduates, including under-
represented minorities, in the fields of science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics important to the defense
mission.297
In 2019, the DoD awarded $23.2 million to 59 MSIs to support
the acquisition of research equipment, which benefitted “24
HBCUs, 34 MSIs, and one Tribal College.”298 Continuing to sup-
port academic institutions, and prioritizing these institutions by
providing research support, awarding contracts, and hiring re-
cent graduates, could help diversify the pool of STEM majors
and yield new STEM graduates interested in forming businesses
and contracting with the government.
2. STEM Legislation
Given the notorious challenges for women working in STEM
professions, legislation aimed at improving working conditions
would help encourage women to enter into and stay in the
field.299 For example, in 2019 Congress passed the Building
Blocks of STEM Act (Building Blocks Act), which modifies Na-
tional Science Foundation (NSF) grant programs that support
297 Press Release, Dep’t of Def., Defense Department Announces Fiscal Year





299 Beyond the legislation discussed in this section, other recent legislation in-
cludes attempts to deal with “cultural and institutional barriers to expanding the
academic and federal STEM workforce.” STEM Opportunities Act of 2019, H.R.
2528, 116th Cong. § 7 (2019). Section 7 requires the director of the NSF to de-
velop written best practices for institutions of higher education and federal labo-
ratories to conduct periodic climate surveys of STEM departments and divisions
“with a particular focus on identifying any cultural or institutional barriers to the
recruitment, retention, or advancement of women, racial and ethnic minorities,
and other groups historically underrepresented in STEM studies and careers.” Id.
§ 7(a)(1).
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STEM education.300 Specifically, the Building Blocks Act encour-
ages participation of underrepresented populations in STEM
fields by prescribing research into whether and how teachers en-
courage or discourage participation of female students in STEM
activities in their classrooms, and what types of activities would
prompt more girls to consider STEM.301 This research makes an
important stride towards determining how and at what point wo-
men begin to feel discouragement from entering into these
fields in the first place.
Despite the progress legislation like the Building Blocks Act
represents in encouraging participation of women in the field,
more must be done. Proposed legislation, such as the Combat-
ing Sexual Harassment in Science Act of 2019, would make con-
siderable strides towards addressing toxic environments and
behavior that render working in STEM unbearable for many wo-
men.302 The bill seeks “to provide for research on the causes,
consequences and prevalence of, as well as interventions for
preventing, sexual harassment in the STEM workforce. The bill
also directs coordination among Federal science agencies efforts
to address sexual harassment involving federally funded re-
searchers.”303 It includes important protections for victims, such
as by directing “the Office of Science and Technology Policy to
consider policy guidelines for all federal science agencies . . . to
help victims reenter the workforce after being the target of har-
assment.”304 Congress should devote serious attention to this
bill, and similar initiatives, as an important means of improving
the STEM profession. Given the high prevalence of sexual har-
assment within science fields,305 greater protection for employ-
ees and better accommodations for survivors could provide the
300 Building Blocks of STEM Act, Pub. L. 116-102 §§ 2(1), 4(3), 133 Stat. 3263,
3263–64.
301 Id. § 4(3)(A).
302 Combatting Sexual Harassment in Science Act of 2019, H.R. 36, 116th
Cong. § 2 (2019).
303 H.R. REP. NO. 116-153, pt. 2, at 6 (2019).
304 Press Release, Congresswoman Lizzie Fletcher, Congresswoman Lizzie
Fletcher Supports Passage of Bill Combatting Sexual Harassment in STEM (July
23, 2019), https://fletcher.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=
2159 [https://perma.cc/QPR2-EJNS].
305 NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENG’G AND MED., SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WOMEN: CLIMATE, CULTURE, AND CONSEQUENCES IN ACADEMIC SCIENCES, ENGINEER-
ING, AND MEDICINE 65 (Paula A. Johnson, Sheila E. Widnall & Frazier F. Benya
eds., 2018). “Greater than 50 percent of women faculty and staff and 20-50 per-
cent of women students encounter or experience sexually harassing conduct in
academia.” Id. These rates are similar to other workplaces. Id. at 1–2. Women in
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support needed to ensure women feel comfortable remaining
and succeeding in the profession.
The three proposed solutions—fraud reduction, increased
use of other transaction authority, and improvements to the
pipeline through educational investment and legislation—
scarcely represent the only or best means by which to improve
diversity in government contracting for the space industry. How-
ever, the solutions do provide the government with options,
both within and outside the scope of the FAR and SBA pro-
grams, to better include disadvantaged American business own-
ers in the work government agencies undertake.
VI. CONCLUSION
Diversity matters. From a historical perspective, women and
racial minorities faced significant barriers and discrimination on
the path to business ownership; from a forward-looking perspec-
tive, wealth generation and the strengthening of minority com-
munities through financial investment remains crucial for lifting
up disadvantaged groups. The space industry, notoriously domi-
nated by white, male voices, stands to benefit immensely from
diverse perspectives and greater inclusivity. Government con-
tracting provides one means by which the industry might diver-
sify. Federal socioeconomic programs provide solid guidance to
COs as to how to allocate more federal resources to WOBs and
MOBs. These programs, in turn, help diverse business owners
create, innovate, and expand, and may lead to more diverse sub-
contracting as well. With improvements to the system such as
better WOSB and SBA 8(a) Program functioning, utilization of
unique contracting opportunities, and greater investment in
and support of women and minorities in STEM, federal govern-
ment contracting programs could greatly improve the makeup
and inclusivity of the space industry.
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In the last two decades, the Department of Homeland Secur-
ity (DHS) has implemented a variety of new screening and iden-
tity verification methods in U.S. airports through its various
agencies such as the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). In particular,
biometric technology has become a focal point of aviation secur-
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using fingerprint, iris, and facial scans to verify travelers’ identi-
ties, not only to enhance security but also to improve the travel
experience.
This Comment examines how DHS, its agencies, and private
companies are using biometric technology for aviation security.
It then considers the most common privacy concerns raised by
the expanded use of biometric technology: data breaches, func-
tion creep, and data sharing. As biometric technology is new
and continually developing, the scope and extent of privacy
threats cannot be completely quantified. However, a combina-
tion of new legislation, technological solutions, and indepen-
dent oversight may be an effective way to protect both biometric
data and traveler privacy while maintaining the benefits of en-
hanced security.
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I. INTRODUCTION
AIR TRAVEL IS AN increasingly common way to travel. In2018, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
screened more than 804 million aviation passengers—a 5% in-
crease from the previous year.1 Millions of those Americans have
been willing to trade their biometric information for the prom-
1 About Face: Examining the Department of Homeland Security’s Use of Facial Recogni-
tion and Other Biometric Technologies: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.,
116th Cong. 33 (2019) (prepared statement of Austin Gould, Assistant Adminis-
trator, Requirements and Capabilities Analysis), https://www.tsa.gov/news/
press/testimony/2019/07/10/use-biometric-technology-department-homeland-
security [https://perma.cc/ZUQ6-2UKG] [hereinafter Biometric Technology
Hearing].
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ise of shorter airport security lines, safer flights, and a better
flying experience.2 However, biometric data collection raises se-
rious questions about data security and traveler privacy.
Biometrics is the science used to identify or verify an individ-
ual’s identity “using physiological or behavioral characteristics.”3
Biometric technology is not limited to government use. Many
companies have started integrating biometric technology into
their products for both security and convenience.4 The con-
sumer industry integrated biometrics into Americans’ everyday
lives.5 For example, iPhone users can now unlock their phones
with their fingerprint or their face instead of a traditional alpha-
numeric password.6
While increased use of biometric security measures can bene-
fit airports in a multitude of ways, the rapid expansion of bio-
metric technology has raised privacy concerns from both sides
of the political aisle.7 Privacy advocates question the govern-
ment’s storage and use of biometric data.8 However, privacy and
security are not mutually exclusive—Congress and the private
sector can strike the proper balance between security and pri-
vacy. An effective solution might include federal legislation, im-
proved technological protections, increased independent
oversight, or more effective opt-out procedures.
2 See Press Release, U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., TSA PreCheck Reaches Mile-
stone With 10 Million Members (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.tsa.gov/news/
press/releases/2020/03/02/tsa-prechecktm-reaches-milestone-10-million-mem
bers [https://perma.cc/N7CU-M27K].
3 JOHN R. VACCA, BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES AND VERIFICATION SYSTEMS 589
(2007).
4 Nasir Memon, How Biometric Authentication Poses New Challenges to Our Security
and Privacy, 34 IEEE SIGNAL PROCESSING MAG., July 11, 2017, at 194, 196, https://
ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=7974880&tag=1 [https://
perma.cc/64M2-CCA2].
5 Id. at 196.
6 Id.; Samuel Gibbs & Alex Hern, Apple Unveils iPad Air and iPad Mini With
Touch ID Fingerprint Scanner, GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2014/oct/16/apple-unveils-new-powerful-ipad-air-ipad-mini-
touch-id-fingerprint-scanner [https://perma.cc/75DA-KWAC]; Sam Rutherford,
Touch ID Will Reportedly Return to iPhones in 2021 With Apple’s New In-Screen Finger-
print Sensor, GIZMODO (Aug. 5, 2019), https://gizmodo.com/touch-id-will-report-
edly-return-to-iphones-in-2021-with-1836973588 [https://perma.cc/NWE5-
B9E8].
7 See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Edward Markey and Sen. Mike Lee to Kevin
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Part II of this Comment will discuss biometrics generally and
the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) application of
biometric technology to aviation security. Part III will summarize
the federal laws authorizing the use of biometric technology and
the federal data privacy laws limiting these technologies. Part IV
will discuss the primary privacy concerns biometric security tech-
nology poses, and Part V will analyze solutions that promote se-
curity while preserving privacy.9
II. HISTORY
A. GENERAL HISTORY OF BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY
The U.S. government has been collecting Americans’ biomet-
ric data since the early 1900s.10 Law enforcement agencies first
started biometric collection by manually recording physical
characteristics, often called “soft biometrics,”11 “such as hair
color, eye color, height and weight.”12 Eventually, law enforce-
ment began using fingerprinting to identify criminal suspects.13
The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) national fingerprint
collection program dates back to 1924,14 and its database con-
tains “almost 72 million criminal fingerprints, more than 50 mil-
lion civil fingerprints, [and] more than 51 million facial
images.”15 Biometric data is now largely automated16 and in-
cludes everything from “fingerprints, DNA samples, iris or reti-
nal scans, [and] voice recordings, [to] walking gait, typing
pattern of the fingers, 3D facial scans, and other forms of hand
geometry data.”17 In wide-scale public use applications, the best
9 The possible constitutional implications of biometric technology are outside
the scope of this Comment.
10 ELS J. KINDT, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION ISSUES OF BIOMETRIC APPLICA-
TIONS: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS 18 (Pompeu Casanovas & Giovanni Sartor
eds., 2013).
11 Id. at 35 & n.75.
12 Haydn Evans, The State of Biometrics Technology: The Uses, the Concerns, LAW360
(Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/950365/the-state-of-biometrics
-technology-the-uses-the-concerns [https://perma.cc/ZA3T-FQJ2].
13 Id.
14 Carra Pope, Comment, Biometric Data Collection in an Unprotected World: Ex-
ploring the Need For Federal Legislation Protecting Biometric Data, 26 J.L. & POL’Y 769,
774–75 (2018) (citing Fingerprints and Other Biometrics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-otherbiometrics/
[https://perma.cc/FQ45-HMR8]).
15 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIM. JUSTICE INFO. SERVS., CJIS ANNUAL REPORT
2016, at 16 (2017).
16 KINDT, supra note 10, at 18.
17 Pope, supra note 14, at 773–74.
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biometric identifiers are “accurate, non-invasive, capable of ac-
commodating large amounts of information, and accepted by
the general public.”18 Because these characteristics are “univer-
sal” to all human beings, “persistent” and unchanging over time,
and “unique” or distinctive to each individual, biometrics are an
incredibly useful security tool.19
1. How Biometric Systems Work
Biometric data can be used for either verification or identifi-
cation.20 All biometric systems, however, “start with an enroll-
ment stage followed by a matching stage.”21 Enrollment involves
a person presenting an identifier (such as a passport) and link-
ing a biometric identifier (like a fingerprint) to that identity.22
Verification—also called a “one-to-one comparison”23—uses a
person’s presented biometric identifier to verify his claimed
identity by matching it to a previously submitted and stored bio-
metric template in a database.24 Essentially, verification confirms
a person is who he says he is.25 This process can take only a few
seconds.26 Although biometric databases can contain data “from
dozens to millions of enrolled templates[, they] are always pred-
icated on matching an individual’s presented biometric against
his or her reference template.”27 Thus, biometric data systems
can verify one’s identity almost instantaneously.
By contrast, identification—also called a “one-to-many” com-
parison28—compares a person’s presented biometric identifier
“with all previously submitted and stored biometric characteris-
tic[s] in one or more database(s) through a search.”29 A
18 Eric P. Haas, Comment, Back to the Future? The Use of Biometrics, Its Impact on
Airport Security, and How This Technology Should Be Governed, 69 J. AIR L. & COM.
459, 475 (2004).
19 KINDT, supra note 10, at 20–23.
20 Id. at 36–37.
21 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-785T, AVIATION SECURITY: CHAL-
LENGES IN USING BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES 3 (2004).
22 Id.
23 KINDT, supra note 10, at 36.
24 Id. at 36–37.
25 Id.; Paul Rosenzweig, Alane Kochems & Ari Schwartz, Report: Biometric Tech-
nologies: Security, Legal, and Policy Implications, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 21, 2004),
https://www.heritage.org/homeland-security/report/biometric-technologies-se
curity-legal-and-policy-implications [https://perma.cc/H6Y7-LRPA].
26 KINDT, supra note 10, at 732.
27 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 21, at 4.
28 Rosenzweig et al., supra note 25.
29 KINDT, supra note 10, at 37.
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“[p]ositive identification system” is used “to ensure [a person’s]
biometric is enrolled in the [particular] database.”30 In contrast,
a “[n]egative identification system” is used “to ensure a person’s
biometric information is not present in a [certain] database31—
like the No Fly List, for example.32
Identification systems and verification systems have different
databases. For identification to work, a database of stored bio-
metric data is always necessary.33 With verification, storage of
only a single biometric characteristic is necessary.34 The biomet-
ric data may be stored in a database or stored locally35—for ex-
ample, on an identification card.
2. The Government’s Database
Biometric data collection is “only as useful as” the govern-
ment’s ability to organize and access it quickly; thus, the effec-
tiveness—and invasiveness—of this data collection “is directly
correlated to . . . the underlying database.”36 The Office of Bio-
metric Identity Management (OBIM) maintains DHS’s biomet-
ric database.37 OBIM “supplies the technology for matching,
storing, and sharing biometric data.”38 OBIM’s database, the Au-
tomated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), is the “larg-
est biometric repository in the U.S. government.”39 According to
DHS, IDENT currently holds over 260 million “unique identities
and processes more than 350,000 biometric transactions per
day.”40 State and local law enforcement submit many of these
transactions.41 The stored information is used for a variety of
30 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 21, at 4 (emphasis added).
31 Id.
32 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., REPORT ON EFFECTS ON PRIVACY AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES 4–5 (2006).
33 KINDT, supra note 10, at 37–38.
34 Id. at 38–39.
35 Id. at 37–38.
36 John J. Brogan, Facing the Music: The Dubious Constitutionality of Facial Recogni-
tion Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 65, 69 (2002); Haas, supra note
18, at 478.
37 U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., 2019 PRIVACY OFFICE ANNUAL REPORT TO CON-
GRESS (FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 2018–JUNE 30, 2019) 23, 47 (2019), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/dhs_privacy_office_2019_annual_
report-final-10-22-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZD5V-YSRP].




41 Pope, supra note 14, at 778.
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purposes: “national security, law enforcement, immigration and
border management, intelligence, and other background inves-
tigative purposes.”42 Further, IDENT allows interoperability and
data sharing between various federal agencies including the De-
partment of Defense (DoD), Department of Justice (DoJ), De-
partment of State (State Department), and other agencies
within DHS including TSA and Customs and Border Protection
(CBP).43
B. BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY IN AVIATION SECURITY
The DoD’s use of biometric technology for aviation security is
relatively new, and technology is still developing in this area.
TSA itself was created less than twenty years ago in response to
the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terror attacks.44 TSA is the DHS
agency primarily responsible for airline safety;45 however, CBP
also employs biometric technology in its programs for travelers
exiting and entering the United States.46 Additionally, TSA and
CBP are currently working together to bring facial recognition
to airports across the nation.47 Private companies also play a role
in biometric aviation security by establishing their own biomet-
ric authentication systems or partnering with DHS on existing
programs.48 This Part will discuss the various aviation security
programs that currently utilize biometric data.
1. TSA PreCheck
TSA PreCheck (PreCheck) is one of TSA’s “Trusted Traveler”
programs.49 It is a voluntary, “expedited screening program” for
42 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-46, TSA MODERNIZATION: USE OF
SOUND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT PRACTICES IS NEEDED TO AVOID
REPEATING PAST PROBLEMS 24 (2017).
43 Biometrics, supra note 38; Pope, supra note 14, at 777 n.40.
44 Chase Hilton, Comment, Fingerprints: A New Means of Identification in Airport
Security Screening, 81 J. AIR L. & COM. 561, 567 (2016).
45 Id. at 590.
46 See infra Part II.B.4.
47 Biometrics Technology, U.S. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/biome
trics-technology [https://perma.cc/SAH9-R5VS].
48 See infra Part II.B.5.
49 DHS offers several other Trusted Traveler programs similar to PreCheck
that allow expedited screening for air and land travel. Trusted Traveler Programs,
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://ttp.dhs.gov/ [https://perma.cc/ST6R-
LC5C]. Global Entry allows expedited entry into the United States from interna-
tional locations, NEXUS allows expedited entry to the United States from Ca-
nada, and Sentri allows expedited entry into the United States from Mexico. Id.
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“known and trusted travelers”50 that, according to TSA, serves
the dual purpose of enhancing security and providing “a better
travel experience.”51 TSA introduced PreCheck in 2011,52 and
currently, seventy-three airlines and over two hundred airports
participate in the program.53 Air travelers can apply for
PreCheck by filling out an online application, paying an $85 ap-
plication fee, and providing personal identification documenta-
tion (such as a passport) and their fingerprints.54 The traveler’s
biometrics—fingerprints—are then linked to their identity.55 Af-
ter approval, travelers are issued a “known traveler number,”
which they can add to their flight reservations.56 This in turn
prints a PreCheck indicator on the traveler’s boarding pass, and
grants the traveler access to expedited boarding lanes.57
Travelers’ fingerprints are not only used for background
checks at for enrollment, however. The fingerprints collected
are also enrolled in IDENT, and according to DHS, will be used
for “recurrent immigration, law enforcement, and intelligence
checks,” which includes checking enrolled prints against prints
associated with unsolved crimes.58 Further, the personally identi-
fiable information collected, including fingerprints, may also be
shared with “other federal, state and local government, and pri-
vate sector entities.”59
50 Transportation Security Timeline, U.S. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.
gov/timeline [https://perma.cc/RE4X-KZRU].
51 TSA PreCheck Factsheet, U.S. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/sites/
default/files/resources/tsaprecheck_factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/YX67-
5S2M].
52 Transportation Security Timeline, supra note 50.
53 TSA PreCheck Factsheet, supra note 51.
54 TSA PreCheck FAQ, U.S. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/pre
check/faq [https://perma.cc/D558-B8PM].
55 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/TSA/PIA-041(A), PRIVACY IMPACT AS-




56 TSA PreCheck FAQ, supra note 54.
57 Id.
58 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 55, at 4.
59 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/TSA/PIA-041, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESS-
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2. Traveler Verification Service
In 2018, TSA partnered with CBP to implement a number of
pilot programs in airports across the country to test the Traveler
Verification Service (TVS).60 TVS is a biometric entry and exit
program that uses facial recognition technology to verify passen-
gers’ information as they enter or exit the country.61 TVS works
by checking “traveler[s’] live facial scans against their passport
photo to ensure they match.”62 If a traveler is verified as a U.S.
citizen, that person is “removed from the exit screening and
their photo is to be removed from the file.”63 However, DHS
does not disclose exactly how long it retains the facial data.64
CBP says that “the photo is discarded after a short period of
time,”65 as the agency is “committed to protecting the privacy of
all travelers.”66 But some critics point out that because regula-
tion is lacking, “there is no guarantee that the government will
destroy the biometric data in a timely manner, or at all.”67
According to DHS, private companies, airlines, and airport
authorities, in partnership with DHS, may use their own tech-
nology to “facilitate identity verification.”68 The agency claims
that it does not allow these private companies to save the photos
collected, and it requires that the photos are deleted immedi-
ately after “transmittal and identity verification.”69 However,
DHS allows partners to elect to take photos with their own
equipment, so long as the photos are not retained “for their
own business purposes”70 and so long as the company provides
60 Biometric Technology Hearing, supra note 1; Pope, supra note 14, at 778; see also
Biometric Exit Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT.,
https://www.cbp.gov/travel/biometrics/biometric-exit-faqs [https://perma.cc/
M5UJ-KXTS].
61 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/CBP/PIA-056, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESS-
MENT FOR THE TRAVELER VERIFICATION SERVICE (TVS) 1, 15 (2018), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-cbp030-tvs-november
2018_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DVZ-CTKJ].
62 Pope, supra note 14, at 778.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Press Release, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., CBP Deploys Biometric Exit




67 Pope, supra note 14, at 778.
68 Biometric Exit Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), supra note 60.
69 Id.
70 Id.
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“a separate public notice, such as signage, which does not link
that particular process to CBP.”71 While TVS and private part-
nerships are still in their early stages, DHS is focused on rapid
expansion of facial recognition technology—in April 2019, the
agency said it intends to scan 97% of departing passengers’ faces
within the next four years.72
3. Secure Flight
Secure Flight and the No Fly List are TSA-created lists that
operate together to track individuals deemed to be a threat to
national security by U.S. intelligence agencies.73 The No Fly List
is an actual compilation of names of individuals who cannot fly
because they are deemed a security risk.74 Secure Flight is a
“watchlist match[ing]” program that prevents “the misidentifica-
tion of passengers who have names similar to actual people on
the government watchlists,” such as the No Fly List.75 As of July
2019, TSA reported that it was assessing the benefits of combin-
ing the facial recognition identification results from TVS with
Secure Flight to “further improve the identity verification
process.”76
4. Arrival and Departure Information System
The Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) is an-
other government database maintained by CBP that matches bi-
ographic and biometric data to entry and exit information in
order to catch visa overstays,77 although the agency has since ex-
panded the program “for all traveler encounters regardless of
citizenship.”78 In 2003, DHS created the United States Visitor
71 Id.
72 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FISCAL YEAR 2018 ENTRY/EXIT OVERSTAY RE-
PORT 4 (2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0417_
fy18-entry-and-exit-overstay-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X8G-4TQC].
73 Hilton, supra note 44, at 567.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 567–68 (citing Bob Burns, Secure Flight: TSA Now Performing 100%
Watchlist Matching for Domestic Flights, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN. BLOG (June 11, 2010),
http://blog.tsa.gov/2010/06/secure-flight-tsa-now-performing-100.html [https:/
/perma.cc/PD4A-NFUX]).
76 Biometric Technology Hearing, supra note 1.
77 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-269R, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY: REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 ENTRY/EXIT OVERSTAY REPORT 18
(2019).
78 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/CBP/PIA-024(C), PRIVACY IMPACT AS-
SESSMENT FOR ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE INFORMATION SYSTEM (ADIS) 1 (2020),
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and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) pro-
gram that collected digital photos and fingerprints of all persons
entering and exiting the United States—not only at border
crossings but also at airport terminals.79 US-VISIT managed
ADIS until 2013, when OBIM replaced US-VISIT.80 ADIS com-
piles information from “a variety of federal systems to create a
complete travel profile of an individual using his or her travel
history.”81 IDENT provides biometric information to populate
an ADIS record that includes fingerprints and facial images.82
5. Private Companies
CLEAR is a company that offers a biometric authentication
system similar to PreCheck. In 2010, DHS first certified the pri-
vately-held CLEAR under the Safety Act to implement its system
in airports around the country.83 CLEAR professes to replace
travelers’ “ID[s] with [their] eyes and fingertips.”84 During en-
rollment, CLEAR collects travelers’ personal information and bi-
ometric data (images of travelers’ faces, irises, and fingerprints)
and transforms it into a unique “encrypted code.”85 Then, at the
airport, passengers bypass the TSA document checkpoint using
the CLEAR system that matches their live fingerprints and irises
to their “unique code” to verify their identity.86 CLEAR and
PreCheck are separate systems that can be used together:
“CLEAR speeds up the travel document check process, [and]
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-024c-adis-janu-
ary2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CNM-ULGQ].
79 Pope, supra note 14, at 776.
80 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 78, at 2.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 4–5.
83 Approved Technologies, SAFETY ACT, https://www.safetyact.gov/lit/at/aa
(search in keyword bar for “Alclear, LLC”) (last visited Oct. 12, 2020). The Safety
Act is part of the Homeland Security Act. Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering
Effective Technologies Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2238 (2002).
The goal of the Safety Act is to “encourage the development and deployment of
effective anti-terrorism products and services by providing liability protections”
for providers of Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technologies. SAFETY ACT, https://
www.safetyact.gov/lit/h/p [https://perma.cc/8HCN-XTHV].
84 How Does CLEAR Work?, CLEAR ME, https://www.clearme.com/support/get
ting-started/how-does-clear-work [https://perma.cc/P7SP-MLD5].
85 How It Works, CLEAR ME, https://www.clearme.com/how-it-works [https://
perma.cc/3RLJ-EFXU].
86 Id.
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TSA PreCheck expedites the physical screening process.”87 After
CLEAR verifies a traveler’s identity, that traveler may enter the
PreCheck line for expedited screening.88 Although it is unclear
how the program’s database is operated and protected,
CLEAR’s privacy policy maintains that it protects biometric data
with “encryption, firewalls, and intrusion detection and preven-
tion systems.”89
Airports around the country are also using biometric identifi-
cation to regulate employees’ access. Both San Francisco Inter-
national Airport and Ohio’s Toledo Airport have used hand
geometry devices to protect access to certain secure areas of the
airport.90 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been
testing biometric access control in airports since the late
1990s.91 And TSA also administers the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential, which is a “common credential for all
transportation workers requiring . . . access to secure areas of
the national transportation system,” including airports.92 Use of
this technology does not come without legal risk to employers,
however. Major airline companies, including Southwest Airlines
and United Airlines, have recently faced lawsuits by airline em-
ployees for improperly storing and collecting their biometric
data without their consent in violation of state privacy laws.93
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. LEGAL AUTHORIZATION OF BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY
After 9/11, Congress took a variety of measures to enhance
aviation security, passing a myriad of laws and creating TSA and
DHS.94 However, several laws dating back to 1996 authorize the
various programs that allow DHS to collect biometric informa-
tion at the border and at airports.95 For example, the Illegal Im-




89 Privacy Policy, CLEAR ME, https://www.clearme.com/privacy_policy [https://
perma.cc/L3R9-DKNX].
90 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 21, at 14.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Dave Embree, Southwest Airlines Latest Company to Face Suit Over Use of Biomet-
ric Data, 35:21 WESTLAW J. AVIATION 4, at *1 (2017), Westlaw WJAVIA.
94 Haas, supra note 18, at 459.
95 These laws include: Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibil-
ity Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996); Enhanced Border Security
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migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),
passed in 1996, was one of the first laws that authorized federal
agencies to collect biographical information on persons enter-
ing and exiting the country.96 IIRIRA authorization was supple-
mented in 2004 by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act, which integrated biometric technology for the
first time.97 Further, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Home-
land Security Act) gave DHS broad authority to collect and ana-
lyze personally identifiable information and to share this
intelligence information with other federal agencies.98 However,
some question the government’s authority to use its facial recog-
nition programs on American citizens at the border.99 One re-
port notes that “Congress has passed legislation at least nine
times concerning authorization for the collection of biometric
data from foreign nationals, but no law directly authorizes DHS
to collect the biometrics of Americans at the border.”100
More recently, President Trump added to DHS’s biometric
mandate by signing two executive orders urging DHS to make
biometrics a priority and to expedite biometric development in
an entry-exit tracking system.101 Additionally, in 2018, Congress
and Visa Entry Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002); Intelli-
gence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118
Stat. 3638 (2004); Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007). U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
supra note 61, at 1 & nn.1–4.
96 Mark Skerry, Note, Protect America by Being Unique: How Changes in Biometric
Data Collection Procedures Can Improve US-VISIT, 2 CASE W. RESERVE J.L. TECH. &
INTERNET 71, 73 (2011).
97 Id. at 74.
98 Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss:
Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 465 n.323 (2012)
(citing 6 U.S.C. § 121(a)–(d)).
99 HARRISON RUDOLPH, LAURA M. MOY & ALVARO M. BEDOYA, GEO. L. CTR. ON
PRIVACY & TECH., NOT READY FOR TAKEOFF: FACE SCANS AT AIRPORT DEPARTURE
GATES 2 (2017), https://www.airportfacescans.com/sites/default/files/Biomet
rics_Report__Not_Ready_For_Takeoff.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB4D-GFJ6].
100 Id. at 7.
101 Christopher Reynolds, Airport Facial Recognition Tech Sparks Privacy Concerns,
GOVTECH (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.govtech.com/data/Airport-Facial-Recog-
nition-Tech-Sparks-Privacy-Concerns.html [https://perma.cc/WX75-YJME];
Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 § 7 (Jan. 27, 2017); see also U.S. DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 61, at 1; Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg.
13209 § 8 (Mar. 6, 2017); Press Release, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., CBP Meets
with Privacy Groups to Discuss Biometric Exit (Feb. 2, 2018), https://
www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-meets-privacy-groups-dis
cuss-biometric-exit-0 [https://perma.cc/YZ2G-9ZTQ].
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passed the FAA Reauthorization Act,102 which incorporated the
TSA Modernization Act.103 The TSA Modernization Act not only
included authority for biometrics expansion but also added re-
porting and compliance requirements, placing a limit on such
expansion.104 Although some argue that lack of funding will be
the real constraint on biometric technology’s expansion105 be-
cause the recent congressional mandates impose new costs with-
out supplying extra funding, TSA will not be able to roll out this
technology as fast as they would otherwise like.106 Further, “the
new law requires considerable evaluation of the efficacy, privacy
issues, and expanded use of biometrics by TSA which must first
be detailed in reports to Congress—meaning Congress will be
the final arbiter of TSA’s biometric deployment plans, and what
gets fully funded or doesn’t.”107
B. FEDERAL DATA PRIVACY LAWS
Four major federal laws provide the privacy framework for
agency biometric data collection: (1) the Privacy Act of 1974
(Privacy Act);108 (2) the E-Government Act of 2002 (E-Govern-
ment Act);109 (3) the Freedom of Information Act of 1966
(FOIA);110 and (4) the Implementing the Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act).111
This Section summarizes the relevant parts of each statute and
discusses how each relates to the government’s use of biometric
technology.
102 FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–254, 132 Stat. 3186
(2018).
103 Id. § 1901; Anthony Kimery, TSA’s ‘Biometric Roadmap’ May Need More Fund-




104 Kimery, supra note 103.
105 Id. (quoting John Halinski, Former TSA Deputy Administrator).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Pub. L. No. 93-579 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a).
109 Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002).
110 Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552).
111 Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007).
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1. Privacy Act of 1974
Currently, DHS, TSA, and CBP are operating under the Pri-
vacy Act,112 which is the only comprehensive federal data privacy
protection law; however, the Privacy Act does not explicitly
cover biometric data.113 Rather, it regulates federal agencies’
“collection, use, dissemination, and maintenance”114 of person-
ally identifiable information, which has been interpreted to ap-
ply to biometric information including fingerprints and facial
scans.115 This law is the closest applicable law to regulating the
government’s collection of biometric data. Otherwise, the use of
“biometrics data . . . is largely unregulated”116 and is “one of the
most unprotected areas of our personal identity.”117
The Privacy Act has four main requirements applicable to bio-
metric technology. First, it mandates that each agency publish in
the Federal Register a system of records notice for each database
of personally identifiable information it maintains.118 A descrip-
tion of the character, categories, and uses of the information
collected is required.119 However, this requirement only applies
to data contained in a “system of records”—defined as “a group
of any records under the control of any agency from which in-
formation is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some
. . . other identifying particular assigned to the individual.”120
Second, the Privacy Act limits the circumstances under which
agencies can share personally identifiable information with
other agencies and third parties by requiring an agency to iden-
tify a particular enumerated condition of disclosure and state
the authority that authorizes “the solicitation of the information
and whether disclosure of such information is mandatory or vol-
untary.”121 However, the enumerated conditions are relatively
broad—information may be disclosed for routine agency use,
112 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a), (e).
113 Michael Monajemi, Privacy Regulation in the Age of Biometrics That Deal With a
New World Order of Information, 25 U. MIA. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 371, 395 (2018).
114 Id.
115 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 21, at 23.
116 Evans, supra note 12.
117 Pope, supra note 14, at 770.
118 Katie Cristina, Comment, The TSA’s New PreCheck is Beginning to Look a Lot
Like CAPPS II: The Privacy Implications of Reviving the Tenets of the Failed Predecessor,
78 J. AIR L. & COM. 617, 635 (2012); Donohue, supra note 98, at 470.
119 Cristina, supra note 118, at 635 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)).
120 5 U.S.C. § 552a(5); Donohue, supra note 98, at 469.
121 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(4)–(5), (e)(3)(A); Margaret Hu, The Ironic Privacy Act,
96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1267, 1278–79 (2019).
490 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [85
civil or criminal law enforcement purposes, or to achieve other
administrative objectives.122 Third, every time an agency changes
its system of records or wants to use its system in a new way, the
Privacy Act mandates that the agency publish a notice in the
Federal Register and allow interested persons an opportunity to
submit comments to the agency.123 Finally, the Privacy Act pro-
vides civil remedies and authorizes civil lawsuits against the gov-
ernment for violations.124
Privacy advocates argue that the Privacy Act does not ade-
quately protect citizens’ biometric data because it contains sev-
eral broad exemptions.125 First, it does not regulate state or local
governments, so the Privacy Act does not protect any biometric
information they collect.126 Second, the Privacy Act does not ap-
ply to private entities or private companies.127 This is potentially
problematic for two reasons: “First, there is no uniform federal
statute directed toward a private entity’s collection, use, and
storage of biometric information.”128 Second, DHS has partner-
ships with private companies, but it “has not published any
guidelines for or agreements with its private partners.”129 None-
theless, DHS and its agencies acknowledge that the Privacy Act
remains the primary statute protecting government-collected bi-
ometric data.
2. E-Government Act of 2002
The E-Government Act requires any agency “collecting per-
sonal information [to] issue a [Privacy Impact Assessment
(PIA)] prior to developing or procuring technologies that col-
lect, maintain, or disseminate personally identifiable informa-
tion from or about members of the public.”130 Each time DHS
122 Hu, supra note 121, at 1278–79 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1), (3), (7)).
123 Id. at 1279 (citing § 552a(e)(4), (11)).
124 Id. at 1278 (citing § 552a(g)(1)(D), (g)(4)(A)).
125 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING
§ 31:26, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2019); Donohue, supra note 98, at
470–71.
126 Donohue, supra note 98, at 471 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2)(A)).
127 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2)).
128 See Natasha Kohne, Isabelle Gold & Kamran Salour, Unique Biometric Data




129 RUDOLPH ET AL., supra note 99, at 14–15.
130 Donohue, supra note 98, at 476.
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creates a new program, it must issue a new PIA.131 PIAs are re-
quired to describe the “nature and source” of the collected in-
formation, the reasons for collection, and the “intended use” of
data collected.132 PIAs must also address how the information
will be shared, whether individuals may consent, and whether
the initiative falls under the Privacy Act.133 However, like the Pri-
vacy Act, the E-Government Act contains exemptions—one of
the most notable being that “public dissemination of the PIA”
may be protected as classified or suspended for national security
reasons.134
3. Freedom of Information Act
The FOIA works in conjunction with the Privacy Act. In the
biometric data context, airline passengers may file complaints or
seek access to records about themselves to ensure the accuracy
of the information collected.135 One goal of the Privacy Act is to
ensure that individuals can verify the accuracy of their
records.136 To that end, the Privacy Act allows an individual to
request their own records through FOIA.137 However, insofar as
the Privacy Act relies on such requests to refine biometric
records, the process has been underutilized—from June 2018 to
June 2019, DHS received only thirty-one total requests.138
4. Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
of 2007
The Homeland Security Act created the “first statutorily cre-
ated privacy office in the Federal Government,”139 headed by a
Chief Privacy Officer (CPO), who is appointed by the Secre-
tary.140 The Homeland Security Act was amended by the 9/11
Commission Act “to give new authorities to the Chief Privacy
Officer.”141 The CPO is responsible for DHS’s privacy policy,
which includes ensuring compliance with the Privacy Act, coor-
131 Id.
132 Id. at 477.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 59, at 9.
136 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1).
137 Id. § 552a(d)(2).
138 U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., supra note 37, at 47 fig.6.
139 Id. at 8.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 5.
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dinating with the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to
address privacy concerns, and ensuring Congress receives re-
ports on civil liberties and privacy considerations.142 This office
is also responsible for responding to complaints submitted by
employees, other agencies, and the public.143 The CPO is also
responsible for DHS’s FOIA policy.144 According to DHS’s 2019
Privacy Report, DHS’s FOIA Program “receives the largest num-
ber of FOIA requests of any federal department or agency, more
than 40 percent of all requests within the Federal
Government.”145
IV. PRIVACY CONCERNS
Biometric characteristics themselves are privacy neutral and
have been accepted for years; however, privacy concerns arise in
how biometrics are used and how technological advancement
affects such use.146 DHS promises passengers that it is “ensuring
appropriate privacy and cybersecurity safeguards are in
place.”147 However, the rapid expansion of biometric technology
in the last decade has raised serious concerns among privacy
critics about how biometric data is stored and safeguarded.
Unaddressed privacy concerns even have some airports banning
the use of facial recognition technology until proper privacy pol-
icies are created and implemented.148 Privacy advocates have
generally focused their concern in three major areas (1) data
breaches; (2) “function creep”; and (3) data sharing.149
A. DATA BREACHES
In the last decade, the number and scale of cyberattacks have
been on the rise—“more than doubling between 2006 and 2012
142 6 U.S.C. § 142(a)(2), (5), (6).
143 U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., supra note 37, at 45.
144 Id. at 54.
145 Id. at 55.
146 Steven C. Bennett, Privacy Implications of Biometrics, 53:3 PRAC. LAW. 13, 13
(2019), Westlaw PRACLAW.
147 Biometric Technology Hearing, supra note 1, at 34 (prepared statement of Aus-
tin Gould, Assistant Administrator, Requirements and Capabilities Analysis).
148 Christopher Reynolds, LAX Embraces Facial Recognition Tech, But Sea-Tac Air-
port Hits the Brakes, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/travel/
story/2019-12-12/lax-airports-facial-recognition-seattle-ban [https://perma.cc/
S7XK-8HH4].
149 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 21, at 23. Fourth Amend-
ment and other generalized constitutional privacy concerns are beyond the scope
of this Comment.
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and leveling since.”150 The frequency of cyber breaches is ap-
proximate because so many are either “undetected or . . . inten-
tionally unreported.”151 Data breaches have a variety of causes,
including “accidental publication; insider jobs; lost or stolen
computers or media; and patently malfunctioning security mea-
sures.”152 However, hacking has proved to be the most common
and most damaging cause of breaches, as hacking “results in
more stolen or compromised records than all other categories
combined.”153
The threat of a biometric data breach is not just a hypotheti-
cal fear—it is reality. In 2015, the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment (OPM) suffered a data breach where 5.6 million
employees’ fingerprints were stolen.154 In June 2019, CBP suf-
fered a similar data breach where “hackers had stolen an undis-
closed number of license-plate images and travelers’ ID photos
from a subcontractor.”155 Vice, a Canadian-American magazine,
and The Register, a United Kingdom outlet, reported finding
“traveler data on the dark web in the hours after that breach,
including financial information, photos, and location informa-
tion.”156 According to an official, this breach, unlike the OPM
breach,157 did not involve a foreign actor.158 The CBP breach
prompted Senators Mike Lee and Edward Markey to write to
150 Marian K. Riedy & Barlomiej Hanus, Yes, Your Personal Data is at Risk: Get
Over It!, 19 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 3, 11 (2016); see also 2015 Data Protection &
Breach Readiness Guide, INTERNET SOC’Y (May 16, 2016), https://
www.internetsociety.org/resources/ota/2016/2015-data-protection-breach-readi
ness-guide/ [https://perma.cc/XK95-AQKG] (“Victims included nearly every
segment of the population including consumers, government employees, and
children.”).
151 Riedy & Hanus, supra note 150, at 11.
152 Id. at 12–13.
153 Id. at 13, 15 (“[H]acking accounts for . . . an estimated 70% of all
breaches.”).
154 Pope, supra note 14, at 770.
155 Sidney Fussell, This Is Exactly What Privacy Experts Said Would Happen, ATLAN-
TIC (June 11, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/
06/travelers-images-stolen-attack-cbp/591403/ [https://perma.cc/C8U7-5HXE].
156 Id.
157 Evan Perez, FBI Arrests Chinese National Connected to Malware Used in OPM
Data Breach, CNN (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/24/politics/
fbi-arrests-chinese-national-in-opm-data-breach/index.html [https://perma.cc/
YLB7-CMH2].
158 Drew Harwell & Geoffrey A. Fowler, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Says
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DHS requesting the immediate issuance of a “report to Con-
gress on the viability of DHS’s biometric identification technol-
ogy.”159 Both Senators had previously called for DHS to “pause”
progress on biometric technology until DHS issued “formal
rules that address critical privacy and security concerns” includ-
ing who has access to the data, how long it will be held, and how
it will be safeguarded.160
Biometric data security is also a concern across the globe. In-
dia has one of the world’s largest national biometric databases,
Aadhaar, which contains the biometric identifiers of more than
one billion people.161 Enrollment in the database is required for
citizens to receive government benefits, and India even requires
citizens to link their bank accounts to the database.162 In 2017,
the database was breached, and according to reports, approxi-
mately 130 million Indians’ Aadhaar numbers were exposed,163
highlighting the vulnerabilities of these systems. Similarly, in Ar-
gentina, hackers gained access to the Argentina Federal Police’s
database and leaked 700 gigabytes (GB) of data, which included
the biometric information of numerous police officers.164
These few examples highlight the reality of the risk to all
databases, not only from bad actors of foreign governments but
also from sophisticated cybercriminals who seek to exploit data
for financial gain.165 DHS itself has recognized that the aggrega-
tion of information located in IDENT makes it an attractive tar-
get.166 However, the potential uses of stolen biometric data are
largely unknown, as this technology is still in its beginning
159 Letter from Sen. Edward Markey and Sen. Mike Lee to Kevin McAleenan,
Acting Sec’y of Homeland Sec., supra note 7, at 1.
160 Id.
161 Pope, supra note 14, at 786.
162 Id.
163 Dell Cameron, 130 Million at Risk of Fraud After Massive Leak of Indian Biomet-
ric System Data, GIZMODO (May 3, 2017), https://gizmodo.com/130-million-at-
risk-of-fraud-after-massive-leak-of-indi-1794856154 [https://perma.cc/62D4-
7AJC].
164 Eugenia Lostri, Hackers Leaked Sensitive Government Data in Argentina—And
Nobody Cares, LAWFARE (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/hackers-
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stages.167 In the aftermath of the OPM breach, OPM stressed
that it believed “the ability to misuse fingerprint data [was] lim-
ited,” but recognized that “this probability could change over
time as technology evolves.”168 Besides identity theft, some have
suggested that a person who has had their biometric data ex-
posed or stolen in a breach “could be discriminated against or
lose out on a job opportunity because their information cannot
be considered secure.”169 The consequences of a massive breach
are potentially far-reaching and damaging, but it is ultimately
too soon to tell.
Finally, in the event of a data breach, the remedies available
to those impacted are limited—some have attempted to sue the
federal government for violating the Privacy Act; however, these
actions are largely unsuccessful and cannot satisfy the standing
requirement due to the difficulty of proving actual harm.170
B. FUNCTION CREEP
Another common concern of critics and privacy advocates is
commonly referred to as “function creep.”171 Function creep is
the possibility of misuse or re-use of collected information—an
agency using data for purposes other than for which it was origi-
nally collected.172 This too is no hypothetical fear—there are ex-
amples of function creep already taking place. For example,
IDENT was created in 1994 as a system for the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), and DHS itself says that “the in-
tended use of IDENT has expanded beyond that for which it was
initially designed.”173 Further, according to its 2018 Biometrics
Roadmap, TSA plans to expand the use of fingerprints by “sup-
plement[ing] data of currently enrolled” PreCheck travelers
with that of other Trusted Traveler programs, including CBP
167 Allison Grande, OPM Fingerpring Hack Exposes Liabilities in Biometric Data,
LAW360 (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/707030/opm-finger
print-hack-exposes-liabilities-in-biometric-data [https://perma.cc/K4XH-6WEA].
168 Press Release, U.S. Off. of Personnel Mgmt., Statement by OPM Press Sec-
retary Sam Schumach on Background Investigations Incident (Sept. 23, 2015),
https://www.opm.gov/news/releases/2015/09/cyber-statement-923/ [https://
perma.cc/67VF-8XPJ].
169 Grande, supra note 167.
170 Id.
171 KINDT, supra note 10, at 377.
172 Id.
173 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 166, at 2.
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and State Department data.174 In the private, nongovernment
context, CLEAR has now expanded its services to sports ve-
nues.175 Spectators can now use their “face or fingerprints” as
their ticket to enter select baseball stadiums.176 These are only a
few of many examples of how function creep can easily morph
one application of data into another.
While the advancement of biometric technology potentially
keeps aviation safer and technological advancement is generally
a good thing, practical concerns remain. As biometric technol-
ogy improves, there is a concern that DHS could go beyond its
legislative mandate by expanding particular uses of biometric
technology without explicit congressional authorization.177 For
instance, a report by Georgetown University’s Center on Privacy
and Technology suggests that the TVS biometric entry and exit
program may be beyond the scope of DHS’s mandate; although
Congress has authorized the collection of biometric data from
foreign nationals, it “has never explicitly authorized biometric
collections from Americans at the border.”178 Thus, the report
argues that DHS needs a new congressional mandate granting
express permission before it may collect data in new ways and
from American citizens.179
C. DATA SHARING
The federal government’s collection of biometric data
through a number of federal agencies—not limited to DHS—
raises concerns about how these agencies share information, not
only with each other but also with private contractors.
First, data sharing between agencies, or interoperability, has
been emphasized by both Congress and the Executive.180 A frag-
mented system of incomplete information hurts the ultimate
purpose of biometric systems—enhanced security—and leaves
agencies unable to “connect the dots” in intelligence data. How-
ever, even DHS recognizes that a system with so many sharing
174 U.S. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., TSA BIOMETRICS ROADMAP FOR AVIATION SECURITY
& THE PASSENGER EXPERIENCE 13 (Sept. 2018), https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default
/files/tsa_biometrics_roadmap.pdf [https://perma.cc/NYH3-VGS7].
175 You Are Your Ticket, CLEAR ME, https://www.clearme.com/ticketing [https:/
/perma.cc/9K3V-NWD3].
176 Id.
177 RUDOLPH ET AL., supra note 99, at 7.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 16.
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partners presents a risk of data sharing with entities that do not
have appropriate authority or an actual need for the data.181 For
example, IDENT users include CBP; Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; the U.S. Coast Guard; U.S. Citizenship and Immi-
gration Services; the State Department; the DoD; the DoJ; fed-
eral, state, and local investigative agencies; and even “[f]oreign
government law enforcement, intelligence, and criminal agen-
cies, as well as international entities (such as the International
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)).”182 One of the
main criticisms of interoperability is that it “reflects diffuse ac-
countability . . . [because] no one committee is tasked with con-
sidering the implications of the overall system.”183 Thus, overall
accountability is lacking.
Interoperability also increases the probability that the applica-
tion of biometric systems will be expanded—by “link[ing] bits
and pieces of behavioral information about individuals enrolled
in widely different applications.”184 Some argue that, already,
without this biometric information, the government has the re-
sources to monitor citizens in their daily lives with “omnipresent
video cameras; extensive databases replete with medical, finan-
cial, and criminal information; and facial matching technol-
ogy.”185 Adding biometric data to this list presents additional
concerns to those who already fear an eventual surveillance
state.186
Second, in expanding its use of biometric technologies, DHS
has increasingly relied on private contractors, leaving travelers
vulnerable to tracking and data misuse by private companies.
For an example of these partnerships, the biometric entry and
exit program relies on “airlines and technology vendors for cen-
tral components” of the program.187 To operate biometric exit
for JetBlue flights, DHS partnered with JetBlue and a private air
travel vendor.188 And while DHS entered into a Memorandum
181 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE AUTO-
MATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IDENT) 8 (2012), https://www.dhs.
gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-nppd-ident-december2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y2LB-3B9M].
182 Id. at 3–5.
183 Donohue, supra note 98, at 454.
184 DAVIDE MALTONI, DAVIO MAIO, ANIL K. JAIN & SALIL PRABHAKAR, HANDBOOK
OF FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION 46 (2006).
185 Brogan, supra note 36, at 67.
186 Rosenzweig et al., supra note 25.
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of Understanding with JetBlue, neither the memorandum “nor
any other agreement governing private entities’ use of biometric
exit data has been made public.”189 Congress encourages these
partnerships—the TSA Modernization Act required TSA to part-
ner with at least two private sector entities to provide enrollment
services for Precheck.190 It is unclear what impact these partner-
ships have on data privacy; however, TSA says that private sys-
tems will be reviewed “to ensure they meet the latest
cybersecurity requirements.”191 Data stolen in the CBP breach
was taken from a CBP subcontractor, making concerns about
agency partnerships with subcontractors a reality.192
V. STRIKING THE SECURITY–PRIVACY BALANCE:
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The choice between security and privacy is not binary. The
United States can strike a balance between privacy and security
with the right measures. Among the possible solutions to this
balance are (1) technological solutions; (2) legislative solutions;
(3) independent oversight; and (4) an increased focus on trav-
eler notice and consent. A combination of these solutions may
also be the most effective. This Part first considers the prelimi-
nary question of whether biometric systems are actually keeping
the skies safer. It then considers each of the possible solutions to
the data privacy concerns and the possible efficacy of each.
A. EFFICACY OF BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS
There is strong evidence that the biometric technology keeps
Americans safer. For example, CBP’s biometric exit, facial rec-
ognition “technology has enabled CBP to interdict more than
200 individuals who illegally attempted to enter the United
States by using the genuine travel documents of persons whom
they resemble.”193 One of the biggest threats to aviation security
189 Id.
190 Press Release, U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., Additional Vendors to Provide
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is allowing falsely identified passengers through TSA security,
and there is evidence to suggest that people’s—more specifi-
cally, TSA agents’—ability to correctly match an individual to a
presented photo identification is “incredibly fallible with error
rates between 10 and 20 percent under ideal laboratory-induced
conditions.”194 Thus, facial recognition technology is a promis-
ing way to reduce that error rate and increase security.
However, Senator Mike Lee of Utah and others have ex-
pressed concerns about the accuracy of facial recognition tech-
nology, arguing that even if this technology works 96% of the
time, one in twenty-five travelers would still be misidentified.195
A growing fear is that “gender and ethnicity increase the likeli-
hood of being improperly flagged.”196 DHS has recognized
these concerns, and claims that “[t]he accuracy of facial recog-
nition systems has improved significantly in recent years”; ac-
cording to a 2018 report by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology, “with good quality portrait photos, the most
accurate algorithms have ‘error rates below 0.2%.’”197 Congress
should keep in mind the efficacy of biometric technology and its
important role in aviation security while addressing privacy
concerns.
194 Hilton, supra note 44, at 564 (quoting Matthew Pryce, Dr. Megan Papesh,
Louisiana State University – Flaws of Facial Recognition Tech, WAMC NORTHEAST PUB.
RADIO (June 3, 2014), https://www.wamc.org/post/dr-megan-papesh-louisiana-
state-university-flaws-facial-recognition-tech [https://perma.cc/34WL-MG6B]).
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NAL (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.dailysignal.com/2017/12/28/invasive-new-air
port-screenings-may-put-privacy-risk/?mc_cid=d4c99ccc1c&mc_eid=7f301efaba
[https://perma.cc/4U3X-KNDL].
196 Id.; see also Larry Hardesty, Study Finds Gender and Skin-Type Bias in Commer-
cial Artificial-Intelligence Systems, MIT NEWS (Feb. 11, 2018), http://news.mit.edu/
2018/study-finds-gender-skin-type-bias-artificial-intelligence-systems-0212 [https:/
/perma.cc/NDA5-MLX2]; Drew Harwell, Amazon Facial-Identification Software Used
By Police Falls Short on Tests for Accuracy and Bias, New Research Finds, WASH. POST
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/01/25/ama
zon-facial-identification-software-used-by-police-falls-short-tests-accuracy-bias-new-
research-finds/ [https://perma.cc/5S5F-HW88].
197 DATA PRIV. & INTEGRITY ADV. COMM., U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., REP. 2019-
01, PRIVACY RECOMMENDATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF FACIAL RECOGNI-
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%20Technology_02%2026%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/32ER-PNMP] (quot-
ing PATRICK GROTHER, MEI NGAN & KAYEE HANAOKA, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS &
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B. TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS
Blockchain-based systems may be one way DHS can improve
its data storage to address hacking concerns.198 Companies such
as International Business Machines (IBM)199 and Zamna,200 a
blockchain startup, have already posed blockchain systems as a
solution. Zamna explains that the blockchain acts as a middle-
man between data sources and allows passengers’ biometric in-
formation to be verified without having to share the data with
third parties.201 Blockchain alone would not address all privacy
concerns; however, a blockchain system could be part of a larger
plan to address hacking and some data sharing concerns.
Currently, DHS is in the process of moving its biometric data
from IDENT to a new system: the Homeland Advanced Recogni-
tion Technology System (HART).202 This new system will be lo-
cated within Amazon Web Services’ GovCloud; other agencies,
such as the DoD, Central Intelligence Agency, and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, already use HART to
store some of the government’s most sensitive data.203 Part of
the reason for this switch is “perceived security improve-
ments”204 over the original IDENT system, which is now almost
twenty-five years old.205 To put that into perspective, the first
198 Jeremy Epstein, A Massive Biometric Breach Is Only a Matter of Time, VEN-
TUREBEAT (Mar. 16, 2019), https://venturebeat.com/2019/03/16/a-massive-bio
metric-breach-is-only-a-matter-of-time/ [https://perma.cc/47KT-SFTB].
199 Kalonji Bankole, Implement an Automated Airport Security Control System, IBM
DEVELOPER (May 13, 2019), https://developer.ibm.com/patterns/blockchain-im
plement-automated-airport-security-control-system/ [https://perma.cc/HW2Y-
UBTK].
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iPhone was released thirteen years ago, and since then there
have been tranformative updates, demonstrating how rapidly
technology changes.206 To keep Americans safe and protect
their privacy and civil liberties, the government must keep its
biometric technology and its security mechanisms up to date
with modern-day capabilities.
C. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
Although the Privacy Act covers the personally identifiable in-
formation collected by the government, there is no law that reg-
ulates how private companies may use and store biometric
data.207 In the absence of such legislation, many states have en-
acted their own biometric data privacy protection statutes.208
While a comprehensive federal law regulating private compa-
nies’ use of biometric data may alleviate some concerns sur-
rounding the federal government’s partnerships with private
companies, federal legislation may not be the most efficient or
useful solution. Even the most comprehensive data privacy stat-
ute would almost certainly be inapplicable to regulate informa-
206 Compare Press Release, Apple, Apple Reinvents the Phone with iPhone (Jan.
9, 2007), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2007/01/09Apple-Reinvents-the-
Phone-with-iPhone/ [https://perma.cc/Z6TY-7HJD] (describing the first iPhone
with a two megapixel (MP) camera and up to eight GBs of storage), with Press
Release, Apple, Apple Announces iPhone 12 and iPhone Mini: A New Era for
iPhone with 5G (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2020/10/
apple-announces-iphone-12-and-iphone-12-mini-a-new-era-for-iphone-with-5g/
[https://perma.cc/UK9Z-GV26] (describing the latest iPhone with professional-
grade twelve MP photography and video systems and up to 256 GBs of storage).
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tion collected for intelligence or national security purposes.209
Instead, clear legislative standards for data sharing between the
government and private companies should be pursued to allow
the government to partner with private companies for innova-
tive advancements while protecting privacy and increasing confi-
dence in the system. Further, renewed—and more specific—
authorization from Congress for new biometric programs involv-
ing American citizens may prove to be an effective component
of future reform, as it could require Congress to gather and
study more information on data privacy measures.210
D. INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT
In order to guard against misuse, all biometric systems, and
the federal government’s use of these programs as a whole,
should have stronger audit and oversight protections.211 Several
oversight mechanisms within DHS are responsible for issuing re-
ports on the various DHS programs and the privacy impact of
those programs. These include: (1) the Privacy Officer created
by the Homeland Security Act; (2) the E-Government Act’s pub-
lic PIA requirement, which also invites notice and comment;
and (3) the Privacy Act’s System of Records Notice require-
ments.212 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as-
sumes the primary “responsibility for overseeing
implementation of the Privacy Act and the PIAs.”213 However,
the OMB “has been extremely deferential to agencies exercising
their powers of exemption,” and there is no recourse to the
courts.214 Therefore, the public may benefit from an increased
oversight role by independent committees or agencies. How-
ever, Congress should not overburden DHS and its agencies
with excessive reporting and oversight requirements.
There are two independent bodies not located within DHS
that currently provide some oversight. The first is the Privacy
209 Deeks & Mercer, supra note 207.
210 See RUDOLPH ET AL., supra note 99, at 17 (“[The program] may implicate
serious privacy concerns. . . . If DHS persists with the program, significant re-
forms are vitally necessary.”).
211 Rosenzweig et al., supra note 25.
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Privacy, HILL (May 9, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/442
722-biometrics-can-protect-our-borders-along-with-our-privacy [https://
perma.cc/X5GK-5WAY].
213 Donohue, supra note 98, at 477.
214 Id. at 477–78.
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and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB).215 The PCLOB is
an independent executive agency, established by the 9/11 Com-
mission Act and composed of a bipartisan five-member board.
Current oversight activities are limited, however.216 In June
2019, the PCLOB voted to begin a new oversight project that
will examine “the use of facial recognition and . . . biometric
technologies in aviation security.”217 As of October 2019, the
PCLOB is also planning to review the pilot program at the Las
Vegas McCarran International Airport.218 This could be an im-
portant step toward meaningful privacy protections due to the
indepent and bipartisan nature of the PCLOB.
Second, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a leg-
islative agency within Congress, has issued a number of reports
and has previously found that the FBI—another federal law en-
forcement agency that uses biometric technology—had insuffi-
cient oversight over its use of facial recognition technology.219
However, the GAO covers a wide range of issues from fiscal pol-
icy to healthcare and energy.220 Thus, oversight by a more fo-
cused entity like the PCLOB may yield the most promising
results.
E. NOTICE AND CONSENT
Some argue that an increased focus on notice and consent
may be more effective than new legislation or oversight.221 This
approach emphasizes the importance of putting travelers on no-
tice that their biometric information is being collected and
stored, as well as providing meaningful opportunities for trav-
elers to withhold consent. While some programs like PreCheck
215 History and Mission, PRIV. & C.L. OVERSIGHT BD., https://www.pclob.gov/
About/HistoryMission [https://perma.cc/Q89Y-FZ7P].
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are voluntary, withholding consent of the facial recognition at
the airport may not even be possible. At best, “[o]pting out is
complicated” because there are multiple checkpoints at air-
ports: airlines use facial recognition “as a boarding pass,” CBP
uses facial recognition when a traveler exits the country, and
TSA uses facial recognition to verify photo identification.222 At
worst, an opt-out feature may render the security purpose of bio-
metric technology inoperable; therefore, some argue that it is
necessary for DHS to make biometric data collection a condi-
tion for participation.223 On the other hand, increased notice to
participants could be a valuable oversight method—the value of
an informed citizenry and the power of public opinion should
not be discounted.
F. LOOKING OUTSIDE BIOMETRICS
Biometric security may not be the only way forward for avia-
tion security. Others have even suggested that the United States
look in a completely new direction for airport security.224 Israel,
a country that faces a significant number of terrorist threats,
uses “behavioral profiling,” which involves questioning passen-
gers at airports to isolate those exhibiting suspicious behavior.225
Those passengers are then subjected to a more “targeted inter-
rogation and search.”226 This “profiling” is “conducted in a neu-
tral manner” and “focuses on data such as how a passenger
bought their ticket, their past travels, recent actions, and behav-
iors.”227 However, some argue that volume, costs, and concerns
about ethnic and religious profiling prevent this from being an
effective alternative security solution.228
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VI. CONCLUSION
The concerns posed by privacy advocates about data sharing,
function creep, hacking, and inaccuracies are serious and rea-
sonable concerns. DHS appears to take those privacy concerns
seriously—it has issued numerous, detailed PIAs for its various
programs that use biometric information. It has also begun a
series of meetings with privacy and industry experts to discuss
the biometric exit mandate, and these meetings have already re-
sulted in CBP instituting new privacy measures.229 However,
DHS and Congress ought to look beyond internal reporting re-
quirements and institute additional measures either through
technology or independent oversight to strengthen and bolster
privacy protections and increase government accountability.
Even though biometric technology seems to be the way of the
future, it is still in its infancy. The scope and severity of the con-
sequences of mass biometric data collection are yet unknown.
Biometric technology, and the government’s implementation of
such, may be moving faster than privacy solutions can keep up.
Biometric technology has the potential to revolutionize aviation
security; however, more study and consideration should be
given to the privacy implications and possible solutions in order
to protect data privacy adequately.
229 CBP Press Release, supra note 193.
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ABSTRACT
One of the primary challenges facing the American aviation
industry is the issue of federal preemption. Although Congress
has a long history of heavy involvement in regulating the avia-
tion industry, the Federal Aviation Act (FAAct) does not include
an express preemption provision, leaving states, courts, and in-
dustry members with little guidance about the proper reach of
federal and state regulations. The circuit courts are sharply di-
vided on their approaches and answers to this question. The is-
sue of preemption is especially important in the context of
aviation manufacturing, where the federal government has pre-
scribed a litany of different safety standards, but state law prod-
uct liability claims continue to be governed by state law
standards of care. Manufacturers are therefore subjected to a
variety of potential requirements across each state, which is
problematic for a number of reasons.
Exacerbating the issue, the Supreme Court recently declined
to hear two cases regarding FAAct preemption, each from a dif-
ferent side of the circuit split. Until this split is resolved, in the
interest of uniformity and certainty, undecided circuits should
adopt the Second Circuit’s field preemption approach and re-
ject the Third Circuit’s conflict preemption approach. Field pre-
emption is more consistent with both the intended purpose of
the FAAct and the unique nature of the aviation industry.
This Comment will analyze the differing approaches taken by
the circuit courts and will make the argument that the federal
design regulations establish a standard of care which should be
integrated into various state law claims. Uniformity is necessary
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for the aviation industry given its interconnection with interstate
commerce and will provide clarity for both manufacturers and
courts. Finally, this Comment will explain why and how other
circuit courts should adopt the field preemption approach while
awaiting Supreme Court guidance.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 508
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509
A. FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509
B. FEDERAL PREEMPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 511
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514
IV. ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521
A. THE CASE FOR FIELD PREEMPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521
B. APPLYING Tweed to Other Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 532
V. CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534
I. INTRODUCTION
THE AVIATION INDUSTRY IS a vital sector of interstatecommerce in America, transporting millions of people and
products across the country every day. Although inherently na-
tional in scale, the industry is still subject to a variety of state laws
and regulations, particularly within the field of aviation safety.
Circuit courts are currently split on the issue of whether the Fed-
eral Aviation Act (FAAct) preempts only conflicting state laws or
the entire field of aviation safety.1 While the Third Circuit ap-
plied principles of conflict preemption to the FAAct, the Second
Circuit held that the FAAct preempts the entire field of state
aviation safety.2 The Supreme Court has declined to hear either
case,3 adding further uncertainty to the aviation industry. The
Court will likely resolve the issue within the near future, but in
the meantime, other circuits must choose between the two com-
peting approaches to FAAct preemption. Because the Second
Circuit’s decision in Tweed allows for a uniform federal standard
of care for aircraft manufacturers, other circuits should follow
suit and hold that the FAAct impliedly preempts the entire field
1 Compare Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 708–09 (3d Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 495 (2016) (limiting the FAA rules application), with
Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, 140 S. Ct. 2508 (2020) (finding the FAA’s detemination overruled state
law).
2 See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 708–9; Tweed, 930 F.3d at 75.
3 Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth., 140 S. Ct. 2508; Sikkelee, 137 S. Ct. 495.
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of aviation safety. This Comment will begin by explaining the
historical background of both federal aviation regulation and
preemption law in Part II. Next, Part III discusses the current
state of federal preemption law with respect to the FAAct and its
amendments and analyzes the circuit split over the FAAct’s pre-
emption powers. Part IV begins by explaining why the FAAct
should be interpreted to preempt the entire field of aviation
safety and concludes by explaining how other circuit courts
should incorporate Tweed into their own preemption analyses.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATION
The federal government’s history of aviation regulation began
in 1926 with the passage of the Air Commerce Act.4 This legisla-
tion gave the Department of Commerce oversight over (1) air
commerce; (2) issuance and enforcement of traffic rules; (3)
licensing and certification; and (4) airway control.5 Over the
next decade, as air travel became more prevalent, it became
clear that the federal government needed to exercise more con-
trol over aviation safety.6
In 1938, President Roosevelt signed the Civil Aeronautics Act,
which established both the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA)
and later the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).7 The CAA was re-
sponsible for air traffic control, certifications, safety enforce-
ment, and airway development—making it the predecessor of
the modern Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).8 The Sec-
ond World War ushered in significant improvements in aviation
technology, such as jet engines, making aviation safety even
more of a pressing concern for the federal government.9 Al-
though air traffic had more than doubled in the decade follow-
4 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
5 Id. §§ 2–3, 5.
6 A Brief History of the FAA, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2017), https://
www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/ [https://perma.cc/W4AV-PKWN]. In-
terestingly, the death of legendary Notre Dame football coach Knute Rockne was
one of the primary catalysts for the sweeping changes made in the aviation safety
field. Id. Rockne was killed in a plane crash in 1931, and the resulting public
outcry prompted the federal government to take its oversight of aviation more
seriously. Id.
7 Id.; see 49 U.S.C. § 1131. CAB was the predecessor to the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board and was largely responsible for accident investigation, admin-
istrative rulings, and economic regulation. A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 6.
8 A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 6.
9 Id.
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ing World War II, “little had been done to mitigate the risk of
midair collisions.”10
The Federal Aviation Agency (FAAgency) was established in
1958 with the passage of the FAAct.11 In creating the FAAgency,
Congress stated that its intention was “to create a Federal Avia-
tion Agency, to provide for the regulation and promotion of
civil aviation in such manner as to best foster its development
and safety, and to provide for the safe and efficient use of the
airspace by both civil and military aircraft.”12 In a later amend-
ment, the FAAgency was also given “exclusive sovereignty of air-
space of the United States.”13 As the Second Circuit noted
several years into the FAAgency’s existence, the agency’s pur-
pose was to “centraliz[e] in a single authority—indeed, in one
administrator—the power to frame rules for the safe and effi-
cient use of the nation’s airspace.”14 The FAAgency was trans-
ferred to the newly created Department of Transportation
(DoT) in 1966, and was renamed the FAA.15 Its role has only
expanded since then, and today, the FAA is responsible for
many aspects of aviation safety.16 Among other duties, the FAA
currently oversees aircraft licensing and certification; airport
regulations; air traffic control; aircraft noise control and other
environmental programs; commercial space regulation; aviation
research; and the testing and training of personnel across the
industry.17
For the purposes of this Comment, it is necessary to explain
the FAA’s regulatory control over aircraft manufactures. Under
the FAAct, aircraft manufacturers must first obtain three certifi-
cates: a type certificate,18 a production certificate,19 and an air-
worthiness certificate.20 The type certificate certifies that the
design of an aircraft or its parts performs properly and meets
the safety standards defined in FAA regulations.21 The FAA has a
baseline standard for certification for each type of product,
10 Id.
11 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
12 Id. pmbl.
13 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1).
14 Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 894 (2d Cir. 1960).
15 A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 6.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.11–.55 (2020).
19 Id. §§ 21.131–.150.
20 Id. §§ 21.171–.199; 49 U.S.C. §§ 44704(d), 44711(a)(1).
21 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a); 14 C.F.R. § 21.31.
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which designates all of the regulations and safety standards re-
quired to receive the type certification—essentially a standard of
care for manufacturers.22 Once a manufacturer has received a
type certificate for an aircraft or component, it must receive a
production certificate, certifying that a duplicate of the aircraft
or part will conform to the design certified in the type certifi-
cate.23 Finally, the FAA issues an airworthiness certificate for
each aircraft, which certifies that the aircraft conforms to its de-
sign and is safe for flight.24
The FAA also maintains regulatory control over the safety of
an aircraft for the duration of its operational life, which is ac-
complished primarily in three ways. First, the FAA regulates the
training and certification of mechanics and other maintenance
personnel.25 Second, manufacturers who have been issued a
type certificate cannot deviate from the certified design without
FAA approval.26 Third, if the FAA becomes aware of an unsafe
condition on a previously certified aircraft, it may correct the
problem by issuing an “airworthiness directive,” which manufac-
turers must comply with.27
B. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
The doctrine of preemption allows Congress to avoid conflicts
between federal and state laws and is a vital part of ensuring that
the federal system runs smoothly. Preemption is widely assumed
to be rooted in the Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the Consti-
tution, although this assumption has been disputed.28 Though
written about less frequently than other constitutional law top-
ics, it is perhaps the most commonly used constitutional law doc-
22 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.16–.17.
23 Id. §§ 21.131–.150.
24 Id. § 21.183.
25 Id. § 65.81.
26 Id. §§ 21.91–.101.
27 Id. § 39.5.
28 U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2; see also Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemp-
tion, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768 (1994).
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2. Gardbaum argues that preemption is not a product of
the Supremacy Clause, but rather a means of effectuating Congress’s enumerated
powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Gardbaum, supra, at 781–82.
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trine in practice.29 Congress can preempt state laws either
expressly or implicitly by indicating its intent to occupy a given
field to the exclusion of state or local laws, which is known as
field preemption.30 Such intent can be inferred when the perva-
siveness of federal regulation precludes additional regulation by
the states, when the federal government’s interest in the field is
sufficiently dominant, or when the objective of federal regula-
tion aligns with the character of the obligations it imposes.31
The Constitution’s Tenth Amendment creates a presumption
against preemption in areas of the law which states have tradi-
tionally occupied, and in the absence of a clear and manifest
intent to occupy an entire field of the law, the Supreme Court
has stated that state police powers should not be superseded by
federal law.32 Even absent a showing of intent, Congress can pre-
empt state laws which conflict with federal law, either by making
it impossible to comply with both laws or by creating an obstacle
to the accomplishment of a congressional objective.33 Unsurpris-
ingly, congressional intent is the cornerstone of any preemption
analysis, and preemption cases often involve intense scrutiny of
the legislative history behind the statute in question.34 Courts
will also look at the language, structure, and purpose of a statute
or regulation in order to develop an understanding of Con-
gress’s intent.35
The FAAct employs both express and implied preemption.
For example, Section 41713 states,
Except [for certain Alaskan intrastate air transportation], a State,
political subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2
States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provi-
sion having the force and effect of law related to a price, route,
or service of any air carrier that may provide air transportation
under this [subchapter IV].36
The General Aviation Revitalization Act, codified in an official
note to the Federal Aviation Act, provides for an eighteen-year
statute of repose for product liability claims against aircraft and
29 Gardbaum, supra note 28, at 768.
30 Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299–300 (1988).
31 Id. at 300.
32 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); see U.S. CONST. amend. X.
33 Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 300.
34 See, e.g., Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, 181 F.3d 363, 366 (3d Cir. 1999); US Air-
ways, Inc. v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1324 (10th Cir. 2010).
35 See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486.
36 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
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aircraft component manufacturers.37 Finally, the FAAct contains
a “savings clause” designed to preserve state law remedies:
“Nothing contained in this Act shall in any way abridge or alter
the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the
provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies.”38 Due to
the FAAct’s narrow express preemption provisions, its implied
preemption powers are much more meaningful to the federal
government. Any preemption of state aviation law outside of
these provisions must be implied by courts.
An important distinction to understand is the difference be-
tween preemption of a standard of care and preemption of a
claim. For example, there are four elements to a typical state law
negligence claim: standard of care, breach, causation, and dam-
ages.39 In FAAct cases, preemption has recently centered around
the standard of care.40 Thus, while the standard of care may be
preempted by federal regulations, the remaining three elements
are still governed by state law.41 In a negligence claim, the FAA
has prescribed a standard of care, which courts have generally
found to preempt any applicable state standard of care.42 Simi-
larly, the requirements for receiving a type, production, or air-
worthiness certificate create a standard of care which
theoretically governs in product liability or defective design
claims.43 In practice, however, courts disagree about the extent
to which these standards actually preempt any parallel state law
standards.44
The Supreme Court has never spoken on the issue of negli-
gence or products liability in an aviation law case. However, in
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, the Court provided a
framework through which lower courts could analyze FAAct pre-
emption cases.45 In City of Burbank, the Court held that a city
37 General Aviation Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 3(3), 108 Stat.
1552, 1553 (1994).
38 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1106, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
39 See, e.g., V & M Star Steel v. Centimark Corp., 678 F.3d 459, 465–66 (6th Cir.
2012).
40 Alexander T. Simpson, Standard of Care vs. Claim Preemption Under the Federal
Aviation Act, 27 AIR & SPACE L. 4, 4 (2014).
41 Id.
42 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (“No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or
reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.”).
43 See Simpson, supra note 40, at 4.
44 See, e.g., Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 690 (3d Cir.
2016); Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999).
45 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
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noise prevention ordinance, which banned aircraft from taking
off between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m., was preempted by the FAAct, as
amended by the Noise Control Act of 1972.46 Although noise
prevention was an environmental regulation traditionally left to
states, the Court acknowledged the pervasive nature of the
FAA’s own aircraft noise regulation scheme and thus inferred
congressional intent to occupy the entire area of the law.47 The
Court stated that the FAAct required “a delicate balance be-
tween safety and efficiency,”48 and “[t]he interdependence of
these factors requires a uniform and exclusive system of federal
regulation if the congressional objectives underlying the Federal
Aviation Act are to be fulfilled.”49 While the FAAct contained no
express preemption provision on this subject, its legislative his-
tory coupled with the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory
scheme led the Court to conclude it was intended to preempt
state law.50
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
There are two competing views on how the FAAct interacts
with state aviation safety laws under the doctrine of implied pre-
emption. A court’s view of the FAAct’s preemption powers de-
pends largely on its interpretation of the Act’s legislative
history—some see a clear intent to exclude state regulations
from the aviation safety field, while others see Congress exercis-
ing restraint.51 The way a court defines the term “aviation safety”
will also factor into its analysis.52 The Second, Sixth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits have each held that the FAAct impliedly
preempts the entire field of aviation safety law,53 while both the
46 Id. at 633.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 638.
49 Id. at 639.
50 Id. at 636–37. The Senate version of the Noise Control Act contained an
express preemption provision, but was never presented to the House. Id. at 636.
Instead, the House version was presented with amendments. Id. (citing 18 CONG.
REC. 35,886 (1972)). However, Rep. Harley Staggers, Chairman of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, argued on the floor, “We have
evidence that across America some cities and States are trying to pass noise regu-
lations. Certainly, we do not want that to happen. It would harass industry and
progress in America.” Id. at 636–37 (citing 18 CONG. REC. 37,083 (1972)).
51 Compare Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, 181 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 1999), with
Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 683 (3d Cir. 2016).
52 See, e.g., Elassaad v. Indep. Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 127 (3d Cir. 2010).
53 Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2019),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2508 (2020); US Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318,
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Third and Eleventh Circuits have held that the Act only
preempts conflicting state laws.54
Ironically, the Third Circuit is also the source of one of the
most influential opinions applying field preemption to the
FAAct.55 In Abdullah v. American Airlines, the Third Circuit found
that the FAAct impliedly preempted the entire field of aviation
safety law, applying the federal standard of care to an aviation
negligence claim brought under state law.56 Although federal
law preempted the state law standard of care, the court held that
state damage remedies still existed for the violation of the fed-
eral standard of care.57 The court determined that Congress in-
tended for the FAAct to occupy the field of aviation safety law to
the exclusion of the states, basing its conclusion on both legisla-
tive history and persuasive authority from its sister circuits.58 The
court noted that Congress enacted the FAAct in response to a
series of “fatal air crashes between civil and military aircraft oper-
ating under separate flight rules.”59 Further, Senate Reports indi-
cated that Congress intended to vest authority for aviation safety
solely in the FAA, not in the states.60 The court went on to cite a
number of cases in which other circuits found that the FAAct
preempted state or local regulations in a certain area, which it
felt indicated the pervasiveness of the federal government’s reg-
ulatory control.61 Abdullah also established that the federal stan-
dard of care in aviation-related claims preempted any state or
1322 (10th Cir. 2010); Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir.
2007); Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 795 (6th Cir.
2005).
54 See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 683; Pub. Health Tr. v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d
291, 295 (11th Cir. 1993).
55 See Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 364–65.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 365.
58 Id. at 367.
59 Id. at 368 (citing United States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir.
1969)).
60 S. REP. NO. 85-1811, at 5 (1958).
[A]viation is unique among transportation industries in its relation
to the Federal Government—it is the only one whose operations
are conducted almost wholly within the Federal jurisdiction, and
are subject to little or no regulation by States or local authorities.
Thus, the Federal Government bears virtually complete responsibility
for the promotion and supervision of this industry in the public
interest.
Id. (emphasis added).
61 See Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 369–71 (citing Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l. v.
Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d
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local standards of care.62 The court noted that FAA regulations
created a catch-all standard of care in the operation of aircraft,
and that it would be “illogical” for federal law to preempt state
law in matters such as pilot licensing, but not regulations relat-
ing to flight itself.63
The Third Circuit later clarified the extent of Abdullah’s hold-
ing in Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc.64 In Elassaad, a passenger
who was injured while disembarking from a plane brought a
state law negligence claim,65 which the court held was not pre-
empted by the FAAct.66 Abdullah’s holding was not that common
law negligence claims themselves were preempted, only that the
state law standards of care used in those claims were pre-
empted.67 The court noted that the regulations cited in Abdullah
established a standard of care for the operation of aircraft, but
the injury in Elassaad occurred while disembarking after the
plane had landed.68 The court admitted that the FAAct was de-
signed to reduce accidents in air transportation, and that the
FAA “has sole discretion in regulating air safety,” but limited the
definition of air safety in Abdullah to in-flight operations.69 Be-
cause federal regulations did not establish a standard of care for
negligence outside of the operation of the aircraft either in-
flight or while taxiing on the runway, the state law standard of
care was not preempted.70
In Tweed, the Second Circuit recognized at the outset of its
analysis that the FAAct impliedly preempts all state aviation
safety laws, then turned to whether the state law in question fell
400 (7th Cir. 1974); British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.
1977); French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989)).
62 Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 372.
63 Id. at 371; 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (2020).
64 613 F.3d 119, 121 (3d Cir. 2010).
65 Id. at 122.
66 Id. at 131.
67 Id. at 125.
68 Id. at 131.
69 Id. at 126 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
70 Id. at 127.
No person may operate an aircraft, other than for the purpose of
air navigation, on any part of the surface of an airport used by air-
craft for air commerce (including areas used by those aircraft for
receiving or discharging persons or cargo), in a careless or reckless
manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.
14 C.F.R. § 91.13(b).
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within the scope of the FAAct’s preemption.71 The state law at
issue limited the length of an airport’s runway, preventing the
airport from attracting new airlines.72 The airport claimed that
the statute was preempted by the FAAct, but was denied a de-
claratory judgment invalidating the statute by the district
court.73 The Second Circuit reversed, finding that a statute limit-
ing the length of an airport’s runway did fall within the scope of
federal preemption “because of its direct impact on air safety.”74
The court found “localized, state-created limitation[s]” like the
runway statute to be “incompatible with the FAAct’s objective of
establishing a ‘uniform and exclusive system of federal regula-
tion’ in the field of air safety.”75
The Tenth Circuit employed a two-pronged preemption ap-
proach in O’Donnell, concluding that a state law regulating alco-
hol service on aircraft was preempted by the FAAct.76 Like the
Second Circuit in Tweed, the court began its analysis with the
presumption that the FAAct impliedly preempts the entire field
of aviation safety based on the pervasiveness of the federal regu-
latory scheme.77 The first prong of the court’s field preemption
analysis was to identify the legislative field that the state law im-
plicated.78 While the district court viewed the state law as only
regulating alcoholic beverage service on airplanes, the Tenth
Circuit recognized that it “necessarily implicate[d] the field of
airline safety.”79 The second prong of the test was to evaluate
whether Congress intended to occupy that field to the exclusion
of state regulations, and the court determined it did.80 Sidestep-
ping a prior ruling that the FAAct did not preempt state tort
remedies because they were not named in the Act’s express pre-
emption provision, the court acknowledged that such a provi-
sion does not exclude the possibility of implied preemption as
well.81 The court found that both the pervasiveness of the
71 Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2019),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2508 (2020).
72 Id. at 69.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 74.
75 Id. (quoting Air Transp. Ass’n v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 224 (2d Cir. 2008)).
76 US Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1325–26 (10th Cir. 2010).
77 Id. at 1325.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1325–27.
81 Id. at 1326 (discussing Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1444
(10th Cir. 1993)).
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FAAct’s regulations and its legislative history indicated a clear
intent to regulate the aviation safety field exclusively, preempt-
ing the state alcohol regulations in question.82
In Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Systems, Inc., the Sixth Circuit
held that federal aviation standards preempted a state law duty
to warn claim in a products liability case.83 Like the Tenth Cir-
cuit in O’Donnell and the Third Circuit in Abdullah, the Sixth
Circuit relied on the legislative history and pervasiveness of the
FAAct, determining that it was intended to preempt the entire
field of aviation safety.84 The plaintiffs in Greene argued that the
manufacturer breached its duty to warn aircraft users about
manufacturing defects by failing to maintain a database tracking
potential equipment malfunctions.85 However, the plaintiffs
made no claims under federal laws or regulations, and were una-
ble point to any federal standard requiring a manufacturer to
maintain such a database.86 Therefore, the court found that the
additional state-imposed duty to warn of manufacturing defects
was invalid.87
The Third Circuit’s more recent decision in Sikkelee is seem-
ingly incompatible with Abdullah’s holding that additional state-
imposed standards of care in aircraft-related negligence cases
are preempted by the FAAct.88 In Sikkelee, the Third Circuit held
that field preemption does not apply to state law aircraft prod-
ucts liability claims and that the FAAct did not preempt state-
imposed standards of care in such claims.89 Instead, the court
determined that in aviation products liability cases, the FAAct
only preempted conflicting state laws and regulations.90 Like in
Elassaad, the court drew a line between “in-air operations” and
the issuance of safety certificates to aircraft manufacturers, once
again limiting Abdullah’s broad holding.91 The court pointed out
that the regulations cited in Abdullah related only to actually op-
erating an aircraft (i.e., flight), not its design or manufacture,
82 Id. at 1327.
83 Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 795 (6th Cir.
2005).




88 See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 372 (3d Cir. 1999).
89 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 683 (3d Cir. 2016).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 689.
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which was at issue in Sikkelee.92 The driving factor behind this
distinction was the way the federal standard of care in Abdullah
was articulated.93 The in-flight negligence regulation in Abdullah
sounded in common law tort, which the court felt made it com-
prehensive and practical to incorporate into state law claims.94
The design and manufacture regulations, on the other hand,
were much more technical and part-specific, making them “ex-
ceedingly difficult to translate into a standard of care that could
be applied to a tort claim.”95 In Elassaad, the Third Circuit noted
that most of the FAAct regulations concerned aspects of safety
associated with flight, specifically mentioning the certification
and airworthiness requirements for aircraft components.96 This
makes the court’s conclusion that the FAA certification process
was unrelated to in-flight safety even more confusing. Although
certification and airworthiness requirements may not govern in-
flight operations, they clearly concern in-flight safety, which the
court identified as the purpose of the FAAct in Elassaad.97 The
folly of Sikkelee’s holding was further proven on remand, where
the district court found the plaintiff’s state law claims to be con-
flict preempted, as it would be impossible for the manufacturer
to comply with both state and federal regulations.98
Sikkelee formed the basis of a similar decision by the Washing-
ton Supreme Court, which held that the FAAct created only
minimum standards of care for aircraft manufacturers99 and
that state law remedies exceeding that standard of care were not
preempted by the Act.100 In Estate of Becker, the estate of a plane
crash victim brought a state law design defect claim against the
92 Id.
93 Id. at 694.
94 Id. at 695.
95 Id.
96 See Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 128 (3d Cir. 2010).
97 See id. at 126.
98 Sikkelee v. AVCO Corp., 268 F. Supp. 3d 660, 665 (M.D. Pa. 2017). However,
the Third Circuit reversed on appeal, holding that federal law did not conflict
preempt the state law claims. Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 907 F.3d 701,
704 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 860 (2020). The court also reaffirmed its
prior holding that the FAA certification process does not establish a federal stan-
dard of care for aircraft manufacturers. Id. at 717.
99 48 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(1) (“The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration shall promote safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescrib-
ing . . . minimum standards required in the interest of safety for appliances and
for the design, material, construction, quality of work, and performance of air-
craft, aircraft engines, and propellers.”).
100 Estate of Becker v. AVCO Corp., 387 P.3d 1066, 1069 (Wash. 2017).
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manufacturer of a fuel system component in the aircraft.101 The
manufacturer claimed preemption as a defense, arguing that
fuel system manufacturing was pervasively regulated by the fed-
eral government.102 The court rejected the preemption argu-
ment, holding that the regulation in question was not designed
to replace state law, but only to establish a minimum design
standard.103
Like the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has also issued con-
flicting opinions about the reach of the FAAct’s preemption
powers.104 In Montalvo, the court held that the FAAct impliedly
preempted the entire field of aviation safety, dismissing the
plaintiffs’ consolidated failure to warn claims brought under
state law.105 Fourteen plaintiffs each brought negligence claims
against various airlines for failure to warn passengers about the
risk of deep-vein thrombosis, which airlines were under no fed-
eral obligation to do.106 The court recognized that in the ab-
sence of federal preemption of passenger warnings, each state
could mandate a different set of warnings, which could lead to
absurd outcomes.107 In Martin, however, the Ninth Circuit lim-
ited Montalvo’s holding to cases in which the federal regulations
in the field are pervasive.108 In Martin, the plaintiff brought a
design defect claim against an aircraft manufacturer, claiming
that the aircraft’s stairs were defectively designed because they
only had one handrail.109 In comparison to the FAA’s pervasive
regulations on passenger warnings, the only federal regulation
101 Id. at 1067.
102 Id. at 1068.
103 Id. at 1069.
104 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Martin
ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Exp. Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806, 811–12 (9th Cir.
2009).
105 See Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 468.
106 Id. at 467–68.
107 Id. at 473.
Congress could not reasonably have intended an airline on a Provi-
dence–to–Baltimore–to–Miami run to be subject to certain require-
ments in, for example Maryland, but not in Rhode Island or
Florida. It is equally as doubtful that Congress would have intended
the sufficiency of the Airlines’ warnings to hinge on where each
passenger on each flight was likely to file suit.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
108 See Martin, 555 F.3d at 811.
109 Id. at 808.
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of aircraft stairs prohibited designing them in a way which might
block emergency exits.110
The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Lake Aircraft was similar to
that of the Tenth Circuit in Cleveland, relying almost exclusively
on the FAAct’s express preemption provision.111 The court de-
termined that Congress did not intend for the FAAct to preempt
state laws on matters unrelated to airline rates, routes, or ser-
vices, and therefore, the Act did not preempt state law design
defect claims.112 Lake Aircraft was one of the earliest cases on the
subject, and circuit courts’ preemption analyses have since cen-
tered around either the Second Circuit’s field preemption ap-
proach or the Third Circuit’s newer conflict preemption
approach.113
IV. ANALYSIS
A. THE CASE FOR FIELD PREEMPTION
Of all the industries regulated by the federal government, avi-
ation is arguably the most in need of a uniform set of laws and
regulations. The aviation industry is so integral to interstate
commerce114 that it would be counterintuitive for it not to be
governed by a uniform set of laws and regulations. The alterna-
tive to field preemption, in which aviation manufacturers are
potentially subject to a patchwork of different state regulations
and standards of care, is simply incompatible with the industry’s
structure.115 There are several arguments to be made in favor of
field preemption. First, the FAAct’s legislative history and pur-
pose indicate a clear intent to exclude states from regulating
110 Id. at 812. “It’s hard to imagine that any and all state tort claims involving
airplane stairs are preempted by federal law. Because the agency has not compre-
hensively regulated airstairs, the FAA has not preempted state law claims that the
stairs are defective.” Id.
111 Compare Pub. Health Tr. v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291, 295 (11th Cir.
1993), with Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1447 (10th Cir.
1993).
112 Lake Aircraft, Inc., 999 F.2d at 295.
113 See Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir.
2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2508 (2020); Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp.,
822 F.3d 680, 709 (3d Cir. 2016).
114 See generally Data & Statistics, AIRLINES FOR AM., https://www.airlines.org/
data/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
115 See Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 473 (9th Cir. 2007). “Aviation
transportation requires more national coordination than any other public trans-
portation and also poses the largest risks. Regulation on a national basis is re-
quired because air transportation is a national operation.” Id. (internal citations
omitted).
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aviation safety.116 Second, field preemption allows for a uniform
federal standard of care without necessarily preempting state
law claims and remedies.117 Finally, field preemption is more
consistent with related Supreme Court precedent and the pre-
emption doctrine’s constitutional roots.118
As previously mentioned, legislative intent is highly determi-
native of a federal law or regulation’s preemption powers.119 In
addition to legislative history, congressional intent to occupy an
entire field of law can be implied when federal regulation is suf-
ficiently pervasive, when the federal interest in the field is suffi-
ciently dominant, or when the objective of the federal
regulation and the character of its obligations show such a pur-
pose.120 The sheer amount of regulations that the FAA has
promulgated within the aviation safety field makes it difficult to
understand how a court could view the FAA’s regulations as any-
thing but pervasive.121 Another rule, which some courts seem to
have ignored, is often cited to when arguing that the FAA only
establishes a minimum standard for design and manufacture.122
Section 44701(e) governs the FAA’s acceptance of airworthiness
directives issued by foreign governments, yet makes no mention
of state governments.123 The FAA may accept foreign airworthi-
ness directives only in the event that its foreign counterpart has
a certification system requiring an equivalent level of safety as
the FAA does.124 Allowing foreign aviation safety agencies, but
not states, to certify airworthiness seems to indicate that Con-
gress intended to create a system in which there are only two
possible arbiters of aircraft safety—the FAA or its foreign
counterpart.125
Legislative intent is further clarified by looking at the legisla-
tive history associated with the FAAct. Congress emphasized the
unique nature of the aviation industry, which naturally made it a
federal concern:
116 See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 1999).
117 See Tweed, 930 F.3d at 75.
118 See supra Part III.B.
119 See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text.
120 See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988).
121 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 1–1399.
122 49 U.S.C. § 44701(e).
123 Id.
124 Id. § 44701(e)(5)(A)(iii).
125 Id. § 41302.
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[A]viation is unique among transportation industries in its rela-
tion to the Federal Government—it is the only one whose opera-
tions are conducted almost wholly within the Federal
jurisdiction, and are subject to little or no regulation by States or
local authorities. Thus, the Federal Government bears virtually
complete responsibility for the promotion and supervision of this
industry in the public interest.126
The circumstances prompting the FAA’s creation are also con-
sistent with an intent to establish a uniform federal regulatory
system. Congress passed the FAAct in response to a series of “fa-
tal air crashes between civil and military aircraft operating under
separate flight rules.”127 It would make little sense for Congress to
go to the trouble of passing such a comprehensive piece of legis-
lation only to leave the very problem it sought to address unad-
dressed. In City of Burbank, the Supreme Court afforded
significant weight to the legislative history of the FAAct, which it
felt was clearly designed to establish uniform regulations.128
That the Court reached this conclusion even after acknowledg-
ing that noise control regulation was traditionally a state police
power speaks volumes about the weight of the FAAct’s legislative
history.129
One of the primary concerns with field preemption the Third
Circuit expressed in Sikkelee was that it “would have the perverse
effect of granting complete immunity from design defect liabil-
ity to an entire industry.”130 However, because state law claims
should still be available in conjunction with the FAAct under
field preemption, this fear is misguided. The majority of circuit
courts have held that the federal standard of care in the opera-
tion of aircraft preempts any state law standards of care, while
leaving remedies for state law claims intact.131 Significantly, the
FAAct’s savings clause states that “[n]othing contained in this
[chapter] shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now
existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this
[chapter] are in addition to such remedies.”132 The language
126 S. REP. NO. 85-1811, at 5 (1958).
127 United States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1969) (emphasis
added).
128 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 634–40 (1973).
129 See id. at 638.
130 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 695 (3d Cir. 2016).
131 See, e.g., Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999).
132 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1106, 72 Stat. 731, 798
(1958).
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here necessarily implies the existence of state law claims, as a
remedy could not exist without a claim.
Once again, it is important to remember the distinction be-
tween preempting a state law claim and a state law standard of
care. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Abdullah, federal law can pre-
empt the standard of care while leaving state tort remedies
intact:
[W]e find no irreconcilable conflict between federal and state
standards. Nor do we find that imposition of a . . . standard in a
damages action would frustrate the objectives of the federal law.
Quite to the contrary, it is evident in both the savings and the
insurance clauses of the [FAAct] that Congress found state dam-
age remedies to be compatible with federal aviation safety stan-
dards. The savings clause provides that a remedy under this part
is in addition to any other remedies provided by law. Clearly,
Congress did not intend to prohibit state damage remedies by
this language.133
In Ventress v. Japan Airlines, the Ninth Circuit held that a plain-
tiff’s state law claims were preempted by the FAAct, but did so in
a manner consistent with the reasoning set forth in Abdullah.134
In Ventress, the plaintiff failed to allege a violation of any applica-
ble federal aviation safety standard, pleading only state law un-
lawful retaliation and constructive termination claims in
response to his termination.135 The court acknowledged that
while state law claims and remedies were hypothetically available
under Abdullah’s holding, the plaintiff’s failure to allege a claim
under any applicable federal standard warranted preemption.136
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Greene invalidated the entire fail-
ure to warn claim brought under state law because it hinged on
the existence of a federal standard requiring manufacturers to
maintain a malfunction database.137 Had there been both fed-
eral and state law standards requiring such a database, the fed-
eral standard would have preempted the state standard. Even
absent a federal equivalent, the state law standard was pre-
empted because it was supplementary to the federal regulatory
scheme.138 In Sikkelee, the Third Circuit framed the issue as
133 Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 375 (internal quotations omitted).
134 Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 747 F.3d 716, 723 n.7 (9th Cir. 2014).
135 Id. at 719–20.
136 Id. at 723 n.7.
137 See Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 794–95 (6th
Cir. 2005).
138 Id. at 795.
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whether the FAAct preempted state law product liability claims,
rather than just the standard of care.139 However, the court also
rejected arguments that federal regulations established an appli-
cable standard of care for aircraft design and manufacturing.140
Its primary reasoning was that the design certification process—
type, production, and airworthiness certificates—only estab-
lished the procedures for federal approval of aircraft and their
components, lacking the comprehensiveness to supply the stan-
dard of care in a products liability case.141
The federal certification process does exactly that, however.
The FAA’s design safety standard is actually set forth through
the type certification process.142 In addition to type certificates,
the FAA may issue special conditions to manufacturers if its stan-
dard regulations are inadequate for a product, such as a compo-
nent the administration is unfamiliar with.143 The standard for
issuing a type certificate is exacting on manufacturers, and the
language within the regulation purports to establish a standard
for design:
Upon examination of the type design, and after completing all
tests and inspections, that the type design and the product meet
the applicable noise, fuel venting, and emissions requirements of
this subchapter, and further finds that they meet the applicable
airworthiness requirements of this subchapter or that any airwor-
thiness provisions not complied with are compensated for by fac-
tors that provide an equivalent level of safety.144
Prior to this testing phase, an applicant for a type certificate
must also show compliance with all applicable requirements.145
Even if not explicitly, 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.20–.21 seem to establish an
across-the-board standard for aircraft design and manufacture.
Had the Third Circuit recognized this distinction, it could have
simply applied this federal standard of care to the state law
claim, rather than relying on a state law standard requiring addi-
tional design considerations.
The Supreme Court has held that federal regulations estab-
lish a uniform standard of care in the design and manufacture
139 See Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 692 (3d Cir. 2016).
140 See id. at 694.
141 Id.
142 Lauren L. Haertlein & Justin T. Barkowski, Applying a Federal Standard of
Care in Aviation Product Liability Actions, 82 J. AIR L. & COM. 743, 760 (2017).
143 Id.
144 14 C.F.R. § 21.21 (2020) (emphasis added).
145 Id. §§ 21.20–.21.
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of oil tankers, which is governed by a regulatory scheme similar
to that of the aviation industry.146 In Ray, a Washington state law
established safety standards exceeding those required by the
Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA).147 Much like
the FAA, the DoT oversaw a pervasive regulatory system includ-
ing certification of oil tanker design and inspections for ongo-
ing compliance under the PWSA.148 Especially significant is how
the Court addressed the issue of “minimum standards” in the
PWSA.149 Courts that reject field preemption argue that federal
regulations establish only a minimum standard for design and
manufacture.150 In Ray, however, the Court found that the per-
vasive nature of the PWSA regulatory scheme established more
than just a minimum standard.151 The Court noted that in addi-
tion to the power to promulgate safety standards, the PWSA
gave the federal government authority to ensure compliance
through certificates and inspections, prompting its conclusion
that the PWSA preempted the entire field of marine safety
regulations.152
This indicates to us that Congress intended uniform national
standards for design and construction of tankers that would fore-
close the imposition of different or more stringent state require-
ments. In particular, as we see it, Congress did not anticipate that
a vessel found to be in compliance with the Secretary’s design
and construction regulations . . . would nevertheless be barred by
state law from operating in the navigable waters of the United
States on the ground that its design characteristics constitute an
undue hazard.153
The similarities between the two federal regulatory schemes
are readily apparent: both establish a comprehensive certifica-
tion process in design and manufacture, and federal control of
American waters is analogous to federal control of American air-
146 See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 163 (1978).
147 Id. at 154.
148 Id. at 161–62.
149 Id. at 161. The Court noted the PWSA requires promulgation of “compre-
hensive minimum standards of design, construction, alteration, repair, mainte-
nance, and operation” for certain vessels. Id.
150 See Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 694 (3d Cir. 2016);
Estate of Becker v. AVCO Corp., 387 P.3d 1066, 1069 (Wash. 2017).
151 Ray, 435 U.S. at 163.
152 Id. at 162–63.
153 Id. at 163–64.
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ways.154 Much like the Court observed in Ray, it would make lit-
tle sense for aircraft meeting federal design standards to be
subject to liability in certain states with more stringent stan-
dards. The Court cited the legislative history of the PWSA, which
also indicated an intent to preempt state law: “The original
Tank Vessel Act, amended by Title II, sought to effect ‘a reason-
able and uniform set of rules and regulations concerning ship
construction.’”155 The FAA’s parallel aircraft certification system
should therefore indicate an equal intent. The FAAct and PWSA
also mirror each other in their acceptance of foreign safety certi-
fications.156 The PWSA contains a nearly identical provision al-
lowing the federal government alone to accept the safety
certifications of foreign vessels,157 which the Court also felt indi-
cated congressional intent to preempt the entire field of mari-
time safety law.158
Given that the federal design certification process establishes
a standard of care for design and manufacture, it is much
harder to reconcile the Third Circuit’s distinction between in-
air operations and pre- or post-flight regulations. The court
noted in Sikkelee that the examples of the pervasive regulations it
had cited in Abdullah only applied to in-air operations, leaving
certain regulations, such as those applying to type certificates,
outside the reach of the FAAct’s preemption powers.159 Accord-
ing to the court, the design regulations governing type certifi-
cates were not as comprehensive as those governing pilot
certification and other aspects of in-flight operations, therefore
the FAAct established only minimum safety standards rather
than a catch-all standard of care for design and manufacture.160
Naturally, the court pointed out that the FAAct grants the FAA
the authority to prescribe “minimum standards” required “in the
interest of safety” and “necessary for safety.”161 The existence of
“minimum” federal standards, however, does not necessarily im-
ply that states have the power to supplement those standards.
Rather, the use of the word “minimum” was intended to strike
154 Thomas J. McLaughlin, Mary P. Gaston, & Jared D. Hager, Navigating the
Nation’s Waterways and Airways: Maritime Lessons for Federal Preemption of Airworthi-
ness Standards, 23 AIR & SPACE LAW. no. 2, 2010, at 5, 9.
155 Ray, 435 U.S. at 165–66 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 74-2962, at 2 (1936)).
156 McLaughlin, supra note 154, at 9.
157 46 U.S.C. § 3303.
158 See Ray, 435 U.S. at 163.
159 See Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 689 (3d Cir. 2016).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 693; 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a) (emphasis added).
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an optimal balance between adequately ensuring safety in air-
craft design and manufacturing, and facilitating economic
growth by avoiding overly burdensome regulations.162 It would
make little sense for the federal government to prescribe inade-
quate safety regulations and allow each state to decide whether
to supplement them. If that were the case, Congress would be
knowingly risking the lives of passengers on aircraft designed or
manufactured in a state which declined to supplement the mini-
mum federal standard of care. Such a result would be clearly
inconsistent with Congress’s stated goal of ensuring “maximum
possible safety and efficiency” through the FAAct.163
Field preemption is necessary in order to establish a uniform
federal standard of care for aircraft manufacturers. This is the
primary problem with the Third Circuit’s holding in Sikkelee—
the FAAct does not prevent plaintiffs in product liability claims
from also bringing state law claims supplying their own stan-
dards of care.164 Allowing plaintiffs to bring tort claims under
state laws applying different standards of care subjects aircraft
manufacturers to a patchwork of different standards, making it
impracticable—if not impossible—to realistically comply with
each of them.165 Because aircraft manufacturers have essentially
zero control over where an aircraft goes after its sale, forcing
them into compliance with both a federal design standard and
potentially fifty different state standards is simply unreasona-
ble.166 Allowing state law to govern the standard of care in an
aviation products liability claim is also problematic because it
displaces the expertise of the FAA. The FAA employs a highly
technical certification process which governs manufacture and
design throughout the life of the aircraft.167 In contrast, state
standards of care developed through litigation allow the FAA’s
complex certification process to be second-guessed by expert
witnesses, judges, and juries.168
Applying the federal standard of care to state law product lia-
bility claims provides more predictability for aircraft manufac-
turers, while also ensuring a more accurate outcome in each
case. Under state law, the standard of care in a negligence claim
162 See Haertlein & Barkowski, supra note 142, at 759.
163 H.R. REP. NO. 85-2360, at *3747 (1958).
164 See id.
165 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 473 (9th Cir. 2007).
166 See Haertlein & Barkowski, supra note 142, at 757.
167 Id. at 758.
168 Id.
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would be established primarily through expert testimony and a
strict liability claim would hinge on whether the jury finds a de-
sign defect.169 This usually involves weighing the feasibility of al-
ternative designs, which may or may not be relevant to the
specific issue being litigated.170 A jury verdict against a manufac-
turer thus means that the product design was unsafe for opera-
tion, even though the design was approved by the FAA when it
issued a type certificate.171 Thus, the court supersedes the FAA’s
role in certifying aircraft and imposes a duty on the manufac-
turer to comply with a design standard which may be inconsis-
tent with those prescribed by the FAA.172 This lack of uniformity
increases litigation costs due to the reliance on expert witnesses,
while forcing manufacturers to spend more on insurance to pro-
tect themselves from such inconsistent standards.173 Manufactur-
ers will ultimately pass these higher costs along to consumers,
negatively impacting both sides of the market.174
By integrating the federal standard of care set forth through
the certification process into state law claims, the focus at trial
instead becomes whether the product met the FAA’s standards,
rather than those established by expert witnesses.175 The issu-
ance of a type certificate would constitute prima facie evidence
that no defect exists, shifting the burden to the plaintiff to show
that the manufacturer failed to comply with the basis of its certi-
fication in that instance.176 Although this may present a hurdle
for plaintiffs, the federal standard of care provides a more accu-
rate definition of a product defect, while also giving manufactur-
ers more certainty from state to state.
As a starting point in any future Supreme Court case on the
issue, the presumption against federal preemption should not
be so powerful. The presumption primarily applies to the extent
that Congress attempts to preempt state law in an area that the
169 Id. at 765–66.
170 Id. at 766.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 See Geoffrey M. Hand, Should Juries Decide Aircraft Design? Cleveland v. Piper
Aircraft Corp. and Federal Preemption of State Tort Law, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 741, 743
(1995).
174 Id.
175 See id. at 785–86.
176 Id. at 802.
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states have traditionally occupied.177 This concern is typical to
preemption cases, but is likely irrelevant in the aviation context.
The Supreme Court has already acknowledged that the pre-
sumption against preemption does not apply to federal mari-
time safety regulation,178 a field with a similar history of federal
control. The Third Circuit in Sikkelee somehow failed to find a
significant history of federal involvement in aviation safety regu-
lation, stating that “aviation torts have been consistently gov-
erned by state law” before citing an aviation safety case decided
under state law—in 1914.179 While the court then cites to addi-
tional cases decided under state law, this line of jurisprudence—
on its own—could hardly be considered convincing evidence
that aviation law is an area of traditional state occupation. The
federal government did not begin regulating aviation safety un-
til 1926,180 primarily because it was a fledgling industry. Since
1926, however, Congress has exhibited a marked interest in reg-
ulating American airways, and its regulatory schemes have
shown an intent to exclude states from further regulation.181
From a constitutional perspective, when applied to the FAAct,
field preemption is more appropriate than conflict preemption.
Regardless of the doctrine’s source—the Supremacy Clause or
the Necessary and Proper Clause—field preemption seems to be
the clear choice. The Supremacy Clause route is rather simple:
Congress has spoken on the issue, therefore excluding states
from further regulation. Under the Supremacy Clause, the Con-
stitution and federal laws are the supreme law of the land.182 If
the FAA purports to establish standards for aircraft manufacture
and design, as it has through its detailed certification system,183
states should naturally be excluded from imposing additional
standards. The FAA’s multi-level certification system establishes
a comprehensive safety standard for not only the aircraft, but
each of its components as well.184 Therefore, allowing standards
177 See John C. Nettels, Jr. & Jerrick L. Irby, Standard of Care Preemption in Avia-
tion Litigation: Halting Steps to a Coherent Analysis, 76 J. AIR. L. & COM. 327, 335
(2011).
178 United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (“An assumption of nonpre-
emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has
been a history of significant federal presence.”).
179 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 690 (3d Cir. 2016).
180 See Air Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
181 See A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 6.
182 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
183 See supra Part II.A.
184 Haertlein & Barkowski, supra note 142, at 764.
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of care defined by states to govern in aviation product liability
cases would undermine the federal regulatory scheme, which
has already established a standard of care for aircraft design and
manufacturing.185 Relying on principles of conflict preemption
would provide little clarity in comparison with the current re-
gime—although federal law may preempt conflicting state stat-
utes, it would be up to the courts to decide when exactly this
preemption has occurred, which could lead to inconsistent
outcomes.186
Though the Supreme Court has often stated that preemption
is rooted in the Supremacy Clause,187 preemption can also be
viewed as a product of the Necessary and Proper Clause, as Pro-
fessor Stephen A. Gardbaum argues.188 The crux of his argu-
ment is that the supremacy of federal law means that when both
state and federal law within a certain area are valid, the federal
law overrides the state law.189 Therefore, under the Supremacy
Clause, state law still has full effect provided it avoids conflicting
with federal law.190 Preemption, on the other hand, means that
states have no power to act in the given field, regardless of
whether they conflict with any federal laws.191 Gardbaum argues
that under the Necessary and Proper Clause, preemption is sim-
ply a means of allowing Congress to effectively exercise its enu-
merated powers.192 This often requires a uniform set of laws or
regulations to accomplish, especially when regulating interstate
commerce.193 Aviation safety is no exception—as an integral
part of interstate commerce,194 it should be governed by a uni-
form set of laws and regulations. Aviation is a fundamental inter-
state industry which was quite literally invented to travel across
state and national borders, making it uniquely suited for federal
regulation. This is precisely what the Supreme Court made clear
in City of Burbank: if the congressional objectives underlying the
FAAct are to be fulfilled, balancing safety and efficiency requires
185 Id.
186 See supra Part II.B.
187 See, e.g., Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 366 (3d Cir. 1999).
188 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Gardbaum, supra note 28, at 781–82.
189 Gardbaum, supra note 28, at 770.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 771.
192 Id. at 782.
193 Id. at 781.
194 Data & Statistics, supra note 114.
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a uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation.195 How-
ever one chooses to interpret the source of preemption, field
preemption is more consistent with the Constitution when ap-
plied to the field of aviation safety.
B. APPLYING Tweed to Other Circuits
Given both the importance of uniform aviation regulation
and the degree to which the circuits differ in their analysis of
FAAct preemption, the Supreme Court will likely speak on the
issue in the near future. Although the denial of certiorari for
Tweed was certainly disappointing for the aviation industry, the
silver lining is that a future decision may provide more clarity
than one tailored to Tweed’s facts. The Second Circuit was clear
in its view that the FAAct was intended to preempt the entire
field of aviation safety, but it never indicated whether that in-
cluded the applicable standard of care for design and manufac-
ture.196 Thus, a Supreme Court decision in Tweed may have been
limited to the runway statute at issue in the case rather than
addressing the broader question of the FAAct’s overall preemp-
tion power.197 Although Tweed will not be heard before the Su-
preme Court, its preemption analysis should guide other circuit
courts.
The preemption analysis in Tweed is also much simpler than
the Third Circuit’s approach in Sikkelee, making it easier for
other circuit courts to apply. The Second Circuit began by ac-
knowledging its own precedent that the FAAct impliedly pre-
empted the entire field of aviation safety.198 Thus, the question
became whether the statute fell within the scope of preemption
by having a direct impact on air safety.199 The Third Circuit had
also previously held that the FAAct preempted the entire field of
aviation safety in Abdullah,200 but limited “aviation safety” to in-
195 See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638–39
(1973).
196 See Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir.
2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2508 (2020).
197 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Tweed, 930 F.3d 65 (No. 19-375). The
question presented to the Court was “[d]oes the Federal Aviation Act preempt a
state law limiting the length of an airport runway, thereby depriving a State from
determining the size and nature of a local airport?” Id. at ii.
198 See Tweed, 930 F.3d at 74 (citing Goodspeed Airport, LLC v. E. Haddam
Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Comm’n, 634 F.3d 206, 210–11 (2d Cir. 2011)).
199 See id.
200 See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 376 (3d Cir. 1999).
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flight operations in Elassaad and Sikkelee.201 This narrow defini-
tion of aviation safety requires courts to perform a preemption
analysis for any aviation safety law not directly governing in-
flight operations. Under the Tweed approach, a court has only
one question to answer: does the law directly impact aviation
safety?
Of course, circuits yet to decide on the issue have little di-
rectly applicable precedent with which to start their FAAct pre-
emption analysis. In the interest of uniformity, these circuits
should adopt the majority view that the FAAct impliedly
preempts the entire field of aviation safety law. These courts
could undertake their own preemption analysis or simply side
with the weight of persuasive authority, which the Second Cir-
cuit did in Goodspeed.202 After adopting the majority view, the
court need only determine whether the law in question falls
within that field.
This simpler analysis is preferable for several reasons. First,
analyzing aviation safety laws under the presumption of field
preemption ensures more consistent application of the law na-
tionwide. Analyzing congressional intent and the pervasiveness
of regulation in every subset of aviation safety law runs the risk
of contradicting the federal government’s interest in uniformity.
Second, the requirement that a state law must directly affect avi-
ation safety in order to fall within the scope of preemption pro-
vides more certainty to state and local authorities about the
extent of their regulatory power. This is especially important in
the absence of a Supreme Court decision, as it will conserve
state and local government resources which might otherwise be
spent litigating preemption challenges brought by private par-
ties. Finally, agreement among circuits will benefit the aviation
industry by providing more geographic uniformity for manufac-
turers regarding design and manufacturing standards.
The Tweed analysis is also compatible with establishing a uni-
form federal standard of care for aircraft design and manufac-
turing. Preempting additional state-based standards of care
would require proving that the federal regulations directly im-
pact aviation safety, which is not too high a burden. FAA type
certificate regulations require that aircraft and their compo-
201 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 689 (3d Cir. 2016);
Elassaad v. Indep. Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 127 (3d Cir. 2010).
202 See Goodspeed, 634 F.3d at 210 n.5.
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nents meet a “level of safety,”203 which seems to be an obvious
case for preemption under Tweed. Imposing a uniform federal
standard of care does not prevent plaintiffs from bringing prod-
uct liability or design defect claims under state law. Rather, only
state law standards of care would be preempted by the FAA reg-
ulations, as they directly impact aviation safety. The focus at trial
then shifts from establishing a design defect through expert tes-
timony to proving that the manufacturer failed in that instance
to comply with the requirements of its FAA certification.204 This
should allow for a more accurate determination of whether a
design defect actually exists. This also ensures aircraft manufac-
turers will not be subjected to different standards of care based
on where an accident occurs, which is almost entirely out of
their control.
V. CONCLUSION
The American aviation industry requires a set of uniform laws
and regulations in order to operate at maximum efficiency. As it
stands, aircraft manufacturers are subject to a wide variety of
safety standards governed by state tort law—a system which is
simply incompatible with the nature of the aviation industry.
Field preemption is more consistent with both the intended pur-
pose of the FAAct and the unique nature of the aviation indus-
try. Unique as it is, the industry’s regulatory scheme is also very
comparable to regulations on maritime safety, which has proven
to be an industry suited for uniform federal control. Courts that
have declined to apply field preemption to the FAAct have done
so in a misguided manner, either misinterpreting the purpose
of the FAAct or misunderstanding the nature of the aviation
industry.
Integrating federal design and manufacturing standards into
state law tort claims is the optimal regulatory approach for the
aviation industry, as it would provide clarity and certainty for
manufacturers while also simplifying the trial process in negli-
gence and products liability claims. Insulating manufacturers
from the patchwork of different standards of care will lower
203 14 C.F.R. § 21.21(b)(1). The FAA may issue a type certificate if it “finds that
they meet the applicable airworthiness requirements of this subchapter or that
any airworthiness provisions not complied with are compensated for by factors
that provide an equivalent level of safety.” Id. (emphasis added); see also id.
§ 21.21(b)(2) (requiring “that no feature or characteristic makes [an aircraft]
unsafe”).
204 See Hand, supra note 173, at 743.
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both their litigation and insurance costs, savings which can be
passed onto consumers. Uniform federal standards would also
ensure that the subject matter experts, not judges and juries,
decide whether an aircraft or component met the applicable de-
sign standards in each case.
Ideally, the Supreme Court will step in and resolve the circuit
split in the near future. Until then, the Second Circuit’s deci-
sion in Tweed should serve as a template for other circuit courts
that have yet to decide on the issue. This will ensure maximum
possible uniformity in federal aviation regulation and will bene-
fit the judicial system, state and local governments, the aviation
industry, and ultimately, the consumer.
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I. INTRODUCTION
FOR MOST EMPLOYEES, the question “Where do I work?” isnot one that ever comes to mind. But for some workers, par-
ticularly those in the airline industry, a thicket of conflicting lo-
cal, state, and federal laws, along with work that regularly takes
them across state lines, raises serious questions about where ex-
actly the work is being performed—and more importantly, what
rights and protections apply. While workers can be certain that
some federal laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA) or Railway Labor Act of 1926 (RLA) apply to them no
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matter where they work in the country, the applicability of state
and local labor laws that provide additional protections like Cali-
fornia’s wage and hour laws or New York City’s paid sick leave
law is much less certain. This confusion has only been magnified
by some states’ recent assertions of extraterritorial authority to
apply their wage and hour laws to workers located outside of
their borders. In light of this uncertainty and the growing num-
ber of cases stemming from it, there exists a clear need for legis-
lative intervention to preempt conflicting state and local labor
laws and to bring uniformity to the field.
Part II of this Comment provides the historical background of
federal wage and labor law, with a particular focus on how it has
developed for workers in the railway industry, and how that his-
tory shaped the field of airline labor law. Part III examines the
current state of the conflicting federal, state, and local laws, the
recent cases arising out of such conflict, and the assertions of
extraterritorial authority. Part IV advocates for nationwide uni-
formity in labor law for aviation workers, divorcing the labor
rights of airline workers from the RLA, and outlines the policy
implications of letting the current thicket of conflicting laws
worsen. Part V proposes an amendment to Title 49 of the U.S.
Code (Title 49) that would grant the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) the authority to regulate the labor of airline work-
ers and establish a comprehensive framework of labor and wage
laws that will preempt state and local regulations.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Though the development of labor law in the United States has
a long and storied history dating back to the slave trade, the
modern statutory framework finds its roots in several critical
pieces of legislation in the early twentieth century. Prior to the
passage of these seminal pieces of legislation, courts around the
country were striking down protections for workers as unconsti-
tutional, including laws limiting the number of hours an em-
ployee could work in 1905,1 prohibiting conditioning
employment on an agreement to not join a union in 1915,2
prohibiting child labor in 1918,3 and establishing minimum
wage standards for women and children in 1923.4 Subsequent
1 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
2 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915).
3 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918).
4 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 561–62 (1923).
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acts like the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA)5 and
the FLSA6 were radical grants of rights and protections to em-
ployees in a legal environment that had previously been inimical
to them. These two acts built on the foundations of others like
the RLA,7 which provided much needed protections only to
workers in certain industries—that is, the railroad industry, and
later, airline industry. These acts, and the subsequent court deci-
sions upholding them, signaled a sea change in American juris-
prudence toward protecting the rights of workers and, to this
day, serve as the foundation of labor law in the United States.
A. FOUNDATIONS OF AIRLINE WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES: THE INHERITED HISTORY OF RAILWAY
WORKERS’ COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
One of the first instances of collective bargaining and its sub-
sequent suppression by the judiciary came out of Pennsylvania
in the late 1700s. There, a group of shoemakers formed a proto-
union to respond to the increasing labor hardships of an indus-
trializing society and to secure fair wages for its members.8 This
union, however, did not have a long lifespan, and after just ten
years, a suit was brought against members of the union for the
criminal charge of conspiracy in Commonwealth v. Pullis.9 Eight
of the union’s leaders were found guilty of the crime of illegally
conspiring to raise their wages, effectively criminalizing unions
in Pennsylvania.10 The result of Pullis left the legal status of un-
ions in question in other parts of the country, and there were at
least eighteen other instances of early union members being
prosecuted for conspiracy over the course of the next three
decades.11
It would not be until 1842 that a court would declare that
labor unions were in fact legal enterprises and not criminal con-
spiracies.12 That case, Commonwealth v. Hunt, coincidentally also
dealing with shoemakers, set the stage for the legality of collec-
5 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69.
6 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–03.
7 Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–88.
8 Walter Nelles, The First American Labor Case, 41 YALE L.J. 165, 166–67 (1931).
9 3 Doc. Hist. 59 (Phila. Mayor’s Ct. 1806); Omar Swartz, Defending Labor in
Commonwealth v. Pullis: Contemporary Implications for Rethinking Community, 8
HOLY CROSS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 79, 80 n.10 (2004).
10 Id. at 80.
11 Edwin E. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825, 826 (1926).
12 Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 111, 136 (1842).
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tive bargaining in the United States,13 and Chief Justice Shaw’s
majority opinion is widely regarded as “the Magna [Carta] of
American trade-unionism.”14 In Hunt, Chief Justice Shaw made
the distinction between the mere concept of a combination of
workers seeking to use collective bargaining to regulate their
wages—a union—and the methods a union might employ to se-
cure higher wages or other protections.15 By drawing such a
line, Chief Justice Shaw reframed the debate from whether a
union itself amounted to an illegal conspiracy to whether the
objectives sought by the union and methods used to accomplish
such objectives were themselves legal.16 Though the debate over
the precise demarcation of when union action crosses into ille-
gal territory continues to this day, Chief Justice Shaw’s formula-
tion would prove highly influential, with only three conspiracy
cases in the subsequent twenty years brought against workers.17
Though Chief Justice Shaw laid the groundwork for the legality
of unions and their ability to strike lawfully, his opinion would
do little to stem oncoming tides of conflict between workers and
their employers in an increasingly industrial society.18
Strikes would prove to be the tool of choice for American
workers in combatting poor working conditions, low wages, and
overall governmental hostility to the interests of workers.19 The
tensions between workers and their employers came to a head in
1877, when workers—frustrated with repeated pay cuts, shoul-
dering the burden of an economic depression, and the efforts of
employers to stifle the potency of unions—staged what would be
the first nationwide strike in American history, with estimates of
nearly 500,000 workers walking out from their jobs in July
1877.20 Characterized as the “Great Strike” or the “Great Insur-
rection,” the strikes of July 1877 began along America’s exten-
sive railroad system.21 No longer constrained to a mere local
group of disgruntled shoemakers like the unions in Pullis and
Hunt, the Great Strike involved workers of the railroad corpora-
13 Id.
14 LEONARD LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW
183 (1957).
15 Witte, supra note 11, at 828.
16 Id.
17 LEVY, supra note 14, at 206.
18 Witte, supra note 11, at 828.
19 MICHAEL A. BELLESILES, 1877: AMERICA’S YEAR FOR LIVING VIOLENTLY 144
(2010).
20 Id. at 145.
21 Id.
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tions—some of the largest and most influential corporations in
America at the time—the same corporations that played a criti-
cal role in America’s rapid industrialization.22
The increased stakes and heightened impacts of the railway
worker strikes resulted in an increase in the severity of the re-
sponse—this time, rather than taking the striking unions to
court, corporate leaders resorted to force almost immediately.23
When local police forces and state militias—many of them hold-
ing sympathies to the cause of the striking workers24—were una-
ble or unwilling to enact the will of corporate leaders, the
leaders turned to recently inaugurated President Rutherford B.
Hayes.25 Indebted to the corporate leaders who had supported
his presidential campaign, President Hayes authorized federal
troops to suppress the strikes—a rarely used option—and the
Great Strike marked the first time federal troops were used on a
nationwide scale to quash a strike.26
President Hayes’s decision to acquiesce to the demands of
railway corporations and authorize the use of federal force
would ultimately end the strikes, but not without bloodshed,27
destruction of property,28 and the garnering of much public
support for the unions.29 The victory of the corporations would
prove to be a Pyrrhic one, as the landscape of labor relations
had been forever changed.30 It had become clear to the workers
that they could not rely on the current governmental institu-
tions to side with their interests over those of the wealthy railway
owners,31 and it had become clear to the nation’s elite that the
influence and power of a unified working class could have devas-
tating results for the country.32
Responses to the new landscape were mixed; some industrial-
ists raised wages in order to keep their workers happy and
loyal,33 while others like Andrew Carnegie saw only the danger-
ous aspects of unions and conditioned hiring workers on their
22 Id. at 145–46.
23 Id. at 145.
24 Id. at 149.
25 Id. at 146.
26 Id. at 145–46.
27 Id. at 175.
28 Id. at 155–58.
29 Id. at 156.
30 Id. at 190.
31 Id. at 179.
32 Id. at 175.
33 Id. at 168.
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agreement to not join one34—a practice that would later be-
come known as a “yellow-dog contract.”35 Workers who had lost
faith in elected public officials turned to the ballot box in order
to secure their rights.36 And, having witnessed the existential
threat that a striking railway workforce imposes on the country’s
economy,37 it became imperative for the political leaders to pre-
vent such a massive strike from occurring again. The federal
government’s early attempts to mediate the interests of the rail-
way owners and workers would take place through a series of
failed legislation that ultimately culminated in the still extant
RLA in 1926.38
B. THE LEAD UP TO MODERN LAW GOVERNING AIRLINE
EMPLOYEES: BACKGROUND TO THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
Still hot on the heels of the Great Strike of 1877, political
leaders in state governments had great incentive to encourage
harmonious resolution of disputes between unions and employ-
ers. To facilitate such resolution, several states began passing
legislation to arbitrate labor disputes as early as 1878, though
the state statutes ultimately proved to be feckless.39 However,
these statutes provided the groundwork for a federal statute’s
inception. Given the recent history of railway strikes and the rail-
way industry’s susceptibility to such strikes, the impact those
strikes had on the national economy, and the fact that railways
were clearly engaged in interstate commerce, it is of little sur-
prise that the first federal law on labor arbitration would arise in
the context of railway labor disputes.40 As a result, President
Grover Cleveland signed into law the Arbitration Act of 1888
(Arbitration Act), which provided an arena for voluntary arbitra-
tion of railway labor disputes.41 However, much like the previ-
ously ineffective state laws, voluntary arbitration failed to solve
the disagreements between the unions and railway owners: in
the Arbitration Act’s ten-year lifespan, voluntary arbitration was
34 Id. at 154.
35 Joel I. Seidman, The Yellow Dog Contract, 46 Q.J. ECON. 348, 348 (1932).
36 BELLESILES, supra note 19, at 187–88.
37 Id. at 175.
38 Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The Early
Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 373, 386 (1983).
39 Id. at 380–81.
40 Id. at 382.
41 Id.; Arbitration Act of 1888, Pub. L. No. 64-252, 39 Stat. 721 (1888) (re-
pealed 1898).
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not used once.42 The Arbitration Act’s requirement of impartial
and disinterested mediators, slow-moving bureaucracy, and in-
ability to bring both sides to the table resulted in a wholly inef-
fective piece of legislation, which was quickly replaced.43
The Arbitration Act’s follow-up, the Erdman Act of 1898
(Erdman Act),44 sought to correct the deficiencies of the Arbi-
tration Act.45 The Erdman Act removed the requirement of hav-
ing impartial mediators and established a permanent
commission with the power to prevent strikes and firings during
an investigation.46 With the exception of a single failed attempt
to invoke an arbitration proceeding, the Erdman Act was not
used at all during the first eight years of its existence.47 But this
changed beginning in 1906, and it was invoked in sixty cases
from 1906 to 1913.48 The most important change was perhaps
the ability to appeal arbitration rewards to federal courts.49 Un-
fortunately, the increased use resulted in increased disapproval
of the Erdman Act, as decisions affecting millions of dollars and
thousands of workers were often made by an outside mediator
with little to no knowledge of the industry.50 Eventually, dissatis-
faction with the mediators’ decisions led to both unions and rail-
way leaders refusing to use the Act, and threats of an incoming
strike galvanized Congress to pass yet another version of the
bill.51
The 1913 edition of the legislation, the Newlands Labor Act
(Newlands Act),52 again sought to correct perceived deficiencies
in the previous versions, this time establishing a permanent
three-member board of remediation and conciliation utilizing
mediators from within the industry.53 This version received
more use than previous iterations, handling seventy-one dis-
putes between 1913 and 1917, though it ran into an impasse in
1916 after unions asserted that their demand for an eight-hour
42 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 382.
43 Id. at 383.
44 Erdman Act of 1898, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898) (repealed 1913).
45 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 383.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 383–84.
49 Id. at 385.
50 Id. at 384.
51 Id.
52 Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration Between Carriers and Employees,
ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103 (1913) (repealed 1926).
53 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 384–85.
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workday was not a question suitable for the three-member board
to resolve.54
With the threat of yet another strike mounting, Congress
passed the Adamson Eight-Hour Act of 1916 (Adamson Act),55
which established an eight-hour workday and overtime pay for
railway workers.56 Fervently contested by railway owners, the
Adamson Act was litigated all the way up to the Supreme Court,
and, in 1917, the Supreme Court upheld the ability of Congress
to regulate the workday and overtime compensation for inter-
state railway workers,57 a surprising change of pace for a Court
that had struck down New York’s attempt to limit the amount of
hours worked in a bakery to ten hours a day as unconstitutional
just twelve years prior.58
While the goings-on of the railway industry had largely been
an insular affair, in 1918, the mounting need for a nationally
unified railway entity due to the demands of World War I re-
sulted in the nationalization of the railway industry under the
Railway Administration Act.59 The nationalization of the coun-
try’s railway system would last a few years, until 1920, when the
railways returned to private ownership.60 However, the relative
harmony in which railways operated for the years of nationaliza-
tion signaled that improvements still could be made to the Newl-
ands Act, and as a result, Congress passed yet another version,
the Transportation Act of 1920 (Transportation Act).61
The Transportation Act, however, largely regressed from the
improvements made in previous iterations, with both labor un-
ions and railway executives seeking to replace the legislation.62
The Transportation Act mandated use of arbitration proceed-
ings, but the decisions were ultimately toothless because they
were not legally enforceable.63 However, contrary to prior laws,
the Transportation Act was widely used, and the newly estab-
lished board was inundated with nearly 14,000 cases over its five-
54 Id. at 385.
55 Adamson Eight-Hour Act, Pub. L. No, 64-252, 39 Stat. 721 (1916) (current
version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 28301–02).
56 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 385.
57 Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 359 (1917).
58 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 63–64 (1905).
59 Railway Administration Act, Pub. L. No. 65-107, 40 Stat. 451 (1918) (re-
pealed 1920); Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 385.
60 Id.
61 Id.; Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 66-152, 41 Stat. 456 (1920).
62 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 386.
63 Id. at 385.
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year lifespan.64 The dissatisfaction from both railway owners and
union officials led the parties to begin drafting their own ver-
sion of the law, which was then proposed to Congress.65 That
version was ultimately passed in 1926 as the RLA.66
The RLA, further amended in 1934 to fix some deficiencies
and again in 1936 to include the airline industry within the Act’s
purview, remains the governing law over labor relations in both
the railway and airline industries to this day.67 The RLA governs
the handling of disputes within the industries, utilizing a single
organization, the National Railroad Adjustment Board
(Board).68 As a result of comprehensive negotiations, the RLA
contains significant concessions for both sides: labor unions
largely gave up their ability to strike without first going through
the Board, but gained the ability to sue employers in federal
court for violations of the RLA.69 The ability to bring suits for
violation of the RLA on their own volition distinguishes railway
and airline workers from most other employees in the country,
who are subject to the NLRA of 1935, which gives the National
Labor Relations Board exclusive standing to sue.70 This right is a
direct result of the long-fought history of railway workers in the
early stages of an industrializing United States.
While the 1934 amendments sought to correct several defi-
ciencies of the original Act, the 1936 amendments were added
to extend the Act to the fledgling airline industry.71 The RLA
was extended to the airline industry for a myriad of reasons: sim-
ilar to the railway industry, the airline industry dealt with inter-
64 Id.
65 Id. at 386.
66 Id.; Railway Administration Act, Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (cur-
rent version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–88).
67 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 386.
68 Id. at 387.
69 Id. at 387–88.
70 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
The term “employer” includes any person acting as an agent of an
employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United
States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Fed-
eral Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or
any person subject to the Railway Labor Act as amended from time to
time, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an em-
ployer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such
labor organization.
Id. (emphasis added).
71 A. J. Harper II, Major Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act, 35 J. AIR L. & COM.
3, 3 (1969).
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state commerce, making it ripe for federal legislation, and the
airline industry had an immediate need for thorough and effec-
tive regulations, which the RLA could provide.72 By doing so, it
established uniformity between the industries.73 Additionally, by
1936, nearly every other facet of the airline industry was subject
to close regulation, and there was no compelling reason to ex-
clude labor from the norm.74 However, while the RLA undoubt-
edly provided a much-needed framework at the industry’s
emergence, the airline industry has continued to be burdened
by a system that was not designed with its needs in mind.75 As
will be discussed in Part IV.A, the modern needs of the airline
industry have only exacerbated its growing pains within the
framework of the RLA, and either an amendment to existing
federal frameworks or a new statute is required to adequately
respond to the current landscape.
C. NON-UNION LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS: THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE LOCHNER ERA
While the development of the RLA was largely a fifty-year pro-
cess of iterative legislation insulated from other labor develop-
ments in the United States, the modern rights of both railway
and airline workers are further enmeshed in a broader net of
protections, combining the RLA, Supreme Court precedent,
and other federal legislation such as the FLSA of 1938.
Around the same time that the Supreme Court upheld the
Adamson Act in 1917, limiting the working day of railway em-
ployees to eight hours, the Court had been consistently striking
down other extensions of protections to workers.76 Dubbed the
“Lochner era” after the Court’s ruling in Lochner v. New York
(striking down a state law limiting the working day to ten
hours), the Court’s decisions in this era were characterized by a
laissez-faire approach to the labor market.77 Strictly protecting
the principle that individuals were free to enter into contracts of
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 James B. Frankel, Judicial and Regulatory Decisions, 18 J. AIR L. & COM. 461,
461–62 (1951).
75 Id. at 477–79.
76 See supra Part II.
77 Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 15–17 (1991).
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their choice, the Lochner Court rejected the idea of a “paternal
government” interfering with the liberty of contract.78
However, the Lochner era began on shaky ground, as it was not
fully supported by precedent, and it would be a mere three de-
cades before the Lochner jurisprudence fully collapsed in 1937.79
The laissez-faire principles undergirding the Lochner era stood at
odds with an earlier ruling in Holden v. Hardy, which upheld reg-
ulations preventing individuals from contracting in ways that
harmed themselves.80 In fact, it would only be twelve years
before Lochner’s specific holding regarding the validity of maxi-
mum hours legislation would be overruled, though the perni-
cious logic behind its reasoning would persist.81 In Bunting v.
Oregon, the Court upheld a state law limiting the working day to
ten hours and providing time-and-a-half overtime for hours
worked past the limit, overruling the particular holding in
Lochner.82
Despite Bunting overturning Lochner, the era would continue
with some of its most notorious decisions in the years to come.
Just a year after Bunting, the Court struck down a federal law
prohibiting the sale of products made by child labor in inter-
state commerce in Hammer v. Dagenhart.83 The decision in Adkins
v. Children’s Hospital soon followed, where the Court struck
down another federal law providing protections for workers, this
time mandating a minimum wage for female employees in the
District of Columbia.84 Grasping at straws to distinguish the deci-
sion from that of Bunting, the Court focused on the difference
between laws regulating wages and those regulating hours as suf-
ficient grounds to differentiate it from Bunting.85 The Lochner
era’s tenuous grasp of logic would soon lead to its downfall, and
the overruling of Adkins sounded the death knell of the era. In
1937, the Court heard yet another case regarding the minimum
wage, and in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the Court struck the
killing blow to the Lochner jurisprudence and upheld a mini-
mum wage.86
78 Id. at 9.
79 Id. at 52.
80 Id. at 19.
81 Id. at 19–20.
82 Id. at 19–20, 19 n.78; Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 439 (1917).
83 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918).
84 Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 560–61 (1923).
85 Id. at 550–51.
86 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
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With the looming threat of the Court striking down labor reg-
ulations finally over, hardly a year elapsed between the fall of
the Lochner era and the passage of a comprehensive set of fed-
eral labor regulations. The FLSA established a national base
level minimum wage, prohibited the employment of children,
capped the work week at forty-four hours, and provided time-
and-a-half overtime pay on work past the cap—a monumental
expansion of worker protections, and one that President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt characterized as the most important piece of
New Deal legislation next to the Social Security Act.87 The FLSA
would be challenged shortly after on the grounds that it could
not proscribe child labor given the precedent of Hammer v.
Dagenhart, and the Supreme Court was given a chance to strike
down the FLSA. However, in United States v. Darby Lumber Co.,
the Court unanimously upheld the FLSA, abolishing the last ves-
tiges of the Lochner era and overturning Hammer.88 While the
FLSA has been amended many times since its passage, the core
of the legislation nonetheless persists as the national bare mini-
mum of worker rights and protections for employees engaged in
interstate commerce.
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Bolstered by both the RLA and the FLSA, in addition to appli-
cable state and local laws, it would seem at first glance that air-
line workers must be some of the most protected workers in the
country. While airline workers benefit in some areas from the
years of collective labor bargaining that led to the passing of the
RLA, the RLA was written with railway workers in mind, and it
continues to be a poor fit for the airline industry. For employees
in the airline industry, the multi-jurisdictional nature of their
work, combined with conflicting state and local laws and the
lack of a uniform federal standard to preempt such laws, sub-
jects airline workers to a confusing thicket of inconsistent laws
that can obfuscate their rights.
87 Howard D. Samuel, Troubled Passage: The Labor Movement and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, MONTHLY LAB. REV. Dec. 2000, at 32, 32, 36; see also Jared Bernstein
& Ross Eisenbrey, Eliminating the Right to Overtime Pay, ECON. POL’Y INST. (June 25,
2003), https://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_flsa_jun03/ [https://
perma.cc/V49R-7LTK].
88 United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941).
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At odds with the age-old legal maxim of ubi jus ubi remedium
(where there is a right, there is a remedy),89 there can be no
remedy if a worker does not know that she has that right to be-
gin with. Especially given the fact that federal legislation like the
RLA or FLSA merely sets out the bare minimum protections
that are often exceeded by state and local laws like California’s
wage and hour law90 or Washington’s Paid Sick Leave Act
(PSLA),91 an airline worker uncertain of her rights may in fact
end up with fewer protections than a worker who never leaves
the city or state and is certain of her rights.
A. THE BARREN FIELD: A LACK OF CLEAR FEDERAL PREEMPTION
A critical issue for a worker in determining her rights is the
lack of clarity on what laws apply when and the overall absence
of unambiguous federal protections. On the whole for workers
outside of the airline industry, the lack of federal preemptive
standards tends to benefit workers given the bare minimum
standards presented in the federal statutes and the additional
protections workers receive through more comprehensive state
and local laws. Many states have passed higher wage and hour
rates than the FLSA base level, with twenty-nine states (plus
Washington, D.C., Guam, and the Virgin Islands) exceeding the
federal minimum wage.92 The ability of states to pass higher
standards was clearly an intentional feature of the FLSA and is
laid out in § 218(a) of the Act. Colloquially referred to as the
“savings clause,” the FLSA states that “[n]o provision of this Act
or of any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with
any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance” establishing a
higher minimum wage or shorter maximum work week.93 As has
been held by the Third Circuit, “the statute’s plain language
evinces a clear intent to preserve rather than supplant state law.”94
The savings clause allows states and local municipalities to ex-
89 Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Ap-
proach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67, 71, 78 n.47 (2001).
90 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11090 (2020).
91 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.46.210 (West 2020).
92 See Consolidated Minimum Wage Table, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.: WAGE & HOUR DIV.
(Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/mw-consolidated [https://
perma.cc/5YX7-RP4X].
93 29 U.S.C. § 218(a).
94 Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 675 F.3d 249, 262 (3d Cir. 2012) (emphasis ad-
ded); see also Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 614 F.3d 427, 430 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“According to § 218(a), . . . state law supersedes the collective bargaining
agreement.”).
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tend greater protections to workers in their jurisdiction than
would otherwise be available through the FLSA.
Though the RLA does not have a corollary to the savings
clause, the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that RLA
preemption “extends only as far as necessary to protect the role
of labor arbitration in resolving [collective bargaining agree-
ment] disputes.”95 In line with this precedent, the RLA only
preempts state law when a state law claim arises entirely from or
requires construction of a collective bargaining agreement.96 As
such, the RLA does not preempt state law claims to enforce
rights independent of a collective bargaining agreement, such
as minimum labor standards.97
Since neither the FLSA nor the RLA preempt state law in the
vast majority of circumstances, this would ordinarily simplify the
analysis—a worker is subject to the standards in the RLA or
FLSA, then any standards in the state or municipality of her job
that exceed the federal baseline. However, this analysis is con-
founded when an employee does work in multiple jurisdictions,
such as an employee who spends most of her time working in
Dallas, Texas, but who attends a trade conference in Los Ange-
les, California. In that scenario, the labor laws of both Dallas
and Texas would apply to the worker as she does her work in
Dallas, but when she arrives in Los Angeles, she becomes subject
to the laws and protections of California and local laws of Los
Angeles. As the Supreme Court has held, “[a] basic principle of
federalism is that each state may make its own reasoned judg-
ment about what conduct is permitted or proscribed within its
borders.”98 This principle was upheld in Sullivan v. Oracle, where
the California Supreme Court held that the California Labor
Code’s overtime protections applied to work performed in Cali-
fornia by out-of-state plaintiffs on short-term trips.99
However, dealing with airline employees who can potentially
cross hundreds of state borders in each pay period pushes this
scenario to its logical extreme, with potentially multiple differ-
ent and conflicting labor standards applying to employees
95 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 913–14 (9th Cir. 2018) (en
banc), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1445 (2019); see also Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris,
512 U.S. 246, 262–64 (1994); Lingle v. Norge Div. Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,
413 (1988).
96 Matson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 840 F.3d 1126, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2016).
97 Norris, 512 U.S. at 256.
98 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003).
99 Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 241 (Cal. 2011).
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within a span of minutes. This issue is only confounded further
by states that then assert extraterritorial jurisdiction to apply
their wage and hours laws to workers who are neither residents
of the state nor employees of a resident employer. The RLA’s
inability to deal with this problem through federal preemption
only furthers the need to divorce the airline industry from this
outdated and ill-fitting piece of legislation.
B. THE STICKY HAND: EXTRATERRITORIAL ASSERTION OF STATE
WAGE AND HOURS LAWS
Some states have begun to apply their wage and hour statutes
to employees who live or work outside of the state’s jurisdiction.
Unlike the FLSA, which expressly limits its application to work
performed within the United States and its territories,100 many
state wage and hour statutes hold no such geographic limita-
tions. There have been four categories of these laws being ap-
plied extraterritorially to: (1) “out-of-state employees working
in-state for resident employers”; (2) “out-of-state employees
working out-of-state for resident employers”; (3) “resident em-
ployees working in-state for out-of-state employers”; and (4) “res-
ident employees working out-of-state for resident employers.”101
First, in terms of laws being applied extraterritorially to out-of-
state employees working in-state for resident employers, Califor-
nia,102 Illinois,103 and Massachusetts104 have extended their pro-
tections to all instances of work performed in the state,
100 29 U.S.C. § 213(f).
Employment in foreign countries and certain United States territo-
ries: The provisions of sections 206, 207, 211, and 212 of this title
shall not apply with respect to any employee whose services during
the workweek are performed in a workplace within a foreign coun-
try or within territory under the jurisdiction of the United States
other than the following: a State of the United States; the District of
Columbia; Puerto Rico; the Virgin Islands; outer Continental Shelf
lands defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act . . . ; Ameri-
can Samoa; Guam; Wake Island; Eniwetok Atoll; Kwajalein Atoll;
and Johnston Island.
Id.
101 Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Extraterritorial Application of State Wage
and Hours Laws, 29 A.L.R. 7th, art. 7 (2017).
102 Maez v. Chevron Texaco Corp., No. C 04-00790 JSW, 2005 WL 1656908, at
*2, *8–9 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2005) (rejecting Defendant’s argument that Califor-
nia law was inapplicable); Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 243 (Cal. 2011).
103 Adams v. Catrambone, 359 F.3d 858, 863 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying Illinois
law).
104 Dow v. Casale, 989 N.E.2d 909, 913 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013).
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regardless of the resident status of the employee. Second, for
out-of-state employees working out-of-state for resident employ-
ers, Kansas,105 Kentucky,106 and Washington107 have held that
their state wage and hour statutes may apply to protect employ-
ees who may never have even set foot in the state as long as their
employer was based in that state. Third, instances of resident
employees working in-state for out-of-state employers and hav-
ing access to the wage and labor laws of the state have been
found in some capacity in Connecticut,108 Delaware,109 and
Massachusetts.110
The fourth category, and perhaps the most relevant category
for workers within the airline industry, deals with the extraterri-
torial assertion of wage and labor laws for resident employees
working out-of-state for a resident employer. So far, Califor-
nia,111 New York,112 Pennsylvania,113 and Washington114 have ex-
tended such rights in some capacity. Bernstein, out of the
Northern District of California, dealt precisely with the issue of
whether flight attendants, who are based in California but spend
only about a quarter of their time in the state, have access to the
broad protections provided by California’s wage and labor
laws.115 The court held that the workers fell under the protec-
105 Harlow v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 574 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1226–27 (D. Kan.
2008) (applying Kansas law).
106 Himmelheber v. ev3, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-593-H, 2008 WL 360694, at *11
(W.D. Ky. Feb. 8, 2008) (applying Kentucky law).
107 Woods v. Mitchell Bros. Truck Line, Inc., No. 3304-6-II, 2008 WL 496803, at
*2 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2008).
108 Goldberg v. Goodwill Indus., No. CV054009642, 2006 WL 224124, at
*14–15 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2006).
109 Redick v. E Mortg. Mgmt., LLC, No. 11-1260-GMS-CJB, 2013 WL 1089710,
at *1–2, *41–42 (D. Del. Mar. 15, 2013).
110 Taylor v. E. Connection Operating, Inc., 988 N.E.2d 408, 409 (Mass. 2013).
111 Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 3d 1049, at 1055–56, 1063–64
(N.D. Cal. 2017) (applying California law); Tidewater Marine W., Inc. v. Brad-
shaw, 927 P.2d 296, 309 (Cal. 1996).
112 Heng Guo Jin v. Han Sung Sikpoom Trading Corp., No. 13-CV-6789 CBA
LB, 2015 WL 5567073, at *25–26 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2015) (denying summary
judgment on Defendant’s extraterritoriality argument because “[n]either party
has briefed the choice of law analysis”).
113 Truman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., No. 07-01702, 2009 WL
2015126, at *10–11 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2009) (noting that “[n]othing within the
language of the statute implies that work performed in a foreign country by a
Pennsylvania resident does not deserve the same protections as work performed
within Pennsylvania by the same resident and for the same company”).
114 Bostain v. Food Exp., Inc., 153 P.3d 846, 858 (Wash. 2007); Miller v. Farmer
Bros. Co., 150 P.3d 598, 606 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
115 Bernstein, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 1060.
554 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [85
tion of California’s laws and rejected the idea that “job situs [is]
the dispositive factor to determine whether California’s wage
and hour laws apply.”116 This view, read in conjunction with the
California Supreme Court precedent coming out of Sullivan v.
Oracle, covers both those who are based in the state but perform
the majority of their work outside the state, and those based
outside the state who perform some work within the state.117
The holdings in Bernstein and Sullivan were reinforced in
Goldthorpe v. Cathay, which dealt with pilots who were based in
California but spent the majority of their time either in federal
airspace or outside the country.118 The court held that the pilots
were still under the protection of California’s wage and hours
laws, reasoning that there was:
no categorical rule that California’s wage and hour protections
can only apply if most of an employee’s work is performed within
the state, and the presumption against extraterritorial applica-
tion does not prevent the application of California wage and
hour law to transportation workers based in California who travel
interstate. Absent such a categorical rule, and absent the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application, it is difficult to
think of a reason why California law should not apply in this situ-
ation. After all, California’s wage and hour laws . . . were de-
signed to protect workers, and to prevent employers from
exploiting their bargaining advantage by denying workers fair
wages and tolerable working conditions. Courts must construe
these laws “with an eye towards the purposes [they] were meant
to serve, and the type of person they were meant to protect.”119
While this bodes well for airline workers who live or frequently
work in California, what of airline workers across the country?
For airline workers in Washington, the question is much more
complicated, and they only receive the benefits of Washington’s
PSLA if they are a “Washington-based” employee.120 This is an
ad hoc determination and considers a multitude of factors such
as: (1) where the employment agreement was made; (2) the em-
ployee’s domicile; (3) the location of the employer’s base of op-
erations; (4) the location of the employee’s base of operations;
116 Id. at 1059–60.
117 Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 243 (Cal. 2011).
118 Goldthorpe v. Cathay Pac. Airways, 279 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1005 (S.D. Cal.
2018).
119 Id. at 1004–05 (internal citations omitted).
120 Air Transp. Ass’n Am. v. Wash. Dep’t Lab. & Indus., 410 F. Supp. 3d 1162,
1168 (W.D. Wash. 2019).
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(5) whether the employer maintains a work site in Washington;
(6) whether the employee leaves Washington as part of the job;
(7) where work assignments come from; (8) where supervisors
are located; (9) the amount of work done in Washington; and
(10) the length of the contract to work in Washington.121
Though Washington is willing to give less weight to certain fac-
tors depending on the circumstances, e.g., “[f]or flight crew,
who do not spend very much time working in any one place,
[Washington Department of Labor & Industries] has indicated
that location of work is given less weight,” even a seemingly dis-
positive factor like being domiciled at a Washington airport
would not be enough to grant flight crew protections under the
law without satisfying other factors.122 Given the relative strin-
gency of Washington’s determination for granting protections
compared to the leniency of California’s, it does not take much
to imagine a scenario in which an airline worker whose base of
operations is out of a Washington airport and who is a resident
of Washington, but whose employer is based out of California
and who frequently travels to California as a result, receives
much greater protections under California labor laws than those
of her own home state of Washington.
Thus arises the problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction—
though California is seeking to increase the rights and protec-
tions of workers, the thought that an out-of-state domiciled and
working employee would have greater protections in California
than in her home state runs contrary to common sense. And a
right without the knowledge that one has it is hardly a right at
all.
Additionally, this confusion harms employers as well as em-
ployees. While employees may not know their rights, the only
thing they lose for that ignorance is their ability to exercise the
right. However, the stakes are much higher for airline corpora-
tions, who can rack up massive civil liability to their employees if
found to have violated provisions of either the FLSA or state
law.123 In the case of Bernstein, Virgin Airlines racked up over
$85 million in backpay and civil and statutory liabilities.124 Em-
ployers are stuck wading through the murk to try to figure out
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 E.g., John Petrick, Virgin America Calls Bid for $85M in Wage Case ‘Excessive’,
LAW360 (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1102248 [https://
perma.cc/7SZM-6PN7].
124 Id.
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which laws are applicable to their employees, which quickly be-
comes a Sisyphean task as their workers may work in any num-
ber of states in a single pay cycle. The only recourse airlines have
against potential wage and hour violations would be to adopt
the highest standard of all the jurisdictions where they do busi-
ness, which could become a financially ruinous undertaking.
C. THE COVERAGE GAP: INADEQUACIES IN THE FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ACT
At approximately 9:00 a.m. on June 30, 1956, United Airlines
Flight 718 and Trans World Airlines Flight 2, both regularly
scheduled passenger flights to the Midwest, took off from Los
Angeles International Airport.125 A mere hour and a half later,
the two planes collided over the Grand Canyon, destroying both
aircraft and resulting in the deaths of all passengers and crew,
with 128 lives lost.126 Both pilots followed the existing protocol
and reported to communication stations that they would be fly-
ing over the Grand Canyon at the same altitude at the same
time, but the flight controller with that information was under
no obligation to inform the pilots of their impending crash
course.127 In the pre-FAA world, it was the responsibility of the
pilots alone to keep clear of other aircraft.128 This crash went
down in history as the deadliest commercial aviation collision at
the time and marked the first instance of a commercial airline
collision resulting in more than 100 deaths.129 However, the
deaths were not completely in vain, as public outrage over the
outdated and ineffective air traffic control system that resulted
in the crash would galvanize the creation of the Federal Aviation
Agency (later known as the FAA).130
125 NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., REP. NO. SA-320/1-0090 MIDAIR COLLISION, ACCI-
DENT INVESTIGATION REPORT, TRANS WORLD AIRLINES LOCKHEED 1049A N6902C
AND UNITED AIR LINES DOUGLAS DC-7 N6324C, OVER THE GRAND CANYON, ARI-
ZONA, JUNE 30, 1956, ¶¶ 2, 7 (1957), https://www.fss.aero/accident-reports/
look.php?report_key=1251 [https://perma.cc/L3DP-QTAL].
126 Id. ¶ 1.




129 Grand Canyon Collision Declared a National Historic Landmark, GRAND CANYON
VISITOR CTR. (May 1, 2014), https://explorethecanyon.com/grand-canyon-colli-
sion-declared-a-national-historic-landmark/ [https://perma.cc/ZMV3-59HN].
130 Id.
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Just two years after the 1956 Grand Canyon collision, Presi-
dent Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 (FAAct) into law.131 The FAAct’s purpose was to regulate
the safety and efficiency of the airways, providing a comprehen-
sive series of regulations that covered most aspects of the airline
industry.132 The agency would later become known as the FAA
when it was consolidated into the Department of Transportation
(DoT) in 1967, and the FAA continues to be the governing body
for commercial airline regulation and standards.133
The field of airline safety was uniquely ripe for federal regula-
tion because air travel takes place almost entirely within federal
jurisdiction, requires more coordination than any other form of
public transportation, and poses the largest risk to safety when
done carelessly.134 “Regulation on a national basis is required
because air transportation [itself] is a national operation.”135 As
the court in Montalvo held, “[t]he FAA, together with federal air
safety regulations, establish complete and thorough safety stan-
dards for interstate and international air transportation that are
not subject to supplementation by, or variation among,
states.”136 In other words, the FAA is used to preempt the entire
field of aviation safety—“[f]ield preemption occurs if federal law
‘thoroughly occupies’ the ‘legislative field’ in question, i.e., the
field of aviation safety. . . . Such a purpose properly may be in-
ferred . . . where the federal interest in the field is sufficiently
dominant.”137 The Third Circuit succinctly summarized it as fol-
lows: “[F]ederal law establishes the applicable standards of care
in the field of air safety, generally, thus preempting the entire
field from state and territorial regulation.”138 Despite the FAA’s
broad authority in the field of air safety, the administration is
entirely silent on the issue of wage and labor laws for employees
within its industry.
131 A Brief History of the FAA, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.
faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/#birth [https://perma.cc/9QAN-7B9V].
132 Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-726, pmbl., 72 Stat. 731, 731 (1958).
133 A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 131.
134 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 473 (9th Cir. 2007).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 474.
137 Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 1999).
138 Id.
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IV. THE NEED FOR REFORM IN AIRLINE LABOR
LEGISLATION
In an industry where nearly every facet is now closely regu-
lated on a federal level, the thicket of conflicting and confusing
law surrounding airline labor rights is truly an anomaly. This
Comment proposes adding federal legislation that would ex-
pressly preempt state wage and hour laws. The current system
fits poorly within the RLA, causes needless litigation, and obfus-
cates the rights of workers. A uniform legislative framework will
better provide for the needs of workers, increase the overall
safety of the industry, and minimize litigation between workers
and airlines over disagreements about pay and rights.
A. TAKING THE TRAINING WHEELS OFF: THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
HAS OUTGROWN THE RLA
Though the RLA may have provided a useful legal framework
for the airline industry in the 1930s, changes in society, new
technological advancements, and the growth of the industry as a
whole have evinced a need for an updated legal framework tai-
lored to the needs of the airline industry. Two critical factors
interfere with the RLA’s ability to serve the needs of the airline
industry: its bespoke past and its age.
Not only have there been massive changes to the industry in
the interim, but the 1936 amendment to the RLA bundled the
rights of airline workers into an act “designed by and for the
railroad industry.”139 As discussed in Part II, the RLA was the
particular product of half a century of railway strikes, negotia-
tions between railway unions and owners, and legislative at-
tempts to balance the interests of the parties, and the final draft
of the RLA itself was written by the railway unions and owners
together.140 The unique past of the RLA makes it especially un-
suitable for application to a new industry, and whether it actu-
ally provided a benefit to the nascent aviation field is subject to
some controversy, as other transportation industries developed
labor protections without the need of specialized treatment like
the railroad industry.141 Because the RLA was drafted to deal
with the specific intricacies of railway labor relations, it contains
several oddities that were the result of concessions made in ne-
139 James B. Frankel, Airline Labor Policy: The Stepchild of the Railway Labor Act, 18
J. AIR L. & COM. 461, 461 (1951).
140 Id. at 466–67.
141 Id. at 471.
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gotiations between unions and owners. For example, as early as
1952, commentators were concerned with the RLA’s inapplica-
bility to a fledgling industry:
the lack of a remedial forum for both employees and employers
that can expertly administer the relationships intended by the
[RLA] and both interpret and enforce its provisions is a basic
weakness. . . . Such a framework would not seem to be conducive
to the development of the most sensible labor-management rela-
tions in a new and growing industry, however satisfactory in the
more stabilized railroad industry.142
Second, not only was the RLA drafted to deal specifically with
the railway industry, but it was drafted close to a century ago
with few amendments. The airline industry of the modern-day
shares little in common with its predecessor in 1936—it has
faced changing levels of regulation and deregulation, has en-
countered technological developments, and has struggled to
deal with bankruptcies and mergers.143 In addition, the impact
of the September 11th terror attacks permanently changed the
landscape of the airline industry, with air carriers being forced
to shoulder many of the costs of compliance with increased
safety regulations.144 These changes have reached the critical
point where “the RLA is no longer adequate to ensure protec-
tion for airline employees.”145
This is not a problem that is necessarily unique to the RLA—
the need to respond to changes in the rapidly evolving aviation
field spurred the Montreal Convention of 1999 (Montreal Con-
vention). With striking similarities to the need to replace the
outdated RLA and standardize labor rights for workers through-
out the country, the Montreal Convention supplanted the out-
dated Warsaw Convention of 1929 (Warsaw Convention) and
standardized the field of airline liability on international
flights.146 The Montreal Convention was an acknowledgement
that the concerns that faced the start of the airline industry in
the early twentieth century—at the Warsaw Convention, the
142 Malcolm A. Macintyre, The Railway Labor Act—A Misfit for The Airlines, 19 J.
AIR L. & COM. 274, 288 (1952).
143 Lisa Catherine Tulk, The 1926 Railway Labor Act and the Modern American
Airline Industry: Changes and Chaos Outline the Need for Revised Legislation, 69 J. AIR
L. & COM. 615, 627 (2004).
144 Id. at 628.
145 Id. at 645.
146 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air preamble, opened for signature May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. 13038, 2242 U.N.T.S.
309.
560 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [85
concern was limiting liability in order to foster growth of the
nascent industry147—were not the same concerns that faced the
present industry. For many of the same reasons that the RLA
needs to be updated or replaced, calls to ratify the Montreal
Convention over the Warsaw Convention focused on the present
system of fractured and disparate laws depending on the juris-
diction, and the ability of a uniform standard to “simplify, clarify
and expedite the fair resolution of [disputes].”148
And, much like the Warsaw Convention, the RLA’s inadequa-
cies have led to a fractured field of law because there is no unify-
ing authority. The RLA only preempts state law when a state law
claim arises entirely from or requires construction of a collective
bargaining agreement.149 As such, the RLA does not preempt
state law claims to enforce rights independent of a collective
bargaining agreement, such as minimum wage standards or sick
leave.150
Nearly a century old, the RLA simply cannot do enough to
support the modern-day aviation industry, and ought to be re-
placed. Part V proposes new legislation that would supplant the
RLA and bring the labor rights of workers in the aviation indus-
try into the twenty-first century.
B. THE INTERSECTION OF LABOR LAWS AND PASSENGER SAFETY:
INCREASED PROTECTIONS FOR AIRLINE WORKERS WILL
DIRECTLY TRANSLATE INTO INCREASED SAFETY
FOR PASSENGERS
The airline industry is uniquely situated as one of the most
closely regulated industries in the country, and the vast majority
of its operations are conducted within federal jurisdiction—the
airspace. Airlines are heavily regulated by the FAA, which was
formed in order to have a single, uniform system for regulating
airline safety after a series of fatal crashes between civilian and
military aircraft.151 The catastrophic impact of mismanaged
flights was the key impetus in forming the FAA, and the Su-
preme Court has characterized FAA regulations as striking “a
delicate balance between the safety and efficiency” of planes in
147 E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 546 (1991).
148 David E. Rapoport & Hans Ephraimson-Abt, A 73-Year Odyssey: The Time Has
Come for a New International Air Liability System, 2002 ISSUES AVIATION L. & POL’Y
22,151, 22,171 (2002).
149 Matson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 840 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2016).
150 Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 256 (1994).
151 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F. 3d 464, 471 (9th Cir. 2007).
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the sky and maintaining protections for persons on the
ground.152 This delicate balance and the interdependence of
the safety of persons in the sky and on the ground justified the
requirement of a “uniform and exclusive system of federal regu-
lation if the congressional objectives underlying the [FAAct] are
to be fulfilled.”153
However, one facet of airline safety has slipped through the
cracks and has not been regulated by the FAA—sick days and
vacation days of airline staff. While perhaps not what immedi-
ately comes to mind when one thinks of airplane safety—consid-
ering devices such as oxygen masks, parachutes, and chairs that
function as floatation devices—pilot fatigue represents “one of
the biggest threats to air safety.”154 Hardly a decade has passed
since the tragic crash of Continental Flight 3407 outside of Buf-
falo, New York in 2009.155 Fatigue was cited as a cause of the
crew’s failure to adequately respond to the rapidly declining
plane, which ended up stalling and plunging into a house—kill-
ing the pilots, flight attendants, all the passengers, and a man on
the ground—resulting in fifty deaths overall.156 While the odds
of a commercial flight crashing are extremely low, “figures show
that 80% are a result of human error, with pilot fatigue account-
ing for 15–20% of human error in fatal accidents.”157 In the ac-
cident report conducted on the crash, the National
Transportation Safety Board compared fatigue impaired per-
formance with alcohol impairment:
[S]leep loss is at least as potent as ethanol in its performance-
impairing effects and two hours of sleep loss equates to a breath
ethanol concentration of approximately .05% . . . correlat[ing]
prolonged wakefulness with impairment, such that being awake
for 16 hours is equivalent to a .05 [blood alcohol content].158
Despite the clear link between crew fatigue and increased risk of
harm, the FAA has not stepped in to guarantee sufficient time
152 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638–39
(1973).
153 Id. at 639.
154 Keith Moore, Pilot Fatigue ‘One of the Biggest Threats to Air Safety’, BBC NEWS





158 NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/AAR-10/01, PB2010-910401, ACCIDENT
REPORT, LOSS OF CONTROL ON APPROACH COLGAN AIR, INC. OPERATING AS CONTI-
NENTAL CONNECTION FLIGHT 3407, at 3 (2009).
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off for airline crews. This leaves states and municipalities to fight
with airline corporations over the amount of leave allowed.
Dispute over Washington’s PSLA centered around this con-
cern.159 In addition to the risk presented by fatigue, the district
court in Washington also considered how the airline’s unforgiv-
ing time-off policies led to the increased spread of germs, as
“flight attendants have attested to working while sick to avoid
acquiring [demerits].”160 This led to “research show[ing] that
flight attendants’ interactions with passengers make them both
the most likely source and recipient of disease on flights.”161
And, in past attempts to alleviate this problem during the 2009
H1N1 “Swine flu” outbreak, the Association of Flight Attendants
(AFA) raised concerns with the FAA and the House Subcommit-
tee on Aviation that airline carriers should be required to “allow
flight attendants with flu-like symptoms themselves to call in sick
without risk of discipline.”162 The AFA turned to seeking federal
intervention due to its concern that “airline management [was]
more concerned with the appearance of flight attendants than
with the health of the public and the flight crew.”163 Without a
definite federal standard to guarantee labor protections for
workers, history has shown that airline carriers will sacrifice the
health of passengers and crew if it benefits their bottom line.
In Washington, though the airlines described being forced to
comply with the PSLA as an unreasonable burden, evidence
from when airlines were first subjected to New York City’s
Earned Sick Time Act (ESTA), which has similar provisions to
the Washington law, showed that “for the first two years after
Virgin began complying with ESTA, cabin crew delays only in-
creased by .16 percentage points, an amount that is almost irrel-
evant compared to the Airlines’ overall delay rates of 15 to 20
percent.”164 With empirics showing that the airlines’ argument
of the unreasonable burden to comply was without merit, the
159 Air Transp. Ass’n Am. v. Washington Dep’t Lab. & Indus., 410 F. Supp. 3d
1162, 1166 (W.D. Wash. 2019).
160 Id. at 1177.
161 Id.
162 Courtney Clegg, The Aviation Industry and the Transmission of Communicable
Disease: The Case of H1N1 Swine Influenza, 75 J. AIR L. & COM. 437, 460–61 (2010)
(citing Aviation Consumer Issues: Emergency Contingency Planning and Outlook for
Summer Travel: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. on Transp.
and Infrastructure, 111th Cong. 22–24 (2009) (statement of Patricia A. Friend, In-
ternational President, AFA)).
163 Id. at 461.
164 Air Transp. Ass’n Am., 410 F. Supp. 3d at 1176.
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court in Washington held that airline workers were under the
protection of its PSLA.165 This same debate rages on in New
York City over the city’s ESTA, as both Delta166 and American
Airlines167 fight against complying with it.
Without federal intervention through legislation, airline carri-
ers have shown they will continue putting the health and safety
of crew, passengers, and people on the ground at risk. Airline
carriers will go to any measure to maximize profits at the cost of
safety with no hesitation. The FAA is primed to combat this type
of profit-over-safety mindset, and a congressional grant of au-
thority to amend Title 49 to include some sort of provision in
line with either Washington’s PSLA or New York’s ESTA would
end the debate over the amount of leave given to workers, in-
crease safety, decrease the spread of germs, and combat the is-
sue of pilot fatigue.
C. NAVIGATING THE MAZE: THE CURRENT THICKET OF
CONFUSING AND CONTRADICTING STATE AND LOCAL
LAW RESULTS IN NEEDLESS LITIGATION COSTS
The litigation in Bernstein is a quintessential example of litiga-
tion as deadweight loss—an economic term describing an ineffi-
cient allocation of resources that results in a cost to society as a
whole.168 That is to say, it is a needless waste of time, money, and
judicial economy. Embroiled in a multi-year class action wage
lawsuit with its former flight attendants for failure to pay for all
hours worked, overtime or provide accurate wage statements,
and waiting time penalties to discharged employees, Virgin Air-
lines (Virgin) continued to rack up costs as it (1) paid its own
legal fees; (2) was sanctioned to pay the legal fees of the class
action plaintiffs as a result of its misconduct in discovery;169 and,
ultimately, (3) paid approximately $77 million to members of
the class—nearly double from the starting amount of $45.4 mil-
165 Id. at 1177.
166 Linda Cheim, NYC Insists Paid Sick Leave Law Doesn’t Harm Delta, LAW360
(May 1, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1269513 [https://perma.cc/
K9NF-NGKZ].
167 Reenat Sinay, American Airlines Challenges NYC Paid Sick Leave Law, LAW360
(Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1184444/american-airlines-
challenges-nyc-paid-sick-leave-law [https://perma.cc/Z7WH-9KFQ].
168 Alicia Tuovila, Deadweight Loss, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 24, 2019), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/d/deadweightloss.asp [https://perma.cc/4D4V-
W9P5].
169 Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc., No. 15-cv-02277-JST, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
201712, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2018).
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lion in damages and restitution for wage and hour violations as a
result of civil and statutory penalties.170 And while these costs
were mostly avoidable—namely, if Virgin had paid its employees
legally, or at the least complied in the discovery process—Virgin
ultimately will not be the party responsible for paying the fees,
as that cost gets passed on to society through increased costs to
consumers.
While it is certainly plausible that Virgin was genuinely mis-
taken as to the correct amount to pay its flight attendants who
worked in California as a result of the thicket of overlapping and
conflicting law discussed in Part III.B, that does not excuse the
bad faith dealing the business engaged in over the course of the
lawsuit. However, in a world with a clear, uniform, federally pre-
emptive statute instead of the hodgepodge of state regulations,
this lawsuit may have not existed at all. Virgin is far from the first
corporation embroiled in a suit like this, however—wage and
hour class action suits are an increasingly common tool for low
wage employees to fight back against predatory employers and
are by far the most common type of class action claim filed in
federal court.171 In 2017, employers paid out over $1.2 billion in
wage and hour lawsuits,172 and while Virgin’s $77 million judg-
ment may seem like a paltry amount in comparison to the total,
it represents nearly one-fifteenth of the total amount paid out by
all employers across the country that year.
Federally preemptive legislation can be used to stem the in-
creasing tide of wage and hour class action lawsuits. With a clear
and national uniform standard, employers are aware of the ex-
act amount that will be owed to each employee without having
to figure out the different wage and hour calculations for em-
ployees in each state. And, under a clear and uniform standard,
employees know exactly how much they should be earning, al-
lowing them to monitor their income for discrepancies and no-
tify their employer as soon as a discrepancy is noticed, thereby
alleviating the need for massive class-action lawsuits. Increased
information would only serve to benefit both parties, more effi-
170 Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 980, 985, 993 (N.D. Cal.
2019).
171 Daniel V. Dorris, Fair Labor Standards Act Preemption of State Wage-and-Hour
Law Claims, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1251–52 (2009).
172 Wage and Hour Claims: 2018’s Top Litigation Risk For Employers, THATCHER L.
FIRM BLOG (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.thatcherlaw.com/blog/2018/02/wage-
and-hour-claims-2018s-top-litigation-risk-for-employers.shtml [https://perma.cc/
V2MR-X5PY].
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ciently putting wages back in the workers’ pockets to begin with,
saving employers money that would otherwise go to fighting
wage-and-hour class actions, and keeping price lower for con-
sumers as a result.
V. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO TITLE 49
This Comment proposes an amendment to Title 49, which
governs transportation laws, establishes the DoT,173 and is the
current source of the FAA’s authority.174 Given the FAA’s wide
control of all aspects of aviation safety, and the massive safety
implications of labor standards in the industry, as discussed in
Part IV.B, an amendment to Title 49 will solve the current gap
in the FAA’s coverage of safety regulations. Placing labor under
the ambit of Title 49 falls squarely within its policy goal of “as-
signing, maintaining, and enhancing safety and security as the
highest priorities in air commerce.”175 This Comment proposes
adding a new chapter to Title 49 (Transportation), Subtitle VII
(Aviation Programs), Subpart III (Safety). The following pro-
posed amendment is modeled after Washington’s PSLA,176 with
modifications made to align it with the language in Title 49.
Chapter 455—Paid Sick Leave (§§ 45501–45504)
§ 45501. Paid Sick Leave—Every air carrier177 must provide
each of its airmen178 or flight attendants179 paid sick leave as
follows:
173 49 U.S.C. §§ 101–727. Subtitle I of Title 49 establishes the DoT, its goals,
and its duties. Id.
174 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101–50105. Subtitle VII of Title 49 sets out regulations for
the aviation industry. Id.
175 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d)(1).
176 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.46.210 (West 2020).
177 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(2) (defining “air carrier” as “a citizen of the United
States undertaking by any means, directly or indirectly, to provide air
transportation.”).
178 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(8). Title 49 defines “airman” as
an individual—
(A) in command, or as pilot, mechanic, or member of the crew,
who navigates aircraft when under way;
(B) except to the extent the Administrator of the Federal Avia-
tion Administration may provide otherwise for individuals
employed outside the United States, who is directly in
charge of inspecting, maintaining, overhauling, or repairing
aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; or
(C) who serves as an aircraft dispatcher or air traffic control-
tower operator.
Id.
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(a) An airman or flight attendant accrues at least one hour of
paid sick leave for every forty hours worked as an airman
or flight attendant. An air carrier may provide paid sick
leave in advance of accrual provided that such front-load-
ing meets or exceeds the requirements of this section for
accrual, use, and carryover of paid sick leave.
(b) An airman or flight attendant is authorized to use paid
sick leave for the following reasons:
(1) An absence resulting from an airman’s or flight at-
tendant’s mental or physical illness, injury, or health
condition; to accommodate the airman’s or flight at-
tendant’s need for medical diagnosis, care, or treat-
ment of a mental or physical illness, injury, or health
condition; or an airman’s or flight attendant’s need
for preventive medical care;
(2) To allow the airman or flight attendant to provide
care for a family member with a mental or physical
illness, injury, or health condition; care of a family
member who needs medical diagnosis, care, or treat-
ment of a mental or physical illness, injury, or health
condition; or care for a family member who needs
preventive medical care; and
(3) When the airman’s or flight attendant’s place of busi-
ness has been closed by order of a public official for
any health-related reason, or when an airman’s or
flight attendant’s child’s school or place of care has
been closed for such a reason.
(c) An airman or flight attendant is authorized to use paid
sick leave for absences as a result of domestic violence as
defined in Title 34 of the United States Code.180
179 9 U.S.C. § 44728(g) (defining “flight attendant” as “an individual working
as a flight attendant in the cabin of an aircraft that has twenty or more seats and
is being used by an air carrier to provide air transportation.”).
180 See 34 U.S.C. § 12291(a)(8).
The term “domestic violence” includes felony or misdemeanor
crimes of violence committed by a current or former spouse or inti-
mate partner of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares
a child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has
cohabitated with the victim as a spouse or intimate partner, by a
person similarly situated to a spouse of the victim under the domes-
tic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction receiving grant mon-
ies, or by any other person against an adult or youth victim who is
protected from that person’s acts under the domestic or family vio-
lence laws of the jurisdiction.
Id.
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(d) An airman or flight attendant is entitled to use accrued
paid sick leave beginning on the ninetieth calendar day
after the commencement of his or her employment.
(e) Air carriers are not prevented from providing more gen-
erous paid sick leave policies or permitting use of paid
sick leave for additional purposes.
(f) An air carrier may require airmen or flight attendants to
give reasonable notice of an absence from work, so long
as such notice does not interfere with an airman or flight
attendant’s lawful use of paid sick leave.
(g) For absences exceeding three days, an air carrier may re-
quire verification that an airman or flight attendant’s use
of paid sick leave is for an authorized purpose. If an air
carrier requires verification, verification must be pro-
vided to the air carrier within a reasonable time period
during or after the leave. An air carrier’s requirements
for verification may not result in an unreasonable burden
or expense on the airman or flight attendant and may not
exceed privacy or verification requirements otherwise es-
tablished by law.
(h) An air carrier may not require, as a condition of an air-
man or flight attendant taking paid sick leave, that the
airman or flight attendant search for or find a replace-
ment worker to cover the hours during which the airman
or flight attendant is on paid sick leave.
(i) For each hour of paid sick leave used, an airman or flight
attendant must be paid the greater of the minimum
hourly wage rate established in this chapter or his or her
normal hourly compensation. The air carrier is responsi-
ble for providing regular notification to airmen or flight
attendants about the amount of paid sick leave available
to the airman or flight attendant.
(j) Unused paid sick leave carries over to the following year,
except that an air carrier is not required to allow an air-
man or flight attendant to carry over paid sick leave in
excess of forty hours.
(k) This section does not require an air carrier to provide fi-
nancial or other reimbursement for accrued and unused
paid sick leave to any airman or flight attendant upon the
airman or flight attendant’s termination, resignation, re-
tirement, or other separation from employment. When
there is a separation from employment and the airman or
flight attendant is rehired within twelve months of separa-
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tion by the same air carrier, whether at the same or a dif-
ferent business location of the air carrier, previously
accrued unused paid sick leave must be reinstated and
the previous period of employment must be counted for
purposes of determining the airman or flight attendant’s
eligibility to use paid sick leave under subsection
45501(d) of this section.
§ 45502. Family Member Defined—For purposes of this chapter,
“family member” means any of the following:
(a) A child, including a biological, adopted, or foster child,
stepchild, or a child to whom the airman or flight attend-
ant stands in loco parentis, is a legal guardian, or is a de
facto parent, regardless of age or dependency status;
(b) A biological, adoptive, de facto, or foster parent, steppar-
ent, or legal guardian of an airman or flight attendant or
the airman or flight attendant’s spouse or registered do-
mestic partner, or a person who stood in loco parentis
when the airman or flight attendant was a minor child;
(c) A spouse;
(d) A registered domestic partner;
(e) A grandparent;
(f) A grandchild; or
(g) A sibling.
§ 45503. Limitations on Policies—An air carrier may not
adopt or enforce any policy that counts the use of paid sick leave
time as an absence that may lead to or result in discipline
against the airman or flight attendant.
§ 45504. Air Carrier Retaliation—An air carrier may not dis-
criminate or retaliate against an airman or flight attendant for
his or her exercise of any rights under this chapter including the
use of paid sick leave.
VI. CONCLUSION
The lack of a clear and consistent federal standard across the
country harms both airline carriers and aviation employees—
carriers as they grapple with a myriad of regulations and airline
employees who are unsure of their rights and how to exercise
them. There is a clear need for an updated federal framework
that takes into account the airline industry and the needs of
workers in the present day; the RLA served its purpose in stabi-
lizing the nascent airline industry in the 1930s, but the aviation
industry has outgrown its usefulness. To replace the RLA and
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standardize the labor rights of workers in the aviation industry,
this Comment proposes amending Title 49 to include a chapter
on labor. Because of the direct impact of the labor rights of air-
line workers on the safety of the aviation industry, legislation
dealing with these rights falls squarely within the purview of the
FAA. Through the proposed amendment, the aviation industry
will be made safer, workers will receive greater protections, and
the squandering of judicial economy through needless litigation




The subscription price for four issues is $42.00 per year; foreign sub-
scriptions are $49.00 per year.  Regular single issues are available at
$16.50 per copy.  Add 8.25% tax on single issue orders within the
State of Texas.  Tax-exempt institutions must include copy of exemp-
tion certificate with order.  An additional charge will be made for
single issues for postage and handling.
Mail to:
SMU LAW REVIEW
Dedman School of Law
Southern Methodist University
P.O. Box 750116
Dallas, Texas  75275-0116
JOURNAL OF
AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
A Publication of the SMU Law Review Association
Published since 1930, the Journal is the world’s foremost scholarly
publication dealing exclusively with the legal and economic aspects
of aviation and space.  The quarterly Journal is edited and managed
by a student Board of Editors.  Each volume features comprehensive
leading articles; a review of items of current international interest; a
sizable section of student comments, case notes, and recent deci-
sions; book reviews; and a bibliography of current aviation and space
literature.
The Journal also conducts the annual SMU Air Law Symposium.





Domestic $43.00; Foreign $50.00
Address inquiries to:
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Dedman School of Law
Southern Methodist University
P.O. Box 750116
Dallas, Texas  75275-0116
CHANGE OF ADDRESS
Please notify us of any change of name or address:
New Address:
(Name of Firm or Individual)
(City) (State) (Zip Code)
Old Address:*
(Name of Firm or Individual)
(City) (State) (Zip Code)
* Give your old name and address as it appears on the most recent
mailing label.
Complete and mail this form to:
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Dedman School of Law
Southern Methodist University
P.O. Box 750116
Dallas, Texas  75275-0116


